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This thesis locates, introduces and interprets Hans Urs von Balthasar’s short text 
Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics (1974). The text is commended to the 
contemporary reader as a substantial Catholic contribution to the discipline of 
Christian ethics or moral theology. It is particularly interesting in its theological 
treatment of biblical and moral law. 
The first chapter identifies some of the factors pressing on the discipline of Catholic 
moral theology in the decade before Balthasar’s text. First, the 1960s saw the popular 
rejection by clergy and laity of the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology. 
Second, Vatican II instructed theologians to integrate moral and ascetical theology 
and endorsed the emerging ‘Christological shift’ in moral theology. Third, Paul VI 
rejected the official report of the Pontifical Commission on Population, Family and 
Birth (1966) in his 1968 encyclical Humanae vitae. This latter controversy disrupted 
attempts by moral theologians to reach a consensus in their interpretation of the 
council. The chapter also provides an interpretation of the teaching of the council on 
moral theology grounded in detailed exegesis of key conciliar texts. It concludes by 
discussing Josef Fuchs’ influential interpretation of the council which attempts to 
reconcile the Christological shift in moral theology with natural law. Fuchs’ work 
remains an influential interpretation of the council for English language moral 
theologians. 
The second chapter provides the fullest English language account of the formation 
and early years of the International Theological Commission (ITC). The ITC entered 
into the debate regarding the future of Catholic moral theology from its first meeting 
in 1969, culminating in a discussion of moral theology in 1974 for which Balthasar 
prepared his Nine Propositions. From 1972 it is clear that Balthasar diverged from 
the majority view of the ITC regarding the future direction of postconciliar moral 
theology and tabled the Nine Propositions at the 1974 assembly in an unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade the commission to take a different approach. The chapter also 
offers a detailed interpretation of Hegel’s eighteenth century text The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate (SCF) in order to cast light on the structure of Balthasar’s 
argument in the Nine Propositions, including his treatment of law in all its forms.  
The final two chapters offer a detailed interpretation of the Nine Propositions, 
Balthasar’s extended experiment in faith-ethics. These chapters explain the 
unfamiliar format of the text and detail Balthasar’s attempt to fulfil the council’s 
instruction that moral theology should be perfected. They also develop the 
interpretive insights into Balthasar’s argument generated by our close study of 
Hegel’s SCF. Balthasar’s proposal clearly conforms to the council’s desire that the 
Mystery of Christ be placed at the centre of the discipline. His proposal also gives a 
theological account of the fulfilment of Old Testament law in the life of Christ. This 
account challenges any absolutisation of the moral law in contemporary Christian 
ethics and adds significance to Balthasar’s treatment of the divine gift of personhood 
and of individual missions. The thesis concludes by commending Balthasar for his 
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“Catholic moral theology must be above all Christocentric.” 
Bernhard Häring, Road to Relevance (New York: Alba, 1970), p.22, translating 






Balthasar submitted the Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics for discussion at the 
1974 assembly of the Catholic International Theological Commission (ITC). This 
commission was Balthasar’s first high profile appointment as a theologian and he 
played an active role from its formation in 1969. The commission did not adopt the 
Nine Propositions officially in 1974, but allowed it to be published under Balthasar’s 
name on a ‘semi-official’ basis for wider study.
1
 The few reviewers of the text have 
been critical and it has been largely ignored by English language moral theologians.
2
 
This even extends to the main contemporary proponent of Balthasar’s ethical 
thought, Christopher Steck, who excludes the Nine Propositions from his study on 
the basis that it does not make prominent use of Balthasar’s concept of attunement.
3
 
This thesis revises previous assessments of the Nine Propositions by showing that 
Balthasar’s text is a deliberate and sophisticated intervention into the debate 
concerning the future of postconciliar Catholic moral theology. The text was 
composed following a period of considerable instability within the discipline – 
epitomised by the rejection of the official report of the Pontifical Commission on 
Population, Family and Birth (1966) by Paul VI in his 1968 encyclical Humanae 
vitae – and offers an impressive synthesis of Balthasar’s broader theological 
concerns with the preconciliar Christological shift in moral theology and the various 
instructions regarding moral theology in the texts of the Second Vatican Council 
(Vatican II). The text thus provides a window into an important period in the 
development of moral theology.  
As a summary of some of Balthasar’s broader theological concerns the Nine 
Propositions is also highly relevant to discussions about the foundations of the 
discipline of moral theology and Christian ethics. This is particularly the true if one 
is interested in asking how moral concepts such as natural and biblical law, 
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 Michael Sharkey, ed., International Theological Commission: Texts and Documents 1986-2007, 
Vol. 1 (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2009): 108. 
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 Two prominent critics are Dietmar Mieth, “Autonome Moral im christlichen Kontext” Orientierung 
40 (1976): 31-34, and Bruno Schüller, “The debate on the specific character of a Christian ethics: 
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conscience, vocation and virtue might be rooted in the gospel of Jesus Christ. An 
important question, during Vatican II and subsequently, is the response that moral 
theologians offer to the problem of legalism. Balthasar’s text which, contra Steck, 
appears to be quite consistent with his broader theological project, gives an account 
of Christian ethics which does not define itself in opposition to various forms of 
moral law, but argues persuasively that obedience to laws are not the primary means 
by which human persons participate in God’s saving work. Balthasar’s famous 
emphasis on the priority of God’s love for the world is given ethical expression, in 
the Nine Propositions, in the form of Christ’s concrete offering of himself to the 
Father for the sake of the world. In Balthasar’s view, moral theology is to be 
conceived, fundamentally, as the individual’s practical participation, by grace, in the 
universal mission of Christ. 
The first chapter provides a detailed discussion of the discipline of Catholic moral 
theology prior to Balthasar’s Nine Propositions in 1974. The first section rehearses 
some of the basic features of the moral manuals which were particularly influential in 
the first half of the twentieth century and notes the emergence before Vatican II of a 
so-called ‘Christological shift’ in the discipline. The second section then discusses a 
number of key texts from the documents of Vatican II. It is striking that there was not 
much detailed discussion of moral theology at the council, mirrored by a relative 
absence of moral theologians among the bishops and theological advisors. The third 
section then takes up the legacy of the council in moral theology, focusing on the 
influential interpretation of the council by the Jesuit scholar Josef Fuchs. 
The second chapter begins with the fullest account of the formation and early years 
of the ITC presently available in English. We argue that Balthasar is drawn into the 
debate regarding postconciliar moral theology due to his active participation in the 
work of this commission. Balthasar’s first contribution is an experimental argument 
regarding Christian ethics at the end of the first part of Truth is Symphonic (1972). In 
the course of our discussion of this contribution we provide a detailed interpretation 
of an eighteenth century text by Hegel. This provides a way to introduce some of the 
problems regarding the place of law in salvation history which Balthasar addresses. 
The chapter concludes by interpreting a series of three propositions on pluralism in 
moral theology which the ITC agreed in 1972 and two subsequent statements on 
moral theology by commission member Heinz Schürmann and by Pope Paul VI. 
The third and fourth chapters are then dedicated to the detailed interpretation of the 
text of the Nine Propositions. The text of the propositions themselves runs to only a 




thousand. Had the text been accepted by the ITC, it would have served as a kind of 
mini-constitution for postconciliar moral theology and been widely circulated within 
the curia and among theologians. Our interpretation of the text shows that it picks up 
on some of the major theological themes of Balthasar’s Glory of the Lord and Theo-
Drama, particularly the concepts of transportation by faith (“attunement”), person 
and mission. In doing so, Balthasar places the Mystery of Christ at the centre of 
moral theology and argues that ethical truth can only be established in lived existence 
– the dramatic interaction of individual and community – not simply by a legal 
analysis of particular acts or situations. 
We will be very pleased if our discussion of the Nine Propositions results in a 
reassessment of its place in the history of postconciliar Catholic moral theology. 
However, our primary concern is to cast light on the concept of moral law and its 
relationship to the gospel. This is a question close to the heart of any account of 
Christian ethics. We also note, in passing, that the third phase of ecumenical dialogue 
between the Anglican Communion and the Catholic Church is addressing itself to the 
question of ‘right ethical teaching’.
4
 Interpreters of the work of the third Anglican – 
Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC III) may benefit from a better 
understanding of Balthasar’s Nine Propositions and the light that this text can cast on 
the task of moral theology. 
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 ARCIC III, Communiqué from the meeting at Bose [Communiqué], May 2011. Available online at: 
www.anglicancommunion.org/media/105248/ARCIC_III_Bose_2011.pdf  
(Last accessed: 29 December 2015). 
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Chapter 1: Moral theology before the Nine Propositions 
This chapter identifies the main problems facing moral theology in the years prior to 
Balthasar’s Nine Propositions. In this period moral theology is dominated by two 
major events. First, the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology that defined the 
discipline in the early twentieth century were repudiated in practice by clergy and 
laity. Drawing on the English language secondary literature, the first section of this 
chapter identifies some features of these manuals. Second, Vatican II agreed a 
number of texts which make a series of direct and indirect comments on the 
discipline of moral theology. Regrettably, the English language secondary literature 
in Catholic moral theology tends not to engage with the texts of the council in detail. 
For this reason, the second section of this chapter interprets texts from Lumen 
Gentium (LG), Optatam totius (OT) and Gaudium et spes (GS) to support an account 
of the overall teaching of the council on moral theology. Subsequent chapters refer 
back to these texts on a regular basis as they analyse the postconciliar ethical 
proposals of the ITC (chapter two) and of Balthasar (chapters two to four). The final 
section of this chapter then gives an account of the immediate reception of the 
council by interpreting the experimental proposal advanced by Josef Fuchs in 1966. 
The decision to focus on Fuchs is based on his continuing influence in English 
language moral theology, his accessibility to English language readers, and the fact 
that he was at the heart of the postconciliar developments in moral theology. We 
raise a number of questions regarding Fuchs’ ethical proposal. However, his 
influential initial attempt to interpret the council must be acknowledged. 
(i) The neo-Scholastic moral manuals and the “Christological shift” 
The conventional account holds that Catholic moral theology is dominated in the 
early twentieth century by the neo-Scholastic moral manuals. These manuals are then 
repudiated in the middle of the twentieth century.
1
 In recent years, scholars have 
been devoting more attention to the history of moral theology and have raised a 
number of questions regarding this story. These include: Whether it is accurate to 
refer to the moral manuals as “neo-Scholastic”? How complete the hegemony of the 
manuals in the early twentieth century actually is? And the relative influence on the 
moral manuals of twentieth century developments in dogmatic theology (e.g. 
ressourcement), biblical studies, more accurate readings of Aquinas and revisionist 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., Vincent MacNamara, Faith and Ethics: Recent Roman Catholicism (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1985): 9. 
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work by certain moral theologians? These questions do not yet appear to have been 
studied in detail and this section does not address them further. Instead, this section 
draws on some of the existing secondary literature on this period to identify some of 
the fundamental topics of discussion which were inherited by the council fathers at 
Vatican II. The presentation begins with the manual tradition itself before setting it 
alongside an emerging pre-conciliar tradition of Christological revisionism. 
There is no consensus in the secondary literature as to precisely when the moral 
manuals fell out of use in church practice. Some years ago, Raphael Gallagher 
claimed that there was a ‘dramatic and virtually universal collapse of the [moral] 
manual in the 1960s’.
2
 More recently, Gallagher has claimed that Bernhard Häring’s 
The Law of Christ (1954) signals ‘the end of the manual era’.
3
 At the same time 
MacNamara claims that ‘[t]he manual tradition continued through the forties and 
fifties’ and James F. Keenan claims that the neo-Scholastic manuals fell out of use 
‘immediately after the [second world] war’.
4
 All that we can say with any certainty is 
that the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology were widely used in the early 
twentieth century and have been little used since Vatican II. 
There is not a great deal of work available in English on the twentieth century 
manual tradition. The best historical studies that we have been able to locate are by 
MacNamara and Keenan and, even then, the manual tradition is not their primary 
object of study.
5
 MacNamara’s study begins (notionally) in the year 1940 when he 
claims that the moral manuals are still in widespread use. MacNamara presents the 
manuals as a single phenomenon and claims that they are dominated by the concept 
of law. In particular, law is the manualist’s ‘preferred way of referring to morality’ 
                                                          
2
 Raphael Gallagher, “The Fate of the Moral Manual since Saint Alphonsus,” in Enda McDonagh and 
Vincent MacNamara eds. An Irish Reader in Moral Theology: The Legacy of the Last Fifty Years 
Vol. 1: Foundations (Dublin: Columba Press, 2009): 59. Reprinted from Raphael Gallagher and 
Brendan McConvery eds. History and Conscience: Studies in Honour of Father Sean O’Riordan 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1989): 212-239. 
3
 Raphael Gallagher, “Bernhard Häring’s The Law of Christ: Reassessing Its Contribution to the 
Renewal of Moral Theology in Its Era,” Studia Moralia 44.2 (2006): 347. Gallagher claims that there 
is now a broad consensus on this point. 
4
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 14, and James F. Keenan, “Vatican II and Theological Ethics,” 
Theological Studies 74.1 (2013): 164. See also the claim by O’Meara on page 20 below that the 
manuals were still in regular use in 1962. 
5
 MacNamara see note 1 above. James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the 
Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (London/New York: Continuum, 
2010). Studies which might be used to supplement our account include those of Mahoney (1987), 
Gallagher (1990), Pinckaers (1995), Curran (1997, 2008, 2013) and Mealey (2009). Note also that 
MacNamara’s account of the twentieth century movement for ‘renewal’ in moral theology in the 
postconciliar period (in the main text we refer to this movement as ‘revisionist’) appears heavily 
influenced by the summary account provided in Richard A. McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 
1976,” Theological Studies 38.1 (March 1977): 64-65. 
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and they imagine God as ‘the supreme legislator’.
6
 MacNamara also reports that the 
manuals apply ‘to morality all the legal language of the establishment of law, its 
promulgation, its abrogation, dispensation from it, etc.’.
7
 For example, he reports a 
claim from the fifth edition of a manual by Dominicus M. Prümmer to the effect that 




MacNamara develops this account of the manual tradition by identifying a contrast 
between moral theology (the manuals) and ascetical theology. Specifically, 
MacNamara summarises the argument of Prümmer to the effect that the moral 
theology of the manuals is ‘defined in terms of what was essential to remaining in the 
state of grace and reaching eternal life’. So the moral teachings of the manuals set 
out the standards which the Christian is required to meet in order to receive the gift 
of salvation from God. (Or, at least, if the Christian fails to meet these standards he 
should co-operate with the saving work of God by confessing his sin.) Then, in his 
description of ascetical theology, MacNamara notes that the teachings of this 
discipline ‘do not oblige one by virtue of divine will’.
9
 Thus, moral theology is 
concerned with the moral standards willed by God in order that the Christian is able 
to reach his or her supernatural end (salvation) whilst ascetical theology deals with 
questions of ‘perfection’ which are ‘admirable’ but which are not necessary for 
salvation.
10
 Somewhat inconsistently, MacNamara also suggests that ascetic 
instructions are ‘the means by which one more securely acquired eternal life.’
11
 This 
distinction between the disciplines of moral theology (manuals) and ascetical 
theology (perfection) appears to have involved an informal division of the Scriptures. 
Thus moral theologians take up the law of God, largely drawn from the Old 
Testament, whilst ascetical theology treats the ‘counsels of perfection’ found in the 
‘new law …[which] proposes a greater perfection.’
12
 
A final point which we will draw from MacNamara’s study is a debate that appears 
to have been taking place within the manual tradition during the 1940s. According to 
MacNamara, Noldin claims that the ‘obligations to receive the sacraments and to 
believe the truths of faith’ are a Christian supplement to the natural law.
13
 In other 
                                                          
6
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 10 and 11. 
7
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 10. 
8
 Dominicus M. Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis. 5th ed. Vol. 1 (Herder: Freiburg, 1928): 98. 
Cited in MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 11.  
9
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 12. 
10
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 10. 
11
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 10. 
12
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 10 and 12. 
13
 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 12. 
12 
 
words, there are certain moral obligations which arise from faith and not from nature. 
After Vatican II, this is the kind of claim that is typically associated with the so-
called ‘faith-ethics’ [Glaubensethik]. On the other side of the argument, is a report 
from Bruno Schüller that a manual by Franz Hürth and P. M. Abellán maintains the 
complete identity of biblical and natural law and denies that there is any moral 
teaching revealed solely by divine revelation and received by faith.
14
 
The study of the moral manuals by Keenan is more detailed than that by MacNamara 
and identifies some of the ways in which moral theology changes during the early 
twentieth century. Specifically, Keenan argues that the emphasis of the manualists on 
the concept of law increased during the early twentieth century. The origins of the 
manual tradition lie ‘at the end of the late eighteenth century’ and by the end of the 
nineteenth century it was operating as a kind of ‘gentleman’s agreement’ in which 
moral theologians ‘endorsed the schema that the priest and the lay person could 
choose the opinion of whomever they wanted, as long as it was someone from their 
guild, and did not contradict a defined teaching.’
15
 Keenan is interested in the fact 
that there is a greater diversity among the moral teachings of the manualists before 
the mid-twentieth century. Keenan goes on to claim that this diversity gradually 
reduces in the early twentieth century as moral theologians begin to rely ‘more and 
more on ever-emerging ‘teachings’ from Rome.’
16
 
According to Keenan, if a statement is made regarding a question of Christian 
practice by, or on behalf of, the pope then the teaching is said to be ‘defined’. 
Keenan argues that as these defined teachings increase, the role of the moral 
theologian changes. Where in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries he had been a 
member of a ‘guild of arbiters’, the moral theologian is increasingly transformed into 
an interpreter or expositor of the Catholic magisterium.
17
 Keenan fills out this 
account in two ways. First, he notes how the dominant English language manuals in 
the early twentieth century begin to pay greater attention to canon law. For example, 
Keenan reports a comment by the manualist Henry Davis regarding the failure of his 
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 Franz Hürth and P. M. Abellán, De principiis, de virtutibus et praeceptis, Vol. 1 (Rome: 
Gregorianum, 1948): 43, cited in Bruno Schüller, “Autonomous Ethics Revisited” in Joseph A. 
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 Keenan, Catholic Moral Theology, 4, 14 and 30. 
16
 Keenan, Catholic Moral Theology, 13. 
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 Keenan, Catholic Moral Theology, 18. Joseph Ratzinger has contrasted the German experience with 
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O’Grady, “The Ratzinger Round,” The Month Second New Series 6.12 (Dec 1973): 409. 
13 
 
predecessor ‘to incorporate …as much of the codified Canon law as he would have 
wished.’ According to Keenan, Davis promoted his own work, first published in 
1934, on the grounds that ‘a knowledge of Canon law is essential to the student of 
Moral Theology’.
18
 Secondly, Keenan identifies the publication of the Code of 
Canon Law in 1917 as a representative moment in the expansion of papal teaching. 
This event ‘made moral theologians more aware that they were not the only ones 
offering norms for moral conduct’.
19
 Thus it appears that the early twentieth century 
saw a standardisation of the minimum standards being taught in the moral manuals. 
At this point, our analysis moves from the broad outlines of the manual tradition to 
the scholarly discussion that developed regarding the sufficiency of this tradition. In 
the years since MacNamara’s study was completed, further work has been 
undertaken regarding a pre-Vatican II “Christological shift” in moral theology. In 
two recent articles, Keenan and Gallagher agree that the representative text in this 
shift is Häring’s The Law of Christ (1954).
20
 Keenan argues that Häring’s book seals 
the ‘Tillmann-Mersch christological shift’ in moral theology whilst Gallagher argues 
that ‘…[i]t was no longer possible to say that a textbook of Catholic moral theology 
could not be Christ-centred, charity-based and personally-formulated (Thils 
criticisms) after the publication of The Law of Christ.’
21
 Both of these comments 
refer to pre-1954 work on moral theology that was seeking to revise the manual 
tradition.
22
 Gallagher refers to a work by Gustave Thils (1940) and Keenan refers to 
works by Émile Mersch (1936, 1937, 1944) and Fritz Tillmann (1934).
23
  
This new consensus in the secondary literature, namely that there was a preconciliar 
Christological shift in moral theology, would seem to be closely connected to the 
declining use of the moral manuals in the mid-twentieth century. At the very least, 
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 Keenan, Catholic Moral Theology, 18. 
19
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 James Keenan, “Vatican II and Theological Ethics,” 170; Raphael Gallagher, “Bernhard Häring’s 
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 According to Kenneth Melchin the term ‘revisionist’ is first used in David Tracy, Blessed Rage for 
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mystique du Christ: Études de théologie historique (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936); Morale et 
corps mystique (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937); La théologie du corps mystique, 2 Vols. (Paris: 




the Christological shift points to a cluster of questions with which the council fathers 
at Vatican II had to deal. These include: to what extent does Christian ethics flow 
from faith in Jesus Christ and to what extent from moral law (whether biblical or 
natural)? What is the relationship between law and gospel? And what is the basis for 
the difference between ascetical theology, concerned with perfection, and moral 
theology, concerned with right conduct? 
(ii) Vatican II (1962-1965) 
When English language moral theologians discuss the implications of the council for 
Catholic moral theology they tend to focus their attention on a short passage from 
Optatam totius (OT) and excerpts from Gaudium et spes (GS). However, the 
consensus that has recently emerged regarding the preconciliar Christological shift 
suggests that this approach is in need of review. Our analysis begins by discussing 
passages from Lumen Gentium (LG), showing that they make an important 
contribution to the preconciliar questions regarding gospel and law and the 
relationship between ascetical and moral theology. We then go on to develop this 
understanding in our interpretation of the more traditional texts in OT and GS. In the 
course of this section we draw primarily on the recent multi-author five volume 
History of Vatican II, supplemented by Joseph Ratzinger’s contemporary account of 
the council.
24




As an initial orientation, we take Ratzinger’s contemporary account of the first 
period of the council (Autumn 1962) to be uncontroversial. In this first period 
Ratzinger identifies as ‘a real turning point’ the decision by a majority of the council 
fathers to vote against a text ‘On the sources of revelation’.
26
 This was one of around 
seventy texts which were prepared in advance of the council for discussion and 
approval.
27
 According to Ratzinger this vote confirmed that ‘[t]he bishops were no 
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 Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, eds., History of Vatican II: Vol. I-V (Leuven: 
Peeters and Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995-2006) (henceforth “History, Vol. X”); Joseph Ratzinger, 
Theological Highlights of Vatican II (New York/Mahwah: Paulist, 1966). Ratzinger was appointed as 
a peritus at the council. 
25
 Especially Herbert Vorgrimler, ed., Commentary on the documents of Vatican II, Vols. 1-5 (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1967-1969), and René Latourelle, ed., Vatican II: Assessments and 
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longer the same men they had been before the Council. …they had discovered 
themselves as an episcopate, with their own powers and their own collective 
responsibility.’
28
 This account helps to initiate the conventional historical narrative in 
which the conciliar majority found its voice during the first period in opposition to 
previous ‘curial dominance’.
29
 This narrative is taken for granted in the analysis that 
follows. Ratzinger also details some of the practical consequences of the first period 
vote: there was a great reduction in the number of texts being proposed for approval 
by the council and those which remained were subject to substantial revision.
30
 By 
the time of the council’s second period, which opened on 19 September 1963, the 
number of texts proposed had been reduced to sixteen, equal to the number 
ultimately approved by the council.
31
 
(a) Lumen Gentium (LG) 
LG is one of the four constitutions which comprise the most important texts of the 
council. It was even suggested at one point during the second period that ‘all the 
schemas’ be incorporated into it.
32
 Summarising Vatican II, Nicholas Lash has 
identified the ordering of the chapters in LG as one of the two most significant 
accomplishments of the council.
33
 This is a reference to the fact that the text starts 
out from ‘The Mystery of the Church’ (Ch. 1) and ‘The People of God’ (Ch. 2) 
before moving on to ‘The Hierarchical Constitution of the Church and in particular 
the Episcopate’ (Ch. 3).
34
 This order can be contrasted with Pastor aeternus, the First 
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ from Vatican I (1868-70), which 
begins from the person of the pope.
35
 Indeed, Joseph A. Komonchak reports that 
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‘from the earliest days after Pope John XXIII had announced the Council [LG] was 
expected to clarify and to complement the papally centred text of Vatican I…’.
36
 
LG is a long text and we make no attempt to be comprehensive. For example, we do 
not discuss the argument in chapter three regarding the hierarchy of the Church, 
which drew a great deal of attention at the council, or chapter four on the laity. 
Instead, we will identify three features of the text which have implications for 
postconciliar moral theology. The first of these is a tendency in the text to integrate 
different theological topics. As an example, we will briefly discuss the central role 
played by the doctrines of the Trinity and Jesus Christ in the discussion of the church 
(ecclesiology). 
Early drafts of LG did not make much use of the doctrine of the Trinity.
37
 However, 
the final version promulgated by the council affirms the importance of thinking about 
God in three different ways when paragraphs two, three and four discuss the mystery 
of the Church in terms of Father, Son and Spirit. LG 1 (paragraph one of Lumen 
Gentium) also refers to Jesus Christ as ‘the light of the nations’ and the council 
fathers describe themselves as being ‘gathered together in the holy Spirit’.
38
 Taken 
together, these statements from the opening four paragraphs contrast with the 
beginning of Vatican I’s Pastor aeternus, which speaks of the pope who ‘determined 
to build a church’.
39
 
Following this Trinitarian description of the Church, the council fathers go on to 
develop the Pauline metaphor of the church as the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12-13, 
27). In LG 8 the church is described according to the pattern of the formula of 
Chalcedon. Specifically, the text affirms both the ‘unmixed’ and the ‘unseparated’ 
moments of belief in Jesus’ two natures: the church ‘must not be considered as two 
things [unseparated], but as forming one complex reality comprising a human and a 
divine element [unmixed]’. The paragraph also describes the Church as ‘equipped 
with hierarchical structures and [as] the mystical body of Christ, a visible assembly 
and a spiritual community, an earthly church and a church enriched with heavenly 
gifts’ (unmixed).
40
 Thus, the text affirms both of the Chalcedonian moments of belief 
                                                          
36
 Joseph A. Komonchak, “Toward an Ecclesiology of Communion,” in History, Vol. IV, 37. 
Elsewhere in the same volume Alberto Melloni reports that the decision to place the chapter on the 
People of God before the chapter on the Hierarchy was made following the intervention of the Italian 
Bishop Gargitter at the start of the second period. Melloni, “The Beginning of the Second Period,” in 
History, Vol. III, 44. 
37
 Melloni, “The Beginning of the Second Period,” in History, Vol. III, 45 and 45 n175. 
38
 LG 1. Tanner, Decrees, 849, and Flannery, Conciliar Documents, 350. 
39
 Tanner, Decrees, 811. 
40
 LG 8. Tanner, Decrees, 854. A comma has been removed after ‘structures’ to emphasise the three 
pairs and ‘hierarchical’ has been substituted for the misprint ‘hierarchial’. 
17 
 
in Jesus Christ. However, it also makes four distinct references to the ‘unmixed’ 
moment compared with only two references to the ‘unseparated’. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt by the council fathers to repair the one-sided teaching of 
Pastor aeternus. With its account of the pope building a church, the nineteenth 
century decree demonstrates great confidence regarding the coincidence of divine 
and human activity within the leadership of the church. Without succumbing to the 
opposite problem of separating the divine and the human elements in the church, 
LG 8 repeatedly reminds its readers not to mix them. 
This imaginative use of the Chalcedonian formula in a description of the church is 
typical of LG. The second feature of the text that we will highlight centres on the 
fifth chapter which is titled ‘The universal call to holiness in the church’.
41
 As 
discussed in the previous section, the moral theology of the neo-Scholastic manuals 
focuses on the standards necessary to achieve salvation, whilst ascetical theology sets 
out the higher calling of the counsels of perfection. Lay Christians tended to focus on 
the requirements of moral theology through the practice of confession. Clergy were 
expected to maintain these standards but were also consecrated in various ways to 
pursue more rigorous ideals. The ‘universal call to holiness’ in LG challenges any 
simple distinction. In particular, LG 41 claims that: 
The forms and tasks of life are many but holiness is one – that sanctity which 
is cultivated by all who act under God’s Spirit and, obeying the Father’s 
voice and adoring God the Father in spirit and in truth, follow Christ, poor, 
humble and cross-bearing, that they may deserve to be partakers of his glory. 
Each one, however, according to his own gifts and duties must steadfastly 




In keeping with the opening paragraphs, this passage makes a deliberate attempt to 
maintain the three-ness of belief in God. However, the focus of the passage is the 
claim that there is only one God who has issued one call and who is, in conjunction 
with this call, gathering together one people. This is a consequence of the Trinitarian 
affirmation that God only does one work.
43
 Another way of expressing this would be 
to say that the passage affirms the priesthood of all believers (cf. 1 Peter 2:9): whilst 
individual Christians have different gifts and duties they are also similar to the extent 
that they are all receiving the grace to respond to the call of God in Jesus Christ. 
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This aspect of LG, which draws upon an important feature of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, strongly endorses the incipient Christological shift in preconciliar moral 
theology. If the ‘call to holiness’ is a single call that is offered to all, then moral 
theology and ascetical theology cannot be treated as two entirely separate disciplines. 
Any differences between these two disciplines must be superficial when compared to 
the unity of God’s work. Indeed, there is one moment at which LG can be read as 
actually instructing moral and ascetical theologians to integrate their disciplines. In 
chapter two on the people of God, LG 9 notes that the law of this people is ‘the new 
commandment to love as Christ loved us (cf. Jn. 13:34).’
44
 Having said this, though, 
there is another point a little later in chapter five which is more ambiguous. Here 
LG 42 insists that all Christians should go ‘beyond what is of precept in the matter of 
perfection, so as to conform themselves more fully to the obedient Christ’.
45
 This has 
the effect of equalising the call of God on lay Christians and consecrated Christians. 
It also presupposes the continued existence of the moral precepts – possibly with the 
moral manuals in mind – arguing that everyone must consider themselves called to 
do more than simply conform to the minimum standards. 
Without withdrawing our claim that LG calls for the integration of ascetical and 
moral theology, we recognise some further features of the text which challenge this 
interpretation. Komonchak reports that 504 council fathers suggested that chapter 
five on the universal call of holiness be ‘moved earlier in the schema’.
46
 If accepted, 
this suggestion would have better articulated that the church is already being 
gathered (the People of God) and that all Christians participate in the same gracious 
work of God. However, this suggestion was not accepted by the council and the 
universal call to holiness was inserted as the fifth chapter, after the discussion of the 
hierarchy in chapter three and apart from the discussion of the People of God. 
Further, there was also an individual vote of the whole council about whether or not 
chapter six (‘Religious’) should be incorporated into chapter five (‘universal call to 
holiness’). Here the council voted that they should be kept separate by a margin of 
68%-32% (total votes: 2203). This followed a campaign by a group called ‘the 
Bishops’ Secretariat’ which was formed after the second period by ‘bishops who 
belonged to religious orders’.
47
 
It is not difficult to understand why the Catholic religious wished to be treated 
distinctively. Komonchak reports that Abbot Gut, speaking before the whole council, 
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referred to chapter four of LG on the laity and asked ‘[i]f the laity are worthy of such 
an honour, why not the countless religious?’
48
 However, the distinct treatment of 
religious Christians in the text is an obstacle to the argument that ascetical and moral 
theology should be integrated. Whilst chapter six is carefully worded to avoid 
claiming that there are different kinds of morality for different kinds of Christian, 
such a claim is implied by the chapter’s existence, and many of its formulations 
closely approximate to this view. 
So far this analysis has highlighted the centrality of the doctrines of Trinity and of 
Jesus Christ and the implicit though confused instruction to integrate ascetical and 
moral theology. The third and final part of our discussion of LG takes up the 
question of Chalcedonian Christology again by identifying a passage which has a 
different relationship with Pastor aeternus than LG 8. Where LG 8 highlighted the 
dangers of mixing the natures of Christ when imagining the church, LG 12 is more 
concerned that the whole people of God share in the reception of God’s word with 
the bishops. This text, which can be found in the second chapter on the People of 
God, also includes one of the few explicit references to Christian morality: 
The whole body of the faithful who have an anointing that comes from the 
holy one (cf. 1 Jn. 2:20 and 27) cannot err in matters of belief. This 
characteristic is shown in the supernatural appreciation of the faith of the 
whole people, when, “from the bishops to the last of the faithful”* they 
manifest a universal consent in matters of faith and morals. By this 
appreciation of the faith, aroused and sustained by the Spirit of truth, the 
People of God, guided by the sacred teaching authority, and obeying it, 
receives not the mere word of men, but truly the word of God (cf. 1 Th. 2:13), 
the faith once for all delivered to the saints (cf. Jude 3). The People 
unfailingly adheres to this faith, penetrates it more deeply with right 
judgment, and applies it more fully in daily life.
49
 
*[=n8] See Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. 14, 27. 
The dominant doctrinal theme in this passage is belief in God the Spirit. In the first 
sentence this is alluded to in the ‘anointing’ of the faithful, in the second sentence 
‘the supernatural appreciation of the faith’, and in the third there is an explicit 
reference to ‘the Spirit’. Moreover the question that is being treated is something 
like: how do Christians know what is true in questions of ‘faith and morals’? 
Interpreting this passage it is important to recall that the text as a whole is responding 
both to a centralisation in the church during the early twentieth century (cf. Keenan 
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above) and to a text on the Church from Vatican I (Pastor aeternus) which has great 
confidence in the identification of the work of the pope and of God. By strongly 
emphasising that the whole People of God can participate in the identification of 
Christian faith and morals, the passage is including the whole people in the confident 
identification which was previously made between the pope and the work of God. 
The quotation from Augustine is then serving a conciliatory role, by explicitly 
including bishops within the one People of God the quotation guards against any 
separation between lay Christians/clergy and bishops. It is only when the entire 
people agrees – that is lay Christians, clergy and bishops – that the word on which 
they agree can be called ‘truly the word of God’. 
When read alongside LG 8, it is clear that LG 12 is taking a very different approach. 
Despite the safeguard provided by the Augustine quotation, LG 12 repeats the one-
sidedness of Pastor aeternus when it uses the phrases ‘cannot err in matters of belief’ 
and ‘truly the word of God’. These express great confidence that, where there is 
unanimity within the people of God, that God is truly known. Moreover, the 
reference to morals implies that this process might give access to God’s morality. 
Thus, LG 12 focuses on the relationship between bishops and the whole people of 
God whilst LG 8 focuses on the way in which the divine and the human elements of 
the church are conceived. Despite the explicit reference to morals in LG 12, any 
interpretation of the council from the perspective of moral theology will need to take 
account of the concerns of LG 8 as well as LG 12. 
(b) Optatam totius (OT) 
To contemporary readers the fact that the council makes its most explicit comment 
on moral theology in a declaration on the formation of Priests can appear strange. 
However, Thomas O’Meara reports that ‘[a]s Vatican II began in 1962, Roman 
Catholic moral theology was found in seminaries, houses of studies for religious 
orders, and the orders themselves. The ethics for clergy and laity came from 
textbooks whose Aristotelian language and theological conceptuality were neo-
Scholastic...’.
50
 This supports our earlier claim that the moral manuals were primarily 
being used by clergy in the practice of confession (or the sacrament of penance). 
However, it also explains why the question of moral theology arose, unavoidably, in 
a statement on the formation of priests. It is in the seminaries where priests were 
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taught moral theology both to prepare them to hear confession and as the basic 
behavioural requirement for their ministry. 
Taken as a whole, OT treats the training and education of priests and makes detailed 
proposals for the ‘revision of ecclesiastical studies’. The declaration explains that at 
the start of their studies ordinands ‘should already have received that literary and 
scientific education which is a prerequisite to higher studies in their country.’
51
 They 
should also know Latin, the liturgical language of their rite and are encouraged to 
have learned the biblical languages. When they move into their ecclesiastical studies, 
i.e. their direct preparation for the priesthood, the text directs that they should be 
taught philosophy and dogmatic theology in an integrated fashion. It also states that 
scholastic philosophy should be complemented by ‘modern philosophical studies, 
especially those which have greater influence in their own country…’.
52
 It is only 
after this discussion that the text turns to the ‘[o]ther subjects in theology’ which 
ordinands are expected to be taught, namely, moral theology, canon law, church 
history and liturgy: 
In like manner the other theological subjects should be renewed through a 
more vivid contact with the Mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. 
Special care should be given to the perfecting [perficiendae] of moral 
theology. Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of 
holy Scripture and should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the 
faithful in Christ and their obligation [obligationem] to bring forth fruit in 
charity for the life of the world. In the same way the teaching of canon law 
and Church history should take into account the mystery of the Church, as it 
was set forth in the Dogmatic Constitution De Ecclesia [=LG], promulgated 
by this Council. Sacred liturgy, which is to be regarded as the first and 
indispensable source of the true Christian spirit, should be taught as 
prescribed in articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution on Sacred Liturgy.
53
 
Before interpreting this text it is helpful to quote from an autobiographical account 
that has been provided by Häring, one of the few moral theologians who served as a 
theological advisor at the council (peritus): 
When in the next-to-last vote on priestly formation (OT), many Council 
Fathers demanded a clear prohibition of legalistic books on moral theology, 
the responsible Commission asked me to try to deal with these requests. At 
first I presented my doubts about condemnations: for then one would have to 
carefully describe what one was condemning, and not much would be gained 
thereby. Thus I formulated the following constructive suggestion: “Special 
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care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific 
presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of Holy Scripture and 
should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their 
mission [Sendung] to bear fruit in love for the life of the world” (No. 16). The 
text was presented for its own vote and was almost unanimously approved.
54
 
In this account Häring explains that he drafted the second and third sentences of 
OT 16 as a single unit in response to requests from some of the council fathers that 
the ‘legalistic books on moral theology’ be condemned. We will take this to be a 
reference to the neo-Scholastic moral manuals which MacNamara reports were 
dominated by the concept of law. Häring’s two sentence response to the moral 
manuals was voted on individually before the work of the commission was agreed by 
the whole council. (This assumes that the vote which Häring refers to is a vote of the 
commission responsible for drafting OT).  
Häring’s account implies that OT 16 is the closest that the council gets to 
commenting on the fact that the moral manuals were rapidly falling out of use. 
Häring explains that there was a movement among the council fathers to endorse this 
repudiation on the grounds that the manuals were ‘legalistic’. This suggests that the 
question of the relationship between gospel and law was at the heart of the 
theological critique of the manuals. Häring’s response to this request, which received 
the approval of the commission and the council, is to avoid a simple condemnation. 
Instead, Häring sets moral theologians the task of ‘perfecting’ moral theology. This 
is an important term because ‘perfecting’ is the activity that is usually associated 
with the consecrated ascetical life.
55
  Thus, Häring is repeating the call discerned in 
LG that moral and ascetical theology need to be integrated. Indeed, the moral 
theologian Norbert Rigali has characterised this text as mandating ‘the creating of a 
new theological discipline of Christian life’.
56
 Keenan offers a similar formulation 
when he claims that this phrase marks the point at which ‘the issue of Christian 
perfection was reinserted into the ambit of moral theology.’
57
 The different names 
that Rigali and Keenan give to the postconciliar discipline –  “Christian life” or 
“moral theology” – make little difference so long as moral theology is ‘perfected’ by 
integrating it with ascetical theology. 
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Another point in support of this interpretation is the fact that OT 16 strongly 
endorses the incipient Christological shift in preconciliar moral theology. Firstly, the 
reference to ‘the exalted vocation of the faithful’ is described as a vocation ‘in 
Christ’. Second, there is a high level statement in the first sentence regarding the 
importance of the Mystery of Christ and the history of salvation for moral theology 
(as well as the other theological disciplines). Regrettably, from the very earliest 
commentaries on this council text, moral theologians have tended to begin their 
quotations of OT 16 from the words ‘Special care…’. This includes the studies by 
MacNamara and Keenan, as well as the article cited by Rigali.
58
 There appear to be 
two reasons for this practice. In the first place, many will have been aware of the role 
played by Häring in the drafting of this passage and decided to begin their quotation 
from the first words of his contribution. In the second place, some moral theologians, 
such as John Mahoney, interpret this text as a ‘rebuke’ for their discipline and focus 
on the fact that the fathers had singled their discipline out for ‘attention’.
59
 However, 
the testimony of Häring establishes that the passage was deliberately worded in order 
to avoid condemnations. Moreover, by habitually overlooking the first sentence of 
the OT 16 passage, moral theologians are overlooking its endorsement of the 
revisionists’ preconciliar Christological shift. For this reason we suggest that future 
quotations from OT 16 should be expanded to include the first sentence of the 
passage. 
Concluding our discussion of OT 16 we note that there is an inconsistency which we 
have been unable to resolve between Häring’s account and the final text. 
Specifically, Häring refers to the ‘mission’ [Sendung] of the faithful where the final 
text of OT uses the term ‘obligation’.
60
 It is possible that Häring has failed to recall 
accurately the text which he suggested to the preparatory commission, but it may 
also be the case that his proposal was altered slightly prior to the final promulgation 
of the text by the Council. 
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(c) Gaudium et spes (GS) 
It was noted earlier that the vote in the first session of the council against the draft 
text on the sources of revelation was followed by a reduction in the number of texts 
proposed for agreement by the council from around seventy to sixteen. As part of this 
process the draft text ‘On morality’ was one of a number of texts to be incorporated 
into what became Gaudium et spes (GS).
61
 (At this stage, i.e. before the second 
session of the council, this new text was known as Schema XIII.) The notional 
incorporation of ‘On morality’ into Schema XIII is one explanation for the focus 
which GS has received from English language moral theologians since the council.
62
 
Another reason is the prominent role played by Häring in the drafting of GS. Before 
discussing two of the passages in GS which are most important for postconciliar 
moral theology, we will first rehearse the basic stages through which the text 
developed. This is necessary in order to establish that there is little opportunity for 
GS to have influenced the content of the other council texts. When Alexander Carter 
claims immediately after the council that the argument of OT flows from the 
dogmatic constitution on the church (LG) and from the pastoral constitution (GS), he 
must be incorrect.
63
 LG was promulgated on 21 November 1964, leaving plenty of 
time for it to influence OT which was only promulgated on 28 October 1965. 
However, the final draft of GS was not produced until shortly before the final period 
of the council (September 1965). By this stage LG had been promulgated and the text 
of OT had been broadly settled. A second reason for rehearsing the textual history of 
GS is that it allows us to introduce the question of the relationship of this text to 
LG/OT. Here the main interpretative question is how attention to the modern world 
can be thought together with the Christological account of the church and the unity 
of God’s work. This question has vexed council participants and interpreters from the 
1960s until the present day. 
In History of Vatican II (“History”), Gilles Routhier reports a comment by J. Prignon 
at the start of the fourth and final period of the council that the version of GS which 
is to be presented to the council fathers ‘would certainly be the last and that the text 
had been drafted with the knowledge that there would be no sixth version.’
64
 
Prompted by this comment, it is possible to identify the five different versions which 
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the text went through between the end of the council’s first period and the beginning 
of the fourth. 
After the seventy preconciliar texts were rejected during the first period of the 
council, Häring reports that two separate drafts for GS were prepared. First, a sub-
commission in Rome produced a draft from various preconciliar texts such as ‘On 
morality’. Then, dismissing this text as inadequate, a new draft was prepared by a 
group of theologians convened by Cardinal Suenens and including Karl Rahner.
65
 
During the second period of the council (1963) a joint (or ‘mixed’) commission was 
given responsibility for what was now called Schema XIII. It comprised ‘the 
Doctrinal Commission and the complete Commission for the Lay Apostolate’. These 
commissions had been elected by the council fathers in the first period and worked in 
the background during the council, drafting texts and considering amendments. The 
joint commission debated which of the two draft texts represented the best place to 
start. This debate proved inconclusive and Häring was put in charge of producing a 
third version of the text. Häring attributes this decision to his suggestion that the 
work be organised around the concept of the ‘signs of the times’.
66
 This concept was 
retained in subsequent versions and can be found, in the final version of the text, in 
the first sentence of the introduction (GS 4). 
The third version, produced under Häring’s direction, is reported to have been very 
long. This helps to explain how the final text of GS promulgated by the council 
ended up running to 23 335 words, more than 40% longer than the second longest 
council text (LG: 16 200 words).
67
 Due to the length of the text, the mixed 
commission only had time to discuss the first part in detail, which meant that the 
draft was presented for discussion by the Council in its third period (1964) in the 
form of a shorter text (later part one of GS) and four Annexes (later part two of 
GS).
68
 This process caused Ratzinger some concern since the council only debated 
part one in the third period, whilst the long Annexes were carried forward without 
scrutiny.
69
 Ratzinger also reports that the third period discussion by the council 
‘yielded only a general approval of the direction and the aim of the effort. …the 
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fathers also ordered a thoroughgoing revision of the text.’
70
 This revision took place 
between the third and fourth periods of the council. 
Elsewhere in History, Ricardo Burigana and Giovanni Turbanti report that at some 
point around 16 November 1964, i.e. during the third period, Häring was replaced by 
‘P. Haubtmann as editor-in-chief.’
71
 Haubtmann was a French professor of sociology 
and, following the third period of the Council, drafted a fourth version whilst 
residing in Paris. Whilst Haubtmann consulted widely, it is reported that this fourth 
version was largely his own work. Burigana and Turbanti also report four theological 
topics about which Haubtmann wanted to consult theologians such as Daniélou, 
Congar, Rahner and Semmelroth. One of these is a topic of obvious interest to moral 
theology: ‘the relations that exist between human activity (individual and collective) 
and the kingdom (here below and in glory)’.
72
 
Haubtmann presented his new fourth draft to a ‘meeting of all the subcommissions in 
Ariccia, February 1-6, 1965’.
73
 Here, Burigana and Turbanti report that his new 
version was accepted ‘as a basis for the doctrinal section’ (i.e. part one) but not, by 
implication, for part two. This would explain Ratzinger’s comment regarding the text 
presented to the Council in the fourth period that ‘[t]he second part …leaned more on 
Häring’s [third] draft’.
74
 The fourth version of the text appears, therefore, to have 
been Haubtmann’s new draft of part one and a revised version of Häring’s part two 
(still, at this point, in the form of Annexes). However, this fourth version was itself 
subject to substantial revision after Ariccia. At the meeting, Karol Wojtyła presented 
an alternative and unofficial draft which had been prepared by a group in Kraków 
and criticised Haubtmann’s text as being ‘too optimistic in its approach to the 
problems of modern people’. Whilst Haubtmann’s version was preferred to the 
Kraków draft, ‘the subcommission decided to correct it as far as possible in light of 
Wojtyła’s criticisms’.
75
 Thus, in the period between the February meeting in Ariccia 
and the beginning of the final period of the council, the subcommission appears to 
have produced a fifth version which responded to the criticisms which had been 
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made. It was, then, in the September before the fourth and final period of the council 
that Prignon is reported as insisting that ‘there would be no sixth version.’
76
 
This account establishes that the second part of GS was not discussed by the council 
fathers until its final period in Autumn 1965. It has also established that the final 
draft version of the text was only completed shortly before this final period. Thus, 
there was little opportunity for the work on GS to influence LG or OT. There 
remains, however, a second interpretative question regarding the relationship 
between GS and LG/OT. On this point we have been unable to reconcile the account 
of the fourth period debate of GS in History with the contemporary account provided 
by Ratzinger. 
The near unanimity of the authors of the History is a product of their practice of 
trying to reach a common view. In his preface to volume five, the editor, Giuseppe 
Alberigo, explains that ‘[t]he collaborators in this volume repeatedly compared their 
work at joint meetings.’
77
 Moreover, in the case of GS, Routhier acknowledges the 
direct influence of Turbanti’s doctoral dissertation on his account of the fourth period 
debate of GS.
78
 Our analysis has not been able to consult Turbanti’s dissertation, but 
it would be interesting to establish whether it is the source of the shared perspective 
in History and of the subsequent conflict with Ratzinger’s account. 
The inconsistency turns on the kind of criticisms that were levelled at GS during the 
fourth period by periti (theological advisors) close to the German episcopate. In 
volume five of History, Turbanti provides a short discussion of the summer of 1965 
and identifies two different kinds of criticism facing GS. First, the French theologian 
L. Lebret criticises the text for not paying sufficient attention to the world outside 
western culture. Second, Karl Rahner criticises the text for, among other things, ‘the 
excessive emphasis given to sociology’ and ‘the inadequacy of the theological 
perspective’. Turbanti claims that the commission preparing the text for discussion 
will have interpreted these criticisms as appearing ‘to come from opposite sides’. It is 
not easy to understand what this means. On one level, Turbanti makes clear that 
Lebret had the support of ‘the French bishops as a body’ for some of his criticisms, 
whilst Rahner’s were accepted in part by the ‘German episcopate’. However, 
regional differences are not a persuasive interpretation as the council had seen 
substantial cooperation between representatives from across the world. A better 
interpretation of Turbanti’s claim is his observation earlier in his account that the 
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French theologian Yves Congar was concerned that ‘the schema could be attacked 
from standpoints dictated by divergent and even opposite presuppositions’.
79
 This 
promises a more plausible account of Turbanti’s ‘opposite sides’ because it suggests 
that they were grounded in the substance of the text. Thus, greater attention to the 
world (Lebret) and a more explicit ‘theological perspective’ (Rahner) are apparently 
opposed to one another at the level of their presuppositions. 
We propose that the interpretation of the opposition to GS by the authors of History 
is grounded in a distinction between ‘changeless’ doctrine, on the one hand, and 
‘changeable’ experience of the modern world, on the other. We have adopted this 
distinction from the excellent article on the influence of Redemptorist pastoral 
theology on GS by William McDonough.
80
 This article will be discussed further 
below. McDonough’s distinction may have been in use during the council and seems 
to be the best candidate to account for Turbanti’s understanding of the ‘opposite 
sides’. On Turbanti’s reading, Rahner was pressing for a greater prominence for the 
changeless truths of Christian theology whilst Lebret was pressing for greater 
attention to the changeable diversity of the modern world.
81
 
In History, Routhier takes over the account of GS from Turbanti once the fifth draft 
has been prepared and just before the start of the fourth period of the Council. He 
sets the scene with the claim that ‘[t]here was …such disagreement on the doctrinal 
perspective to be adopted that it threatened to break down the important Franco-
German coalition and, more broadly, the Central European coalition, which had from 
the outset exercised real leadership at the Council.’
82
 This disagreement provoked a 
series of meetings of which the most important appears to have been between the 
French and German episcopates on 17 September.
83
 In his account of this meeting 
Routhier reports a judgement by Prignon that the French episcopate was happy with 
the first part of the text and critical of the second, whilst the Germans were unhappy 
with the first part and content with the second. Routhier also reports the claim by 
Prignon that Ratzinger ‘…attacked the text radically and violently’.
84
 These 
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criticisms by Ratzinger presumably followed from a critical article which he had 
published that summer.
85
 Prignon’s impatient language regarding Ratzinger’s 
criticisms can be attributed to the heat of the moment. By this stage a lot of work had 
been put into the text and it was still uncertain whether it would be accepted by the 
council. So far the council had only discussed the third version of part one of the text 
and it was about to be asked to debate and approve a new (fifth) version of part one 
and a lengthy second part which it had never previously discussed. 
Perhaps as a result of the positive assessment of GS by Turbanti, Routhier has 
trouble accounting for the strength of the criticisms of GS. On the one hand, he 
acknowledges weaknesses in the arguments of the text’s defenders. In addition to the 
German episcopate, Routhier quotes from the diary of the French Jesuit Henri de 
Lubac to the effect that ‘…too many people of good will, who are incompetent and 
superficial, are clinging to this schema: Where will it lead?’
86
 Moreover, Routhier 
accepts that most of the defenders of GS at the 17 September meeting ‘dealt with 
possibilities’ and urged that a rejection of the text would involve ‘disappointing the 
world’s expectations’.
87
 Then, when the text was presented to the council in the 
fourth and final period, Routhier notes that the introductory ‘report was more an 
introduction of the authorities who supported the schema than a report on the schema 
itself.’
88
 On the other hand, Routhier overlooks the weakness of the defence and the 
strength of the criticism when he claims that the text tried to achieve ‘the ultimate 
goal of the Council’s work as envisaged by John XXIII and maintained by Paul VI 
and the entire Council…’.
89
 This has the unfortunate implication that the critics of 
the text were seeking to frustrate the goal of the entire Council. 
The weakest part of Routhier’s account is his attempt to summarise the opposition to 
GS arising from the German episcopate in the final period debate. This analysis has 
already noted that Rahner and Ratzinger both criticised the text in the run up to the 
fourth period. Indeed, Otto Semmelroth, a former student of Rahner, was still hoping 
‘that the schema would be entrusted to a postconcilar commission’ on 7 October.
90
 
However, Routhier accepts at face value that Cardinal Döpfner, who criticised GS 
during the fourth period discussion ‘on behalf of ninety-one German speaking 
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fathers’, spoke for the entire German episcopate.
91
 Routhier’s account of this 
intervention runs as follows: 
The German school, whose sensibilities were closer to those of the Lutherans 
and undoubtedly bore the impress of recent tragic history, called for a clear 
distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. Döpfner was the one 
who most clearly presented this demand of the German-speaking group, a 
demand rooted in Ratzinger’s sharp critique of the schema.
92
 
The references in this passage to ‘the Lutherans’ and to ‘recent tragic history’ is an 
unpersuasive psychological explanation for the criticism of GS by German speaking 
fathers. The Lutheran reference derives from a meeting held on 21 September 
between Haubtmann and observers from Reformed and Lutheran churches. These 
observers had apparently criticised GS because ‘it does not state clearly enough the 
reality of sin and does not take into account the great struggle between God and 
Satan that goes on in the world.’ These criticisms, whilst problematic, will not be 
investigated further. In addition to this summary, Routhier reports a comment from 
Haubtmann’s diary entry from the evening of the meeting: ‘[t]here is far from 
unanimous agreement on this question: ‘Is the kerygma to be given priority or, on the 
contrary, should we begin with the natural order in order to end with Christ?’’
93
 This 
question presupposes that ‘changeless’ doctrine and ‘changeable’ experience are in 
competition. In these terms, Lebret will have been pulling in the direction of 
experience and Rahner in the direction of doctrine. 
As just noted, Döpfner’s insistence on ‘a clear distinction between the natural and 
supernatural orders’ is interpreted by Routhier as a product of ‘recent tragic history’. 
In other words, because German Christians suffered in the Second World War they 
are unable to participate fully in the optimistic opening of the Church to the world. 
This is unsatisfactory because it assumes that the German participants in the council 
were determined by their history. It also leaves a number of loose ends. For example, 
how does Routhier interpret the scepticism about the schema expressed by Henri de 
Lubac? And what is to be made of Haubtmann’s private summary of the meeting 
with the Lutherans in which he places ‘changeless’ doctrine and ‘changeable’ 
experience into competition? 
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Another point on which Routhier is open to question is his claim that Döpfner’s 
criticisms are ‘rooted in Ratzinger’s sharp critique of the schema’. Ratzinger’s 
contemporary account runs as follows: 
One easily got the impression that the authors [of GS] themselves saw the 
christological and centrally Christian statements as only acceptable on faith, 
that they considered this world of faith a kind of second world alongside the 
first and immediate world of ordinary daily life, and that they felt that people 
should not be prematurely and unnecessarily bothered with the second world. 
But how then could faith make its claim on the centre of man’s existence? 
Doesn’t this really reduce faith to an ideology for those who need such a 
refuge apart from reality? If theology is really going to move out from behind 
the walls of specialised science, it must be courageous enough to do this 
wholeheartedly. It must not in the name of caution leave its finest values 
hidden there. The debate on this text taught us that lesson.
94
 
In this passage Ratzinger criticises GS for placing an ‘immediate world of ordinary 
daily life’ into competition for attention with a ‘world of faith’. This view, which 
Ratzinger criticises, appears to be identical with the difficulty which Haubtmann 
notes in his diary on 21 September and appears to have been accepted by Routhier 
and the other authors of History. Ratzinger is not arguing for ‘a clear distinction 
between natural and supernatural orders’ but that the natural and supernatural orders 
need always to be thought together. 
To summarise this discussion: Turbanti assumes that greater attention to the 
(changeable) world and a more explicit (changeless) theological perspective are two 
distinct views which are opposed to each other. Routhier’s account of the ‘German 
school’ presupposes Turbanti’s distinction. For Routhier, supporters of GS were 
open to the world, whilst opponents criticised the text for theological inadequacy. 
Without stating it explicitly, Routhier strongly implies that the German critics of GS 
were taking the side of the curial minority: ‘[w]ith a large number of fathers offering 
the same criticisms on the crucial point of the schema’s theology, the Germans found 
themselves with strange bedfellows.’
95
  
Ratzinger offers a different account of his criticisms: GS changes the account of 
Christian doctrine being taught by the council. LG treats the church, faith and morals 
using the doctrines of the Trinity and Jesus Christ because these are the conceptual 
tools used by the People of God to describe and organise their every-day experience. 
GS – at least on the testimony of Ratzinger and in the accounts of Turbanti and 
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Routhier – relegates Christian belief and doctrine to a secondary concern, introduced 
after a discussion of the distinct phenomena of modern life. Ratzinger’s criticism of 
GS does not fit into the dualistic analysis of Turbanti and Routhier because he does 
not assume that doctrine and experience are in opposition to each other. The result is 
that Ratzinger’s important critique of GS is not included in the History because the 
authors cannot make sense of it. They continue to interpret GS in terms of the 
opposition between the conciliar majority – who wished to be open to the world – 
and the conciliar minority – who wished to assert the unchanging doctrinal truths of 
the church. This may be a persuasive account of the first period debate. However, it 
runs into serious problems when considering the fourth period debate over GS. The 
criticism of GS by figures such as Ratzinger and Rahner is not a retreat into curial 
obstruction but a theological debate regarding the consistency of GS with the line 
already taken in texts like LG and OT. 
In a final comment on the interpretation of GS in History, we note that the kinds of 
criticism advanced by Ratzinger are hinted at in the work of Peter Hünermann. In 
keeping with his colleagues, Hünermann is very positive about GS: ‘[s]o deeply did 
Catholic Christendom identify with the document that its key words came to describe 
the entire conciliar message.’
96
 However, he also acknowledges (without giving any 
references) some subsequent objections to the text. Of these, the ‘more serious 
objections’ are ‘that the Council did not keep to the line taken in LG, but over 
lengthy stretches fell back into thinking based on natural law.’ To this claim, 
Hünermann responds that ‘the vision set down in this document and the overall 
direction it gave the Church seem more important.’
97
 This response seems rather 
weak. 
So far we have shown that it is unlikely that the text of GS influenced the texts of LG 
and OT. We have also shown that GS was criticised by some periti for presupposing 
a different account of doctrine than that in LG and OT. This latter point gains 
significance when it is noted that the interpretations of the council in English 
language moral theology have tended to focus on GS. The final task of this section 
will be to interpret two sections in GS which anticipate subsequent developments in 
moral theology. The first of these is a section on conscience in GS 16: 
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16. Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid 
upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and 
to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: 
do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. His 
dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged.
*
 His conscience 
is man’s most secret core, and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God 
whose voice echoes in his depths.
**
 By conscience, in a wonderful way, that 
law is made known which is fulfilled in the love of God and of one’s 
neighbour.
***
 Through loyalty to conscience Christians are joined to other 
men in the search for truth and for the right solution to so many moral 
problems which arise both in the life of individuals and from social 
relationships. Hence, the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do 
persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and try to be guided by the 
objective norms of morality. …
98
 
* – Rm 2, 14-16.   ** – Pius XII, “Radio Message,” AAS 44 (1952): 271.        
*** – See  Mt 22, 37-40; Gal 5, 14. 
There is a tradition in English language moral theology which objects that the 
teaching on conscience in this passage is incoherent.
99
 We agree that there is no 
single reading that successfully interprets all aspects of this complex text. This does 
not mean, however, that the text should be disregarded. Rather, the inconsistency 
requires that postconciliar moral theologians find a consensus reading in which the 
meaning of the text harmonises with the meaning of the council as a whole. This will 
require an adjudication between the different elements of the text. In support of this 
task we offer some preliminary suggestions. Then in chapter two we will discuss the 
interpretation of this text by the International Theological Commission and in chapter 
four we discuss Balthasar’s alternative reading in the Nine Propositions.  
In this preliminary discussion, we draw on the excellent historical work of 
McDonough who provides important information regarding the drafting of the text. 
Specifically, McDonough attributes the references to the ‘love’ of good and to 
‘man’s most secret core’ to the Redemptorist moralist Domenico Capone. These 
suggestions by Capone were added to the text fairly late in the process by means of 
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an amendment tabled by Häring.
100
 Following Karl Golser, McDonough interprets 
these changes as effecting ‘a move from understanding conscience as “an organ of 
law” to understanding it “as the transcendental orientation of the person to the good, 
as a call to love.”’
101
 This appears to mean that where the earlier parts of GS 16 
imagine conscience as the internal application of laws to situations, the later texts of 
Capone and Häring seek to recover what McDonough terms the “Augustinian” 
account of conscience as the secret heart of the individual. This later view represents 
conscience as the sphere within which the good can exert its attractive power. 
McDonough’s interpretation of the text, which draws on the work of Golser, allows 
the ambiguity of GS 16 to be specified as follows. The majority of the quoted 
passage discusses conscience as a kind of self-consciousness which includes within 
itself a factor “X” and the freedom and spontaneity to respond and make use of that 
factor. To put this in medieval terms, the council is using conscience to refer to both 
‘synderesis’ (spontaneity) and ‘conscientia’ (the moral rule). The reference, in the 
penultimate sentence, to ‘loyalty to conscience’, shows that the council does not 
consider the identification of the factor that applies to a particular situation to be a 
question of freedom. Whilst the relevant factor may not immediately be obvious, the 
task is to identify it and follow it. The questions for the individual, then, are whether 
or not one exercises diligence in searching for the relevant factor and whether or not 
one (freely) conforms to that factor once it has been found.  
McDonough’s primary contribution is to point out the two different accounts of this 
factor “X” in the text. On the one hand, there is an account of this factor as ‘law’. 
This is what McDonough means by calling conscience an ‘organ of law’ and appears 
to be the sense of the earlier parts of GS 16. On the other hand, there is an account of 
this factor as the voice of God and/or the call of the good. The first interpretation 
makes sense of sentences one, three, four and nine. The second interpretation makes 
sense of sentences two and six. These latter are both sentences which McDonough 
identifies as last minute additions by Capone through Häring.
102
 There is no means to 
reconcile these interpretations: is the ‘factor’ in this paragraph a set of moral laws, 
‘objective moral norms’ in the words of sentence nine, or is it is the voice of God? 
The adjudication between these two interpretations will require some parts of this 
text to be overlooked in favour of others. This is necessary if consensus is going to 
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be reached regarding the teaching of the council on moral theology. We will revisit 
this challenging interpretative task in chapters two and four. 
The second text to be discussed from GS is taken from its second part which deals 
with a number of ‘urgent problems’ such as ‘the dignity of marriage and the family’ 
(paras 47-52) and the ‘avoidance of war’ (paras 79-82).
103
 Specifically, the quotation 
is taken from GS 51 which forms part of the discussion of marriage: 
When it is a question of harmonizing married love with responsible 
transmission of life, it is not enough to take only the good intention and the 
evaluation of motives into account; the objective criteria must be used, 
criteria drawn from the nature of the human person and human action, criteria 
which respect the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation 
in the context of true love; all this is possible only if the virtue of married 
chastity is seriously practiced. In questions of birth regulation the sons of the 
Church, faithful to these principles, are forbidden to use methods disapproved 




The wording of this text has resulted in it carrying significance beyond the confines 
of the Christian understanding of marriage. As Richard McCormick has noted, the 
reference to ‘objective criteria’ which are ‘drawn from the nature of the human 
person and human action’ endorses a kind of natural law morality. The significance 
of this is heightened by ‘[t]he official commentary’ on this passage which claims that 
it is a paradigm example of postconciliar moral reasoning. Thus, its significance 
extends beyond questions of marriage and sexuality.
105
 McCormick overemphasises 
the significance of the official commentary, which can only be treated as 
authoritative if it is a reliable guide to the teaching of the whole council on moral 
theology. Moreover, the commentary would appear to be inaccurate when it claims 
that ‘the person integrally and adequately considered’ is the measure of all human 
action.
106
 The text of GS 51 claims that it is a set of ‘criteria’ drawn both from the 
‘human person and human action’ which is the measure of right conduct in the 
practice of birth control. Thus, a set of good practices might lead to the definition of 
an objective criterion as easily as a consideration of the nature of human personhood.  
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A second problem with the official commentary is that it does not reconcile the 
reference to human nature with the reference to ‘divine law’ at the end of the quoted 
passage. It may be that the council fathers intended to follow the approach of the 
moral manuals in which natural objective criteria (natural law) are clarified in the 
divine (biblical) law. However, if this passage is intended as a template of perfected 
moral theology – as required by OT 16 – then it remains unclear what relation the 
council fathers envisage between natural/biblical law and the ideals of ascetical 
theology. 
Another significant feature of GS 51 for our analysis is the fact that it anticipates the 
official report of the Pontifical Commission on Population, Family and Birth to be 
considered in the next section of this chapter. As far as we can determine, very few 
moral theologians were invited to attend the council as periti. Indeed, we have only 
been able to identify three: Philippe Delhaye (Lille), Bernhard Häring 
(Lateran/Alphonsian
107
) and the elderly Franz Hürth (Gregorian).
108
 At the same 
time, a steadily increasing number of moral theologians during the council period 
were being appointed to the Pontifical Commission. In its earliest form, this 
commission did not include any theologians. However, around the time of the 
council’s second period Paul VI appointed five moral theologians as members: 
Häring, Jan Visser (Lateran/Alphonsian), Josef Fuchs (Gregorian), Marcelino Zalba 





 Then, around the time of the third period, Paul VI added an additional 
forty-three members including the moral theologians Alfons Auer (Tübingen), 
Delhaye and John Ford (Catholic University of America).
111
 Thus, moral theologians 
                                                          
107
 Robert Blair Kaiser reports that Häring ‘taught moral theology at the Pontifical Lateran 
University’. Kaiser, The Encyclical That Never Was: The Story of the Pontifical Commission on 
Population, Family and Birth, 1964-66, Revised Edition (London: Sheed and Ward, 1987): 72. Häring 
reports that he was called to Rome to teach at the Alphonsian, a new educational institution of the 
Redemptorist order. He taught one semester per year between 1950 and 1953, and appears to have 
returned to the staff following a four year break in 1957. It is not clear whether he was still teaching at 
the Alphonsian during the Council. Häring, My Witness, 33-35. 
108
 John Courtney Murray was appointed as a peritus during the second session but has never taught 
moral theology. Louis Janssens (Louvain) was working as a moral theologian during this period but 
only appears to have participated at the council on an informal basis (Julie Clague, “Moral Theology 
and Doctrinal Change,” in Moral Theology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Bernard Hoose et al. 
(London: T&T Clark, 2008): 70.) 
109
 Robert McClory, Turning Point: The Inside Story of the Papal Birth Control Commission (New 
York: Crossroad, 1995): 47, and Kaiser, Encyclical, 299. 
110
 Mark Graham, Josef Fuchs on Natural Law (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002): 87 
n18 [107], and Kaiser, Encyclical, 72. 
111
 McClory, Turning Point, 62 and 189-190. According to Hans Küng this was the response by 
Paul VI to interventions during the third period of the council in favour of opening the question of 
birth control practices by Patriarch Maximos, Cardinal Léger and Cardinal Suenens: Küng, Disputed 
Truth: Memoirs II, trans. John Bowden (London: Continuum, 2007), 52. 
37 
 
appear to have been far more directly engaged in the work of this non-conciliar 
commission than in the work of the council.  
The only exception to this finding is that some moral theologians were also called on 
to help with the drafting of the chapter on marriage in GS.
112
 This includes the 
passage just quoted from GS 51. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the 
concept of ‘objective criteria’ plays a prominent role in the official report of the 
Pontifical Commission. Indeed, it is possible that the inclusion of this concept in 
GS 51 is due to those members of the Pontifical Commission who were involved in 
reviewing amendments for this chapter in the final period of the council. It would be 
interesting to establish in the future precisely how this paragraph was drafted and 
how this concept came to be a part of it. 
(iii) Fuchs’ ethical experiment: the Mystery of Christ and the natural law 
The pressures facing the discipline of moral theology immediately after the council 
are numerous. Most importantly, moral theologians had to deal with the popular and 
scholarly repudiation of the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology. This was a 
major disruption to the discipline which is not commented on in any detail by the 
council texts. Instead, there is a high level instruction from LG and OT 16 to merge 
ascetical and moral theology and a general commendation of the Christological shift 
in moral theology. A second source of pressure, then, is the fact that more moral 
theologians were involved in the work of the non-conciliar Pontifical Commission on 
Population, Family and Birth than in the council itself. Thus, moral theologians will 
have received the texts of the council as a work largely undertaken by others and 
which bequeathed to them a difficult task of revision and clarification. 
The main discussion in moral theology that emerges from the council period goes on 
to dominate the discipline well into the 1970s. Indeed, Ann Marie Mealey has 
recently suggested that the debate has never been satisfactorily resolved.
113
 The 
debate goes under a variety of names including, the debate concerning the specificity 
of Christian morality, the distinctiveness of Christian morality and the proprium of 
Christian morality. Those who enter the debate by affirming the 
specificity/distinctiveness/proprium of Christian morality are said to teach a faith-
ethic (Glaubensethik). The name of those who deny the specificity is less uniform.  
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The English language secondary literature often refers to this debate as if it appeared 
out of nowhere in the early 1970s.
114
 In fact, we have already noted one piece of 
evidence in the first section of this chapter that the debate existed within the manual 
tradition before the council. The neo-Scholastic manual by Noldin argues that there 
were some moral claims that depend solely on revelation whilst the manual by Hürth 
and Abellán is reported as denying this. The debate appears to have become more 
highly charged during the council period and is the main topic of conversation in 
moral theology from 1966 onwards. Here, the first piece of evidence is a quotation 
from Häring, provided by MacNamara, in which the former criticises ‘the incredible 
idea that the moral teaching of the New Testament does not provide any new content 
to natural law morality but only new motivation.’
115
 In this quotation Häring 
presupposes the continuing relevance of natural law morality, but is critical of the 
claim that Christian revelation only produces a stronger motivation or ability to keep 
the natural law. Häring insists that faith in Christ must bring new moral content that 
was not previously available through natural law.  
The second piece of evidence is Franz Böckle’s insistence that the discussion 
concerning the specificity of Christian morality began at ‘a conference at Lund in 
1966 organised by the Societas Ethica’.
116
 The third piece of evidence is the claim by 
James J. Walter that ‘[t]he earliest discussion of the uniqueness of Christian morality 
that occurs after the close of Vatican II was the XXVIII Week of French Catholic 
Intellectuals (March 2-8, 1966).’
117
 
We are not aware of any attempt by English language moral theologians to trace the 
debate concerning the specificity of Christian morality through the debates of the 
council, or back to the neo-Scholastic manuals. This would seem to be a product of a 
wider tendency among English language moral theologians to avoid commenting on 
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the council period and the council texts in detail. To return to the secondary literature 
rehearsed in the first section of the chapter, MacNamara and Keenan both largely 
avoid the task of interpreting the teaching of the council on moral theology despite 
the fact that they are offering studies of the discipline which include the council 
period. They restrict themselves to conventional discussions of OT 16 and make 
passing reference to GS.
118
 The best examples of detailed discussion of council texts 
that we are aware of are either translated into English or are not written by moral 
theologians.
119
 Indeed, if Keenan’s study is representative, English language moral 
theologians still rely heavily upon the interpretation offered by Josef Fuchs 
immediately after the council.
120
 This dependence is unnerving when one recognises 
that the council poses profound questions about the future of the discipline, 
instructing that it be integrated with ascetical theology and supporting the 
preconciliar Christological shift. 
Due to his continuing influence, the remainder of this chapter will interpret three 
influential texts by Josef Fuchs composed in the years immediately after the council. 
The first is the journal article published in mid-1966 cited by Keenan.
121
 The second 
is the official report of the Pontifical Commission completed on 26 May 1966 in 
which Fuchs played a substantial role.
122
 (This report is sometimes referred to 
inaccurately as the ‘Majority Report’ as a result of confusion surrounding its first 
publication in the United States.
123
) The third is a famous lecture regarding the 
specificity of Christian morality from December 1968 (first published in 1970).
124
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Each of these texts is still cited by English language moral theologians in 
monographs or textbooks.
125
 By exploring Fuchs’ influential interpretation of the 
meaning of the council for postconciliar moral theology, we will identify some of the 
issues and concerns which Balthasar subsequently addresses himself to in the Nine 
Propositions. 
It has already been noted that Fuchs is one of the earliest theological appointments to 
the Pontifical Commission and that he is involved in the analysis of amendments to 
the chapter on marriage in GS. Keenan, following Kaiser, reports that Fuchs 
abstained from teaching at the Gregorian in the academic year 1965-66 as he did not 
wish to teach moral theology whilst he harboured doubts about permissible birth 
control practices. Keenan also notes that Fuchs instructed the Gregorian University 
Press not to republish his work on sexual ethics, De Castitate et Ordine Sexuali 
(1959).
126
 Fuchs used this time to compose his interpretation of the council for moral 
theology: ‘Moral Theology Perfected: The Wishes of Vatican II’.
127
 The evidence 
suggests that the article was written before Fuchs drafted the official report of the 
Pontifical Commission. However, this evidence is limited.
128
 
In this article, first published in 1966, Fuchs takes up a central question posed for 
moral theologians by the texts of the council. On the one hand, there is a clear 
teaching in OT 16 and LG that moral theology be merged with ascetical theology.
129
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Fuchs’ focus on the challenge of integrating moral and ascetical theology is indicated 
by his reference to the ‘perfecting’ of moral theology in the title of the article. At the 
same time, though, Fuchs is also concerned to understand what this change means for 
the use of natural law in moral theology. This second concern finds expression when 
Fuchs explains that: 
When the Second Vatican Council made the person of Christ the centre of 
moral theology it certainly had no intention of excluding from that discipline 




This text captures all of the important components, starting with the instruction in 
OT 16 regarding the centrality of the Mystery of Christ. We have interpreted this in 
the previous section as an endorsement, by the council fathers, of the incipient 
Christological shift in preconciliar moral theology and a desire to integrate moral and 
ascetical theology. Fuchs agrees that the council teaches that moral theology should 
make Jesus Christ central. However, he raises an important question for the 
discipline of moral theology: what does this mean for arguments on the basis of 
natural law? As we have seen, natural law is endorsed explicitly in a small number of 
texts in GS 16 and 51 and it is possible to read allusions to it in other texts from the 
council. However, Hünermann notes that the explicit references to natural law are 
one of the reasons why GS received so much criticism in the final period of the 
council. Thus, Fuchs is raising a question that is important for moral theologians and 
which has not been definitively resolved by the texts of the council. In his 1966 
article, Fuchs attempts to articulate the continuing need for natural law reasoning, but 
in a way that does not isolate the pastoral constitution (GS) from the rest of the 
council. This attempt to resolve the problem without pitting the council texts against 
each other is laudable. Moreover, his proposed solution has some very interesting 
features. There is not space in this section to consider the merits of Fuchs’ argument 
in comprehensive detail. Instead, we will attempt a tentative analysis of his argument 
viewed with assistance from the formula of Chalcedon. The results suggest that a 
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Christological approach might prove fruitful if one were to investigate Fuchs’ 
postconciliar moral theology in more detail. 
The reasons for considering Fuchs’ article from the perspective of the formula of 
Chalcedon are threefold. First, OT 16 invites a Christological investigation of moral 
theology when it claims that the discipline ‘should be renewed through a more vivid 
contact with the Mystery of Christ.’ Second, although Fuchs does not claim to be 
using the formula of Chalcedon in his article, there are hints which suggest that he 
was experimenting with ways in which the person of Christ could cast light on the 
structure or logic of post-conciliar moral theology. Third, Balthasar’s attempt to 
articulate a postconciliar moral theology in the Nine Propositions is heavily focused 
on the Mystery of Christ, as we shall see in chapter three. 
The two passages where Fuchs’ appears most clearly to be experimenting with a new 
Christological approach to moral theology are separated by a few pages: 
[1] …when the Council places Christ in the centre of moral theology it views 
him in thoroughly scriptural light – as the God-man. Moral theology, 
therefore, conformably to the Council’s wishes, is not to abstract from man. 
By doing so it becomes a supernatural abstraction. It must be a moral 
theology of man and, as such, must include the moral ‘law of nature’. But it 
must be borne in mind that moral theology does not treat of man in the raw, 
so to speak, but of Christian man, of man called by God ‘in Christ’.
131
 
[2] As a matter of fact moral theologians not infrequently divide the domain 
of morality into two spheres, the Christian and the non-Christian, the latter 
being regarded as ‘natural law morality’. This distinction, however, calls for 
substantial qualifications; it might, indeed, be better if it were dropped 
entirely. In fact, the morality that the Council describes as the exalted 
vocation in Christ appears to be the one and only morality appointed for 
humanity without distinction: man, according to God’s decree, is simply and 
solely man called in Christ. It is merely incidental that not all of mankind 
know and accept the divine call with the same explicitness. If we consider 
this, not subjectively from the viewpoint of our own knowledge, but 
objectively as part of the ordering of things by God’s providence, we can get 
little satisfaction from the familiar theory that Christians have ready at hand 
the moral elements which non-Christians have to discover for themselves 
(and then only incompletely). This theory may be formally unimpeachable 
but it would be better to say that non-Christians largely share Christian 
morality, and this is true despite the fact that Christian morality contains 
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The first passage can be read in terms of an experimental extension of the 
Chalcedonian description of the Church, noted in the interpretation of LG 8 above, to 
moral theology. This is ambitious because, in its traditional use, the formula of 
Chalcedon applies only to belief in Jesus Christ. The council fathers extended this 
metaphor to the Church in LG 8 after the manner of Paul’s metaphor of the church as 
the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12-13,27). However, there is no equivalent biblical 
metaphor by which to extend it to the treatment of moral law.  
Although Fuchs’ never makes this completely explicit, his experimental 
Chalcedonian argument appears to involve associating ‘natural law morality’ with 
the human nature of Jesus Christ. This allows one to understand Fuchs’ claim that if 
postconciliar moral theology stops paying attention to natural law then it will become 
a ‘supernatural abstraction’. This would be a problem akin to the Christological 
problem of only confessing the divinity of Christ. Implied in this experimental 
suggestion is that one must equate Jesus’s divine nature with some kind of Christian 
moral law, which we will refer to, for simplicity, as biblical law. Thus, if Fuchs were 
to spell out a fully Chalcedonian argument at this point he would join the two natures 
of Jesus to two kinds of law, biblical and natural. 
The argument of the second passage is difficult to discern. However, we interpret it 
as concerned with the same problem, namely the relationship in postconciliar moral 
theology between natural law and biblical law. In his interpretation of this passage, 
MacNamara refers to Fuchs’ initial claim as a summary of moral theology ‘along 
traditional lines’. In other words, MacNamara takes the first sentence to be a 
summary of neo-Scholastic moral theology.
133
 However, this does not seem to get 
into the heart of the question troubling Fuchs. Specifically, Fuchs is concerned with 
an opposition which is drawn ‘not infrequently’ between Christian and non-Christian 
morality. Without researching the manual tradition in more detail, it is unclear 
whether this was a familiar feature of preconciliar moral theology as MacNamara 
claims. We noted earlier a difference within the manual tradition between Noldin and 
Hürth and Abellán which implies that Christian and non-Christian (i.e. natural) 
morality were not typically or systematically opposed to one another. Similarly, 
Fuchs comment later in the passage when he refers to the ‘familiar theory that 
Christians have ready at hand the moral elements which non-Christians have to 
discover for themselves’ would appear to be more typical of the manual tradition, 
although further research would be needed to confirm this. This second claim by 
Fuchs accepts that everyone – Christian and non-Christian – has access to the natural 
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law. However, Christians are able to determine moral truth more reliably by 
reference to the Scriptures whereas non-Christians only have reference to the vaguer 
natural law. On this account, natural law and biblical law are not opposed to one 
another, but the former is vaguer than the latter. 
Whatever the precise relation to the manual tradition, Fuchs’ primary concern in this 
passage appears to be to prevent biblical law from being opposed to natural law 
morality, arguing instead that the two forms of morality should be taken together. 
Before offering some tentative criticisms of Fuchs’ approach, it is worth noting the 
strengths of the argument that Fuchs is offering. As Fuchs explains in the third 
sentence, the council teaches that there is only one vocation in Christ (LG 41).
134
  
Fuchs goes on to claim that this vocation is given to all humanity, which is an 
uncontroversial repetition of the claim in LG 3 that: ‘[a]ll men are called to this 
union with Christ, who is the light of the world, from whom we go forth, through 
whom we live, and towards whom our whole life is directed.’
135
 Indeed, Häring 
reports elsewhere that a draft text was withdrawn during the council’s preparatory 
phase because it did not include a statement regarding God’s universal will for 
salvation.
136
 By noting this, Fuchs asks how can it be possible for there to be an 
opposition between biblical and natural law morality if God calls the whole of 
humanity in the same way. 
Fuchs argues that because of the universality of the call of God in Christ, there can 
be no division of morality into biblical and natural. This argument has the advantage 
that it is clearly grounded in the Mystery of Christ. After all, the universal call of 
God to humanity is received through Christ. Secondly, by suggesting that biblical 
and natural law must be aligned, Fuchs is showing how the references to the natural 
law in GS can be read as consistent with the focus on the Scriptures and the Mystery 
of Christ in OT and LG. Thirdly and finally, by insisting that biblical and natural law 
reflect the same objective ‘ordering of things by God’s providence’ Fuchs avoids the 
possibility that there can be a fundamental moral conflict between Christian morality 
and the natural moral law. Fuchs confirms that he is concerned about this possibility 
elsewhere in the article when he discusses the claim in OT 16 that moral theology 
should be ‘more thoroughly nourished by scriptural teaching’. Fuchs immediately 
counters that this ‘does not exactly mean that the nourishment should take the form 
of arguments drawn from the Bible for particular principles and particular norms of 
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 The school of thought within postconciliar moral theology which did 
attempt this became known as the ‘faith-ethic’. Fuchs’ argument against this 
approach is that it overlooks the fact that moral arguments drawn from the bible will 
necessarily draw the same conclusions as those grounded in natural law reasoning. 
An evaluation of Fuchs’ proposal for postconciliar moral theology, and its 
implications for the development of faith-ethics, is far broader than an interpretation 
of these passages. However, it is worth noting that the Christological references 
which Fuchs makes are as much an obstacle to his argument as an advantage. To put 
this another way, Fuchs experimental connection between morality and the person of 
Christ is not entirely successful and this may explain why he never makes it fully 
explicit. This in turn raises a question for future research about how successful Fuchs 
ever was at placing the Mystery of Christ – which the Chalcedonian formula 
summarises – at the centre of moral theology. 
The first point to recall is that, in the first quoted passage, Fuchs associates the 
natural law with the human nature of Christ. This implies that the biblical law is 
associated with the divine nature of Christ. Fuchs then expands on this relationship in 
the final sentence of the second quoted passage when he claims that ‘Christian 
morality contains ‘supernatural’ as well as ‘natural’ elements, since its prototype is 
the God-man Christ.’ This is the point at which Fuchs is most explicit about the 
Chalcedonian form of the argument that he is trying to make. As the formula makes 
clear, Jesus Christ is one person in two natures. Similarly, Christian morality is one 
thing which combines supernatural and natural elements. We have been referring to 
these ‘elements’ that Fuchs refers to as biblical and natural law. 
What may be read as Fuchs’ experimental Chalcedonian formulation of Christian 
morality is bold and imaginative. However, it can be criticised tentatively for failing 
to account for the difference between the supernatural and natural elements. In 
particular, when Fuchs argues that non-Christians ‘largely share’ Christian morality 
because they grasp the natural law the comparison to the Chalcedonian formula 
breaks down. One is not able to say similarly that someone largely shares a Christian 
understanding of Jesus Christ because they confess that he is a man. Moreover, 
without a similar statement, parallel to the other nature of Christ in the Chalcedonian 
formula, it is unclear how Fuchs’ references to the God-man in the first and second 
quoted passages can be used to support his account of postconciliar moral theology. 
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With one possible exception, Fuchs never provided a more detailed interpretation of 
the council than that found in his 1966 article.
138
  Four years after this article, Fuchs 
is making claims such as the following: ‘[i]n the Decree on Priestly Formation 
(Optatam totius) the Second Vatican Council called for a thorough renewal of moral 
theology; …It should not be overlooked that in the Pastoral Constitution of the same 
Council on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes) a different stress and 
trend appear.’
139
 This comment suggests that Fuchs began to believe that his 
interpretation of the council was grounded more firmly in GS than in OT and LG. 
The question that this poses for future research, is whether and how Fuchs 
postconciliar use of natural law can be understood as fulfilling the requirements of 
OT and LG as well as GS? Indeed, we are not aware of studies by Keenan or any 
other English language scholar which show in detail how the teachings on moral 
theology in LG and OT can be read together with the natural law passages in GS. 
Leaving aside the experimental Christological formulations, the aspect of Fuchs 1966 
article to which he becomes increasingly committed, at least in the following few 
years, is that divine, i.e. biblical, and natural law cannot be opposed to one another 
and that there is only a single moral law which is simultaneously Christian and 
human. This observation leads us on to the two other texts by Fuchs listed at the start 
of this section. The first is the official report of the Pontifical Commission.  
An important difference between ‘Moral Theology Perfected’ and the official report 
– both written around the same time – is that the latter cannot restrict itself to 
tentative suggestions. Thus, whilst Fuchs only proposes the merger of the natural and 
divine (biblical) laws in his 1966 article, the official report takes this for granted in 
its analysis of permissible birth control techniques. Thus, the official report describes 
the church as ‘[u]nfolding the natural and divine law…’.
140
 The point here is that the 
natural and divine law is singular, implying that the law which the church unfolds is 
ambiguously natural and divine. GS 51, cited in the previous section, only refers to 
the church as expounding the divine law. As the report continues, it largely ceases to 
refer to ‘the natural and divine law’ in favour of the concept of ‘objective criteria’. 
Christian married couples are expected to operate with a single morality of ‘objective 
criteria’. This new concept is, of course, to be found in GS 51 and, as we have 
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already noted, it would be an interesting question for future research to establish the 
route by which this term was included in that council text. The way in which it is 
used in the official report is as a basis for ‘obligatory norms’ which are 
simultaneously biblical and natural: ‘the church must propose obligatory norms of 
human and Christian life…’.
141
 The following passages demonstrate the prominent 
role taken by this new concept: 
Chapter IV: The Objective Criterion of Morality 
The question comes up which many men rightly think to be of great 
importance, at least practically: what are the objective criteria by which to 
choose a method of reconciling the needs of marital life with a right ordering 




Moreover, the natural law and reason illuminated by Christian faith dictate 
that a couple proceed in choosing means not arbitrarily but according to 
objective criteria. These objective criteria for the right choice of methods are 
the conditions for keeping and fostering the essential values of marriage as a 
community of fruitful love. If these criteria are observed, then a right 




The first quotation and the chapter heading are included to demonstrate the 
prominence given to the moral concept of ‘objective criteria’. The same prominence 
is not found in the council texts and, as far as we are aware, marks a new departure in 
moral theology under the guidance of Fuchs. The second quoted passage then 
confirms that the proposed objective criteria represent the single set of moral criteria 
available to all of humanity. This law is simultaneously divine and natural, but the 
emphasis in this particular paragraph is on the natural. According to the official 
report, both natural and divine law are now to be considered to be different ways of 
referring to the ‘objective criteria’ which are the content of the morality taught by the 
Christian church and by the whole of humanity. 
When interpreting the innovative approach of the official report it is helpful to keep 
in mind some of the specific pressures on Fuchs and his fellow authors.
144
 Working 
in Rome in the immediate aftermath of the council there were many people who held 
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profound reservations about the legacy of the council. As a piece of applied moral 
theology, the report of the Pontifical Commission had to satisfy the popular 
movement for the condemnation of the ‘legalistic’ (Häring) moral manuals. This 
condemnation had been reframed in OT 16. On the other hand, the report had to 
satisfy a curia dominated by officials who had had their draft texts rejected by the 
council fathers during the first period. These officials had to be satisfied because they 
advised the pope (for whom the decision on birth control had been reserved at the 
council). On top of this, the official report was the main text from the conciliar 
period which could be said to have been drafted by moral theologians. Thus, the 
commission authors were faced with the task of setting a direction for postconciliar 
moral theology. 
The concept of ‘objective criteria’ can be interpreted as an attempt to satisfy all 
interested parties. Firstly, the concept of ‘criteria’ avoids the need for the authors to 
choose between ‘counsels’ (neo-Scholastic ascetical theology) and ‘laws’ (neo-
Scholastic moral theology). Thus, the instruction by the council for the merger of the 
two disciplines was neither prejudged, nor openly contradicted, by the report. 
Secondly, as the second quotation from the report makes clear, the authors define a 
number of objective criteria which together form an objective framework for the 
right ordering of Christian (and human) action. This is well designed to satisfy the 
curia and the pope that the authors had not given up on authoritative moral teaching 
regarding Christian practice. However, the report also proposes a major revision of 
church teaching on birth control. This is done, firstly, by defining ‘objective criteria’ 
which are far more general than the previous moral laws on birth control practices. 
Secondly, the report insists that whilst the criteria should be considered to be 
‘objective’, the application of these criteria by Catholic married couples is also 
‘objective’: it is a matter for the conscience of Catholic married couples how these 
objective criteria are to be applied. This secures the main aim of the report (changing 
permissible Christian practice) whilst maintaining ‘objective’ and/or authoritative 
teaching. Unfortunately, in solving the problem in this way, the authors of the report 
introduce a major innovation into moral theology with far reaching consequences: 
not only have natural claims and Christian claims been merged into a single set of 
‘objective’ claims, but the implementation of these claims in practice – the Christian 
couple’s moral performance – has been excluded from the scope of church teaching 
in a new kind of individual objectivity. This is a high price to pay for the appearance 





 In subsequent chapters we will see how Balthasar attempts 
to secure greater freedom for Christian living without abandoning mutual 
accountability within the wider church. 
The final part of this section shows that Fuchs’ 1968 lecture stands in continuity with 
his interpretation of the council in 1966 and his work on the official report. This 
demonstrates the consistency of Fuchs’ argument in the three years after the council 
and challenges the assumption that this particular lecture defines the debate on the 
specificity of Christian morality.
146
 As we have already seen, Fuchs’ basic argument 
is already in place in his 1966 writings and the whole debate, which appears to have 
its origins within the manual tradition, was the subject of wide controversy 
immediately after the council. 
In between Fuchs’ 1966 writings and his 1968 lecture stands the final encyclical of 
Paul VI, Humanae vitae.
147
 This encyclical contradicts the recommendations of the 
official report of the Pontifical Commission and reiterates the church’s insistence that 
all permissible sexual acts must always remain open to procreation.
148
 It is possible 
to discern Fuchs’ reservations about Humanae vitae in his 1968 lecture when he 
alludes to ‘certain questions relating to the body and sexuality’ which are the product 
of ‘non-Christian influences [and which] have become part of Christian moral 
teaching’.
149
 Otherwise, he attempts to show that Humanae vitae is consistent with 
his proposal for postconciliar moral theology.  
The use that Fuchs makes of Humanae vitae is unnerving to the extent that he treats 
Paul VI’s encyclical as superior to the texts of the council. In particular, Fuchs draws 
attention to the approach taken by Paul VI to the question of birth control: ‘[i]f we 
read Paul VI’s encyclical carefully it will become clear that the Pope in no way 
intended to provide a specifically Christian solution for a universal human problem. 
It was precisely this that enabled him to address himself also to non-Christians, in 
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order to put before them a “human” solution to a universal human problem.’ This 
comment is directed against the emerging faith-ethic which claimed that the divine 
law contained in scripture is different from the natural law or from human morality 
in general. Paul addresses his teaching in the encyclical to the church and to ‘men of 
good will’. Fuchs explicitly connects this concept to the approach of John XXIII who 
‘had addressed himself in his encyclical Pacem in terris to all men and women of 
good will…’.
150
 By claiming that Paul VI and John XXIII are teaching a universal 
natural ethic, Fuchs is interpreting their moral teachings in the manner of GS 22. 
More worryingly, Fuchs does not even refer to GS 22 – an important council text for 
the argument in his 1966 article – but assumes that Paul’s 1968 encyclical must offer 
a correct interpretation of the council. This is not a good precedent to set as it 
suggests that the task of interpreting the council texts can be set to one side as soon 
as the pope has spoken on a question. Häring’s practice is to be preferred at this 
point. To give an example from many years later, Häring criticises the 1983 Code of 
Canon Law for contradicting one of the teachings agreed by the council fathers.
151
 
Regrettably, Fuchs’ 1968 lecture suggests that he no longer considers the 
interpretation of the texts of the council to be a pressing task facing the discipline of 
moral theology. 
The mechanics of Fuchs’ proposal in his 1968 lecture share substantial similarities 
with the 1966 article: 
It is already clear that we must distinguish two elements of Christian 
morality. They are basically different from each other, yet belong together, 
and constitute Christian morality in their togetherness and interpenetration.
152
 
This passage continues to refer to ‘two elements’ of Christian morality, which we 
have shown previously that Fuchs had recently connected, experimentally, to the two 
natures of Christ in the formula of Chalcedon. However, the way in which these 
elements are used is slightly different in 1968. In our analysis of the 1966 article 
these elements are equated with natural and divine law. However, by 1968 these 
elements are not being described as laws but as ‘categorical conduct’ and 
‘transcendental attitudes and norms’. One way to think about this is that Fuchs is 
now defining the two elements in terms of a general account of the human person. 
This is a very interesting development as the orthodox use of Chalcedonian language 
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is with reference to belief in Jesus Christ. This formula is extended by LG 8 to apply 
to the church as the body of Christ. By aligning the two elements of moral theology 
with an abstract conception of a human person, and distinguishing categorical 
conduct and transcendental attitudes and norms, Fuchs’ offers a variation on his 
attempt to give a Christological account of postconciliar moral theology. A fuller 
consideration on this development in Fuchs’ arugment – particularly from the 
perspective of Christology – would be an interesting topic for future research. For the 
moment it is simply worth noting the claim by Mark Graham that Fuchs appropriates 
‘Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology’ in the years after the council.
153
 Thus it 
may be that Fuchs’ transformation of the moral elements from two kinds of law into 
two parts of the general human person is an aspect of this wider development in his 
thinking. What remains the case, however, is that Fuchs is committed to a universal 
morality of objective criteria which stands in a complex and close relationship with 
the loving call of God to humankind. 
In three texts from 1966 to 1968, we have now shown that Fuchs’ makes a consistent 
set of proposals for postconciliar moral theology, namely that there is no 
fundamental distinction between biblical and natural moral law. The call of God is 
offered to all human beings and Christian action is governed by the objective moral 
criteria that are part of the ordering of things by the providence of God. We have also 
drawn attention to the tentative and underdeveloped attempts to explicitly link this 
account to the Mystery of Christ and the formula of Chalcedon. When reviewing this 
material it is worth remembering the circumstances of the rejection of the manuals 
and the publication of Humanae vitae meant that Fuchs was working in extremely 
difficult circumstances. Given these events, it is unsurprising that moral theology 
remained in a state of disarray at the end of 1968. There were polarised debates on 
the correct interpretation of the council, the official report of the Pontifical 
Commission had adopted an innovative new approach which generates some 
questions about the place of the Mystery of Christ, and the encyclical Humanae vitae 
had rejected the main contribution of moral theologians during the conciliar period 
without indicating how they should proceed instead. The next chapter traces the way 
in which Balthasar and the International Theological Commission took up the 
challenges facing the discipline. 
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Chapter 2: The occasion and purpose of the Nine Propositions 
Balthasar drafted the Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics for discussion at the 
sixth annual assembly of the Catholic International Theological Commission (ITC) 
held on 15-21 December 1974.
1
 The formation of the ITC had been announced by 
Paul VI on 28 April 1969 and Balthasar was named among the first thirty 
commission members on 1 May of the same year.
2
 In the first section of this chapter 
we rehearse the main events in the creation of this commission and analyse the first 
few years of operation. This demonstrates that the ITC adopted distinct approaches to 
the questions of pluralism in Christian theology and of the future of postconciliar 
moral theology. The second section of the chapter explores the way in which 
Balthasar began to respond to these developments in his 1972 work Truth is 
Symphonic: Aspects of Christian Pluralism (1972). It also shows how an early work 
by Hegel, ‘The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’ (1798-1799) can be used to cast 
light on the shape of Balthasar’s response.
3
 The third section of this chapter sets out 
and analyses the work that the ITC carried out on the future of postconciliar moral 
theology from its formation in 1969 to its plenary assembly on moral theology in 
December 1974. As with the work of Fuchs, the ITC focused its consideration of 
postconciliar moral theology on the question of moral criteria. Consideration of this 
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work by the ITC sets the scene for the third and fourth chapters of this thesis which 
offer a detailed interpretation of Balthasar’s Nine Propositions. 
(i) The International Theological Commission (1969-1972) 
During the final period of the council Paul VI announced two major institutional 
changes: a new Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) and a new Synod 
of Bishops.
4
 The former was a new incarnation of the Sacred Congregation of the 
Holy Office (1908-1965) and the pope retained Cardinal Ottaviani as Prefect.
5
 This 
new organisation was not expected to be very different from its predecessor, however 
Hebblethwaite reports that it was expected ‘to hold study sessions on disputed 
questions’ in doctrine.
6
 These sessions would presumably help the CDF to draft 
higher quality declarations and would improve its relationship with Catholic 
theologians. The formation of a Synod of Bishops, on the other hand, was an entirely 
new development. Soon after this institution had been announced Ratzinger 
published an enthusiastic welcome, forecasting that it would serve as ‘a permanent 
council in miniature …its institution under these circumstances guarantees that the 
Council will continue after its official end; it will from now on be part of the 
everyday life of the Church.’
7
 
Ratzinger’s expectations regarding the contribution that the Synod of Bishops would 
make in the years following the council have been disappointed. The constitution of 
the Synod meant that the agenda for its first assembly in October 1967 was 
determined in advance by the curia. In scenes reminiscent of the first period of the 
council, Hebblethwaite reports that the first synod rejected a doctrinal text ‘On 
certain dangerous modern opinions and also on atheism’. This text had been 
sponsored by Ottaviani in his capacity as Prefect of the new CDF.
8
 Later the synod 
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moved to elect its own doctrinal commission, of which Cardinal Franjo Šeper was 
made president. Describing the outcome of this election the editors of Herder 
Correspondence report that ‘[t]he well-balanced, constructively progressive line he 
[Šeper] took in the doctrinal discussion impressed a solid majority of the bishops as 
just the line they would wish to have taken by the Church in the theological domain 
at the present time.’
9
 
The decision by the synod to elect its own doctrinal commission is similar to the 
insistence by the fathers in the first period of the council that they would hold open 
elections for the various conciliar commissions.
10
 However, it is harder to find a 
parallel in Vatican II for the next development, namely the proposal by the doctrine 
commission that the synod call on Paul VI to establish an ITC.
11
 As the editors of 
Herder Correspondence report: 
…the Synod of Bishops approved by 124 votes to 14 (a further 39 bishops 
voted placet iuxta modum and two abstained) their doctrinal commission’s 
proposal to set up an international theological commission, it was regarded as 




The reference to an ‘unfruitful meeting’ suggests that the synod never showed much 
potential to act as a ‘council in miniature’. Nevertheless, the first assembly of the 
synod had adopted similar voting practices to those used during the council: the 
synod fathers (mainly bishops) were asked to vote ‘content’, ‘not content’, or 
‘content with modification’ (placet iuxta modum). This particular vote shows a heavy 
majority in favour of a new ITC and may have been a response to the inadequacies of 
the doctrinal text proposed by the curia. The use of the term ‘international’ implied 
that the new commission would be a good forum for the regular consultation of 
theologians based outside the universities of Rome. Many of these theologians had 
played an active role as periti (theological advisors) at the council and there was a 
greater appetite among the bishops for theologians to play a role in the decisions of 
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the pope and curial officials. However, the proposal by the synod does not appear to 
have been particularly well received by the pope or the curia as no action was taken 
following the vote of the synod for nearly twelve months.
13
 
A second development which played a role in the origin of the ITC is the publication 
of a statement entitled ‘Freedom for Theology’ on 17 December 1968.
14
 This 
statement was drafted by the Swiss dogmatic theologian Hans Küng and received 
considerable attention in the European and North American press.
15
 No doubt the 
poor reception given to Humanae vitae that summer contributed to Küng’s decision 
to draft the statement. However, Küng identifies his motivation as the reversion on 
the part of the pope and his curial advisors to neo-Scholastic theology. The statement 
also seems to have been provoked by a series of disciplinary actions undertaken by 
the CDF in the period after the first meeting of the Synod of Bishops. On 
27 December 1967 Küng received notification that proceedings had been started 
against his book The Church (1967).
16
 Nine months later rumours circulated in the 
European press that proceedings were being launched against the Dutch theologian 
Edward Schillebeeckx. Küng reports that these rumours proved premature – no such 
proceedings had in fact been started – but confirms that Karl Rahner attended a 
meeting in Rome on 8 October 1968 at which he was asked to give a theological 
defence of Schillebeeckx.
17
 Thus, the three theologians responsible for the creation 
of the journal Concilium had all been associated with CDF investigations shortly 
before Küng drafted ‘Freedom for Theology’.
18
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The first discussion of the statement took place at a Concilium Foundation meeting 
on 12 October 1968 and Küng reports that his subsequent draft was approved by 
colleagues with ‘relatively few corrections’.
19
 The statement spoke for a significant 
body of theologians. The initial thirty-eight signatories included the moral 
theologians Auer (Tübingen) and Böckle (Bonn) as well as Ratzinger (Tübingen).
20
 
Küng reports that it was ultimately endorsed by 1360 theologians ‘from 53 
countries’.
21
 The statement makes two points which are particularly relevant to this 
analysis. Most fundamentally, the statement complains that there is a poor working 
relationship between theologians and the leadership of the church: 
We firmly uphold and affirm a teaching office of the Pope and the bishops, an 
office which is under the word of God and which is there in the service of the 
Church and its proclamation. At the same time, however, we know that this 
pastoral office cannot and must not supersede, hamper and impede the 
teaching task of the theologians as scholars.
22
 
The phrase ‘must not supersede, hamper and impede’ can be read as a challenge to 
the authority of the pope and to the unity of the Church. Are the supporters of this 
statement proposing to break away from the church and ignore the leaders who have 
been appointed to represent them? There is evidence that this may have been the 
intention of some of the signatories, and such a reading is consistent with other 
accounts of Küng’s theology during this period. In particular, Ratzinger reports that: 
‘Küng propounded a theory that there were two forms of leadership in the church: 
the bishops, who are mainly pastors, and the theologians, who are prophets.’
23
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However, Küng’s wider theological arguments can be placed to one side because the 
‘Freedom for Theology’ statement was drafted in consultation with a wider group of 
theologians. Whilst the statement contains hints of a problematic separation between 
theologians and bishops, it is not necessary to read it in this manner. A more 
charitable reading pays attention to the juxtaposition of two claims: (i) to respect the 
role of bishops and pope; (ii) to claim freedom for theologians. There is no need for 
the charitable reader to place these claims into competition and decide which one 
takes priority. One can instead take up a reconciling logic and argue that both can 
coexist. It is possible that theologians can have the freedom to experiment in their 
writings and that bishops and pope can hold responsibility for the teaching which is 
presented to the faithful as the consensus of the church. One can imagine a 
harmonious economy in which theologians advance their new thinking on a 
provisional basis for scrutiny by their fellow Christians. 
On this charitable reading the supporters of the statement are not asserting the 
complete independence of theologians from the church but are responding, 
constructively, to difficulties in the relationship between the leadership of the church 
and theologians. This charitable reading makes better sense of the text as a whole 
which goes on to offer a series of proposals to improve this relationship. Some of 
these suggestions are more practical than others. However, there can be little 
complaint regarding the suggestion that theologians be permitted to express 
themselves in disciplinary hearings in the language with which they are most 
familiar. This is clearly intended to support honest and accurate dialogue and 
highlights a failing in the practices of the CDF.
24
 
The second point made by ‘Freedom for Theology’ and relevant to this analysis is a 
call for the establishment of an ITC. Those involved in the drafting of this statement 
propose an ITC as a vehicle for improving the relationship between theologians, 
bishops, pope and CDF. The statement calls on the pope to establish this theological 
commission ‘at once’ and requests that it ‘be representative in exact proportion of the 
different theological schools and forms of mental outlook’.
25
 In this way, the 
statement confirms that many theologians looked to an ITC with the expectation that 
it would represent their views to the pope and the curia. There is no direct evidence 
that this statement resulted in action being taken by the pope but it may have speeded 
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up the formal announcement of the formation of the ITC which took place four 
months after ‘Freedom for Theology’ was published.
26
 
Once the ITC had been announced, there seem to have been at least three different 
accounts of its purpose. Unsurprisingly, very little appears to have been published 
about the attitude of CDF officials. On 6 January 1968, nearly a year before 
‘Freedom for Theology,’ Cardinal Ottaviani resigned as Prefect of the CDF and 
Cardinal Šeper was nominated to replace him.
27
 Šeper, it will be recalled, had been 
appointed president of the doctrinal commission of the Synod of Bishops in 
October 1967. This makes him an important transitional figure in this period of 
postconciliar history, although he rarely features in English language studies. The 
delay between the call of the Synod of Bishops for the formation of the ITC and the 
pope’s announcement is apparently due to Ottaviani’s opposition to the idea.
28
 
However, even after the formation of the ITC had been announced, the Provisory 
Statute under which it would operate was kept secret.
29
 Moreover, the content of this 
statute was highly restrictive. This matter received considerable attention in the early 
years of the ITC as the Provisory Statute placed the ITC under the direct control of 
the CDF: statute two requires that the Cardinal Prefect of the CDF take the role of 
ITC President, statute nine grants the CDF an absolute veto over the theological 
topics which the commission is permitted to investigate, and statute eleven requires 
commission members to ‘maintain the pontifical secret concerning the themes being 
treated on the part of the Commission, according to the norms of the regulations of 
the Roman Curia.’
30
 The only concessions to the independence of the ITC are a 
delicate form of words that prevents the commission from being counted as a part of 
the CDF (statute one) and an assurance that the work produced by the commission 
would be ‘submitted to the Supreme Pontiff’ for examination, as well as to the CDF 
                                                          
26
 The editors of Herder Correspondence observe similarly: ‘[t]o what extent the statement [Freedom 
for Theology] speeded up the formation of the commission it is hard to say…’ in “The Thirty 
Theologians” Herder Correspondence 6.7 (July 1969): 211. For the date of formation see note 2 
above. 
27
 Acta Apostolica Sedes (1968): 76-77 and 59. 
28
 Hebblethwaite reports that it is only because Šeper had taken over the CDF by 28 April 1969 that 
the ITC was able to get under way: ‘The CDF under Ottaviani would never have accepted the ITC 
because its very existence cast doubt on its own theological competence.’ Hebblethwaite, Paul VI, 
532. 
29
 It is reported on p.214 of “The Thirty Theologians” Herder Correspondence that the leaked statutes 
were published in the National Catholic Reporter (14 May 1969) and The Tablet (17 May). This was 
followed by publication of the (slightly different) official version on 12 July: AAS 62 (1969): 540-541. 
ET Sharkey, Texts, Vol. I, xi-xii. 
30
 Sharky, Texts, xi-xii. 






 On this basis, there is little evidence that the CDF looked favourably 
upon this new gathering of Catholic theologians. 
The other two accounts of the ITC can be associated with specific commission 
members. On the one hand, the majority of the commission (including Balthasar and 
Ratzinger) appear to have taken the view that the ITC needed to establish its 
independence from the CDF as a senior commission of theological advisors. The 
primary evidence that Balthasar and Ratzinger should be considered among such a 
group is the fact that they were both involved in publishing and disseminating texts 
produced by the ITC during the first term.
32
 Indeed, Ratzinger has explained that this 
publication strategy was undertaken in the face of pressure from some members of 
the curia: ‘[i]n the Curia there are some opposed to publication of our [the ITC’s] 
findings which, they maintain, should serve for consultation. It seems to me, 
however, that a certain publicity is necessary to show the collaboration which is 
taking place [between theologians and the church leadership]…’.
33
 
Evidence that Balthasar and Ratzinger had the support of the majority of the ITC in 
the first term can be found in the final communiqué published after the first assembly 
of the ITC on 6-8 October 1969. One of the aims of the majority of the commission 
at this assembly appears to have been to weaken the terms of the Provisory Statute. 
The strategy that was adopted took advantage of the fact that the Cardinal Prefect of 
the CDF was also the President of the ITC. Thus, once the Cardinal and his officials 
had been persuaded that this communiqué could be issued, the ITC was effectively 
speaking with the authority of the Prefect of the CDF. A close reading of the 
communiqué reveals three points at which it revises the content of the Provisory 
Statute. First, where statute ten requires that the work of the ITC is forwarded to the 
pope and the CDF, the final communiqué from the first meeting declares that ‘[t]he 
results of its [the ITC’s] work are transmitted directly to the Holy Father before 
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being communicated to the congregation.’
34
 The inclusion of the word ‘directly’ 
takes the statement beyond the literal meaning of the statute and emphasises an 
immediate relationship between the ITC and the pope. This set up the commission to 
operate in parallel to, rather than under, the CDF. Second, the communiqué insists 
that the ITC ‘…is governed by its own particular norms.’
35
 This contradicts the 
requirement in statute eleven that commission members are bound by the ‘norms of 
the regulations of the Roman Curia.’ Third, the communiqué includes a four item 
work programme which contradicts the requirement that members ‘maintain the 
pontifical secret concerning the themes being treated on the part of the commission.’ 
This latter development meant that if the CDF was subsequently to withdraw 
permission for an item of research, or redirect the work programme, it would have to 
do so in public view. 
In the light of the communiqué, the publication of ITC texts by Balthasar and 
Ratzinger can be interpreted as an attempt to further establish the independence of 
the commission. What is less clear, however, is the relationship that they, or their 
fellow commission members, imagined with the Synod of Bishops. As will be noted 
below, there is close cooperation between the ITC and the Synod in 1971. However, 
it is unclear whether this was a strategy to which the majority of commission 
members were committed, or whether it was only the ambition of a few. Aside from 
the documented cooperation between these institutions in 1971, Hebblethwaite 
reports a complaint by Cardinal Marty that: ‘the ITC never managed to service the 
Synod [of Bishops] as had been envisaged at its foundation. It was, ultimately, at the 
service of the CDF.’
36
 If there was a concerted plan in the early years for the ITC to 
work closely with the Synod it will have been frustrated by the development of the 
latter body after 1971. 
After the CDF and the majority of the commission, Karl Rahner provides the focus 
for a third school of thought regarding the work of the commission. The final 
communiqué from the first assembly of the ITC in 1969 notes that Rahner had 
circulated a report to his fellow commission members in advance ‘on the principal 
questions that, in his opinion, should be dealt with by the commission…’.
37
 Herbert 
Vorgrimler adds that Rahner also delivered ‘the programmatic speech on significant 
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contemporary theological questions’ on the first day of the assembly, of which a 
resumé was published in The Tablet.
38
 The first point in the resumé develops a 
suggestion in ‘Freedom for Theology’ by arguing that: 
The theological commission must understand its function as that of an 
instrument of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. But exactly 
because of that, it will be the primary task of the commission to go into the 
nature and function of this Congregation. The answer on this basic point will 
determine the priorities of further work by the commission.
39
 
When reading this statement it is helpful to note that Paul VI, when he set up the new 
CDF, instructed it to gather ‘a group of Consultors whom the Supreme Pontiff 
appoints from men around the world who are distinguished for their doctrine, 
prudence and expertise. If the matter to be dealt with so requires, the Consultors can 
be added to the experts, chosen particularly from University professors.’
40
 This may 
have been the role into which Rahner was cast in his difficult meeting with the CDF 
regarding the theology of Schillebeeckx in October 1968 (although Küng explains 
that Rahner had not been informed about this in advance). This instruction by 
Paul VI to the CDF is picked up in ‘Freedom for Theology’ where it insists that the 
consultors should be ‘outstanding professional theologians’ and that ‘[t]he 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith must co-operate with this committee [i.e. 
the ITC] as closely as possible.’
41
 Thus, Rahner appears to have imagined the ITC in 
the terms set by ‘Freedom for Theology’: the ITC was composed of ‘outstanding 
professional theologians’ and Rahner appears to have hoped that they could act as a 
body of consultors within the CDF and set the terms of the congregation’s 
supervisory work. Such an arrangement would repair the relationship between the 
CDF and theologians. 
Rahner goes on in his speech to justify the incorporation of the ITC into the CDF. 
Specifically, Rahner adds that ‘the unity between faith and theology which to a 
certain extent existed before is not de facto found today.’ Moreover, ‘different 
theologians have different presuppositions. Therefore, we see developing different 
theological schools which cannot be united into one system. The Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith can no longer presuppose a unity of theology. The manifold 
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There can be no complaint regarding Rahner’s proposal for the role that the ITC 
might play in repairing the relationship between the CDF and professional 
theologians. The large number of theologians who signed up to ‘Freedom for 
Theology’ demonstrates that there was a problem in this relationship which needed 
attention. However, it is also possible to identify some weaknesses. Most practically, 
Rahner’s suggestion of an ITC integrated into the CDF would have worked best if 
the former comprised a mixture of CDF officials and consultant theologians. That 
way, there would have been greater theological expertise in the discharge of the work 
of the congregation and the existing staff would have had the opportunity to learn 
from the international theologians with whom they were now working. However, the 
ITC is constituted in such a way that it was comprised solely of international 
theologians, and its transformation into a high level theological consultancy would 
have displaced the CDF officials currently discharging this task. This non-collegial 
approach in which Rahner imagined that the ITC would direct the work of the CDF 
may have provoked opposition among the latter’s officials. 
There remain a number of ambiguities regarding Rahner’s participation in the early 
years of the ITC, not least because it has not been possible to identify the date of his 
resignation. However, it is evident that he made a strong case during the first 
assembly of 1969 that the ITC undertake a study of theological pluralism. In the 
words of the moral theologian and commission member Philippe Delhaye (Louvain): 
‘[a] first idea was launched by Father Rahner: pluralism. Mons. [Gérard] Philips 
seized the opportunity and emphasised the other aspect of the problem: the unity of 
faith.’
43
 Here, it is worth noting that Philips had played a prominent role during 
Vatican II and ‘was in practice the secretary of the International Theological 
Commission in the course of the first three years, although he did not have the 
official title.’
44
 Thus, Rahner’s proposal does not appear to have been particularly 
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well received. Moreover, theological pluralism is not included in the four 
subcommissions established following the first assembly. As listed in the final 
communiqué these subcommissions are: ‘the unity of the Faith’ (presided over by 
Ratzinger), ‘the priesthood’ (to which Balthasar was appointed), ‘the theology of 
hope’ (subsequently delayed) and ‘the criteria for Christian moral knowledge’ (of 
which Delhaye was president).
45
 Having said this, there is no basis to conclude that 
Rahner’s proposal was dismissed out of hand. In the first place, theological pluralism 
is explicitly acknowledged in the 1969 communiqué as an important question facing 
the church. The communiqué also acknowledges that there is a ‘legitimate pluralism’ 
in theology. Further, the decision to establish a subcommission on ‘the unity of the 
Faith’ (and not on theological pluralism) may have been due to Cardinal Šeper and 
his officials. It is argued above that the majority of the commission adopted a 
strategy to establish their independence from the CDF. It may have been considered 
necessary to exclude the controversial topic of ‘theological pluralism’ from the work 
programme in order to secure permission to have the work programme included in 
the communiqué. After all, the Provisory Statute instructs that commission members 
must ‘maintain the pontifical secret concerning the themes being treated on the part 
of the Commission, according to the norms of the regulations of the Roman Curia.’ 
Moreover, there is a hint in the communiqué that the commission was hoping to 
address the topic in the future as it specifies that ‘[i]t is up to each group 
[subcommission] to decide precisely on its particular theme.’
46
 When Ratzinger’s 
subcommission on ‘the unity of the Faith’ reported back to the commission in 1972 it 
had expanded its remit to include theological pluralism. The role that Rahner played 
in developments after 1969 is unclear, although Peter Henrici claims that Balthasar 
and Rahner debated the concept of theological pluralism at more than one ITC 
assembly.
47
 This discussion must have ended following Rahner’s resignation from 
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This concludes our presentation of the three different early approaches towards the 
ITC and its future. Aside from the role played by Cardinal Šeper, there also appears 
to have been a controversy in 1969 regarding the ‘unauthorised publication’ of an 
ITC report. This may have been the text circulated by Rahner to his fellow 
commission members and referenced in the final communiqué.
49
 Another area of 
uncertainty surrounds the resignation of Johannes Feiner at some point during the 
ITC’s first term (1969-1974).
50
 There is no further information available to us 
regarding the resignation of Feiner. 
The uncertainties regarding the purpose and working practices of the ITC were 
gradually resolved over the first term. It is clear that Balthasar was highly committed 
to his work for the commission. It appears to have been Balthasar’s first major 
appointment as a theologian as he was not appointed as a peritus (theological 
advisor) at Vatican II and had never held a university teaching post. Balthasar 
appears to have been one of the most active and creative members during the 
commission’s first five year term and it is possible to identify a number of his 
occasional publications with his work as a member of the ITC. As noted above, 
Balthasar was appointed to the subcommission researching the theology of the 
priesthood in 1969. Perhaps owing to the controversies in the wider church – 
particularly in the Netherlands – the ITC devoted the majority of its time in 1970 and 
1971 to this research topic. Balthasar appears to have begun work on this theme 
immediately after the first assembly as he publishes a short article at the start of 
1970.
51
 The subcommission of which Balthasar was a member subsequently tabled a 
lengthy report entitled ‘The Priestly Ministry’ at the plenary assembly of the ITC on 
5-7 October 1970.
52
  After a second discussion of the Priesthood in 1971, the ITC 
forwarded this report for study by the 1971 Synod of Bishops.
53
 This text formed the 
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basis of the Synod’s document Ultimis temporibus.
54
 During 1971 Balthasar is also 
reported to have contributed to a separate text taken to the Synod by the German 
speaking bishops and he was employed as one of the 1971 Synod’s theological 
secretaries in which capacity he ‘drafted the document on priestly spirutuality’.
55
 
Following the 1971 Synodal assembly, however, it was decided that subsequent 
assemblies of the Synod of Bishops would restrict themselves to ‘interim statements, 
or ‘messages’, leaving it to the pope of the time to issue a definitive statement in the 
light of each assembly’s deliberations and findings.’
56
 This has placed a limit on the 
possibilities for cooperation as, in the years since 1971, both the Synod and the 
commission have been given the identical task of providing advice to the pope.
57
 
After the promulgation of the text on the priesthood by the 1971 Synod of Bishops, 
the ITC returned its attention to the question of theological pluralism. As noted 
above, this topic was taken up by the subcommission on ‘the unity of the Faith’ 
which was presided over by Ratzinger and which reported back to the ITC at their 
1972 assembly. The outcome of this assembly was the formal adoption by the ITC of 
a series of fifteen propositions titled ‘Unity of the Faith and Theological Pluralism’.
58
 
Delhaye, who succeeded Philips in 1972 as Secretary of the ITC, reports that the first 
nine of the fifteen propositions were drafted personally by Ratzinger in his capacity 
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as president of the subcommission.
59
 Delhaye further explains that propositions ten 
to twelve on the permanence of doctrinal statements were drafted by Louis Bouyer 
following a request for comment to the ITC by the Pope’s Secretary of State.
60
 
Finally, Delhaye acknowledges that there were three propositions on moral 
pluralism. These are not attributed to a request by the Secretary of State and Delhaye 
does not report by whom they were drafted. Their existence is something of a puzzle 
and will be discussed further in section (iii) below. 
Balthasar was not a member of Ratzinger’s subcommission and had no formal 
involvement in the preparations for the 1972 assembly other than his general 
responsibility as a member of the ITC. Nevertheless, Balthasar appears to have 
undertaken extensive preparatory work which he published in a short study Truth is 
Symphonic: Aspects of Christian Pluralism (1972).
61
 A comparison between the 
argument of the first part of this study and the first eight of the propositions issued by 
the ITC in 1972 suggests that there was a high level of agreement between Ratzinger 
and Balthasar. Indeed, there are a number of points in the first eight propositions 
which indicate that Balthasar may even have been a contributing author. These 
include the decision to begin from ‘the …mystery of Christ’ (proposition one), the 
refusal to equate theological orthodoxy with a system (proposition four), a discussion 
of the church’s ‘subjectivity’ (propositions four and six), the use of the term 
‘criterion’ (proposition seven) and the characterisation of sin as ‘purely pragmatic 
cooperation’ (proposition eight).
62
 It seems unlikely that Balthasar was able to 
negotiate all of these changes in an open discussion among thirty commission 
members. It thus seems likely that Balthasar cooperated with Ratzinger informally in 
the preparation of these propositions, despite the fact that he was not formally a 
member of the subcommission. Such cooperation fits into a pattern of close 
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interaction between these two theologians in prior years.
63
 It also fits with the hint by 




The claim that Balthasar cooperated with Ratzinger in 1972 is part of our broader 
argument that he was an active member of the ITC throughout its first term. This 
activity continued after the 1972 ITC assembly when it was decided that some 
commentary should be drafted to accompany the fifteen propositions that had just 
been agreed by the commission. This task was delegated to Ratzinger’s 
subcommission.
65
 However, Delhaye reports that Balthasar was involved in this 
process despite the fact that he was not formally a member of Ratzinger’s 
subcommission. Delhaye also reports that the ITC returned to some of the more 
difficult questions of the priestly ministry at its 1973 assembly, a year for which we 
have found no sources regarding Balthasar’s role but which coincides with the 
publication of the first volume of his Theo-Drama.
66
 Finally, in 1974 Balthasar 
tabled the Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics for agreement by the ITC, despite 
the fact that he was not a member of Delhaye’s subcommission researching ‘the 
criteria for Christian moral knowledge’.
67
 The next section of the chapter will 
analyse some of the factors that lay behind this last development. 
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(ii) Balthasar’s ethical experiment: the Mystery of Christ as a criterion 
The ITC research programme into ‘the criteria for Christian moral knowledge’ is a 
text which makes prominent use of the concept of ‘criteria’ or ‘criterion’. It was 
noted in the previous chapter that this concept is used in GS 51 and then given great 
prominence in the 1966 official report of the Pontifical Commission on Population, 
Family and Birth. In both cases the concept of ‘objective criteria’ is ambiguously 
divine and natural. The decision of the ITC in 1969 to commission research into 
moral criteria represents an entry into the confusion surrounding attempts by moral 
theologians to interpret the texts of the council and the rejection of the official report 
by Paul VI in Humanae vitae (1968). As noted earlier, the ITC subcommission 
investigating moral criteria was presided over by Delhaye, one of only two moral 
theologians on the commission during its first term.
68
 Interestingly, the wording of 
the 1969 ITC work programme already takes a position with regard to the official 
report as it does not refer to the criteria as ‘objective’ and specifies instead that the 
criteria are Christian. This hints that the criteria might not be taken to be natural. The 
ITC then goes on to make further changes to the use of the concept of moral criteria 
in the series of propositions on pluralism agreed by the commission in 1972. These 
claim that there is a single ‘criterion’ serving as a measure for true and false 
pluralism in theology and advancing the new claim that there is only a single 
criterion, not a plurality of criteria.
69
 It also extends the postconciliar use of the term 
beyond the debate about moral theology into the discussion of doctrine. 
As noted above, Ratzinger has been identified by Delhaye as the author of the 
seventh proposition of 1972 in which the term ‘criterion’ is used. However, this use 
is identical to the argument that Balthasar publishes in his study of the same year 
Truth is Symphonic (TS).
70
 It thus seems likely that Balthasar was involved in the 
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incorporation of this argument into the 1972 propositions. It is also possible to 
identify a marked divergence between Balthasar’s argument regarding ‘the criterion’ 
in TS and the final three propositions on moral pluralism from 1972. In TS Balthasar 
uses his account of the single criterion to address both the question of theological 
pluralism and the question of moral pluralism. However, the 1972 propositions only 
use the argument of ‘the criterion’ with regards to the first of these questions. The 
ITC’s treatment of moral pluralism is very different. In other words, Balthasar’s TS 
treats the ITC’s investigations of theological pluralism and the ‘criteria for Christian 
moral knowledge’ as two aspects of the same fundamental question, whilst the 
formal product of the commission, the fifteen propositions on pluralism, continues to 
distinguish between these research questions. Balthasar’s dissatisfaction with the 
treatment of moral pluralism in the 1972 propositions would appear to be the primary 
cause of the Nine Propositions which he tabled for consideration by the commission 
in 1974. 
This section prepares for the interpretation of the Nine Propositions in chapters three 
and four by attending to Balthasar’s argument in TS. As just noted, Balthasar’s 
argument in TS is aimed primarily at theological pluralism, but it goes on to 
demonstrate that the question of moral pluralism can be treated in the same way. Our 
analysis will follow the same sequence by first attending to Balthasar’s account of 




Balthasar’s primary metaphor in TS, introduced in the first couple of pages, is of an 
orchestra preparing to play a symphony. At the beginning, the various instruments in 
the orchestra are assembled and the players start to play to themselves. The result is a 
cacophony of sound without musical merit. Then someone strikes an A on the piano 
and the players of the various instruments – although still playing largely to 
themselves – begin to attune their playing to this note. Finally, the conductor appears 
on the stage, gathers the attention of the orchestra and the players begin to play the 
symphony, under his guidance and using the symphony’s score.
72
 
An important feature of this metaphor is that it has duration. There are three stages: 
before the A, after the A but before the conductor, and after the conductor takes 
charge. This observation will be used in chapter three to help interpret the structure 
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of Balthasar’s Nine Propositions. For the moment, the main feature of interest is the 
way in which the metaphor informs Balthasar’s treatment of theological pluralism. 
Once the orchestra has started playing the symphony there is a clear complementarity 
between the diversity of the instruments (and players) and the unity of the symphony. 
To put this another way, the players are each doing something different: they are 
using their particular instrument to play a particular line of the score. At the same 
time the players are doing a single thing: they are playing a symphony. Balthasar 
uses this metaphor of unity-in-difference and of difference-in-unity to designate the 
relationship between theologians and their varied theological arguments. 
Balthasar’s rich symphony metaphor generates a number of questions, including the 
role played by the score which directs the performance of the players. For the 
moment, we will consider the ways in which Balthasar’s metaphor of the symphony 
challenges or transforms the ITC’s account of theological and moral pluralism. It is 
clear that Balthasar wishes to make a contribution to the question facing the ITC 
because he uses the high-profile concept of the criterion. Thus, Balthasar argues that 
his aim in TS is to identify ‘a practically applicable criterion for the right path to 
knowledge’ which can be used to mark out the limit of ‘permissible theological 
pluralism’.
73
 This latter point repeats the formulation used by the ITC in response to 
Rahner’s advocacy of theological pluralism at their 1969 assembly. This assembly 
had taken place within a year of the publication of ‘Freedom for Theology’ and 
Rahner was one of three scholars involved with that statement who had been 
appointed to the ITC.
74
 As we have seen, the commission’s 1969 communiqué states 
that: ‘…there exists a pluralism that is legitimate and necessary, even in regard to 
doctrine’.
75
 The concept of the criterion was then introduced to the debate at the 1972 
assembly in Ratzinger’s seventh proposition on theological pluralism. 
Consistent with the metaphor of the symphony, the criterion that Balthasar proposes 
in TS by which to determine the limit of legitimate doctrinal pluralism is also the title 
of the new theological journal which he had been responsible for founding, namely, 
‘participation, communio’.
76
 Explained a little more fully, Balthasar characterises 
permissible theological arguments as those that ‘take their stand within the all-
embracing mystery [of Christ].’
77
 This is difficult to interpret because it is difficult to 
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understand how participation might be taken to be a ‘criterion’ for judging 
permissible and impermissible theological arguments. Surely it is an activity rather 
than a governing principle? Balthasar does not clarify this interpretative problem in 
TS as he uses the temporal terms ‘path’ or ‘perspective’ interchangeably with the 
more formal concept of a ‘criterion’. Thus, in order to understand better how 
Balthasar’s symphonic participation might work as a ‘criterion’ we will divert our 
attention for a moment to a text from the eighteenth century by Hegel. 
There is a gap of at least 175 years between Hegel’s ‘The Spirit of Christianity and 
its Fate’ (1798-1799) and Balthasar’s TS.
78
 There are two general reasons why one 
might turn to Hegel to help one understand Balthasar. First, Hegel has a famously 
communal account of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which resembles Balthasar’s concept 
of communio (participation).
79
 Second, the Anglican theologian Ben Quash has 
argued that ‘Hegel accompanies von Balthasar’s thought everywhere in his trilogy’.
80
 
A third, more particular, reason is that it is clear that Balthasar had read this text by 
Hegel as he paraphrases a section in his Theo-Drama I published in 1973.
81
 
There is evidence from Theo-Drama I – published in between TS and the Nine 
Propositions – that Balthasar read widely in the philosophy of Hegel. However, for 
the purposes of interpreting TS and the Nine Propositions we will only be referring 
to ‘The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’ (henceforth, SCF). We use this text as a 
heuristic device to cast light on Balthasar’s treatment of theological and moral 
pluralism, and on the participatory use that Balthasar makes of the concept of a 
criterion. 
It is important to note at the outset that Hegel makes no claim to theological 
orthodoxy in SCF and assumes unorthodox versions of the doctrines of creation, the 
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eschaton, Scripture, Trinity and Christ. With regards to the latter, Hegel argues that 
Christians should only worship Jesus Christ in his divine nature, thus denying the 
significance of Christ’s humanity. Balthasar would not find these claims by Hegel 
persuasive. 
It is also important to note that Hegel’s discussion of ‘the Jewish spirit’ in SCF is 
disturbing.
82
 The account of this spirit is highly stylised, being subordinated to 
Hegel’s critique of the moral philosophy of Kant. Abraham and his descendants are 
presented as proto-Kantians who exist under the mastery of a ‘God’ who is entirely 
distinct from the natural world.
83
 The role being played by Kant is evident from clues 
such as Hegel’s occasional use of the technical term ‘Ideal’ to stand in for ‘God’ and 
by the former’s sudden appearance in the argument.
84
 Thus, in the course of 
promoting his own philosophy over that of Kant, Hegel offers an utterly 
supersessionist account of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. This 
adds to the list of unorthodox theological claims in SCF.
85
 
Behind Hegel’s highly problematic account of the Jewish spirit is a dense discussion 
– in conversation with Kant – of the philosophy of law. The concept of law is closely 
related to that of a criterion and an appreciation of Hegel’s discussion casts 
considerable light on the shape of Balthasar’s argument in TS and the Nine 
Propositions. 
In SCF, Hegel uses the term ‘whole’ to refer to the total context within which human 
existence finds itself. He further argues that this ‘…whole can be divided only into 
idea and reality, so also the supreme unity of mastery lies either in something thought 
or in something real.’
86
 Laws, then, cannot be an expression of the whole because 
they are entirely restricted to the realm of ideas, i.e. thinking. In the case of the 
Jewish spirit, Hegel argues that they only had a single kind of law – ‘religious laws’ 
– and that these were experienced as ‘purely objective commands’ from “God”.
87
 
Later, as part of his total opposition to the Jewish spirit, Jesus introduces a distinction 
between religious laws, which relate to the worship of the divine, and moral or civil 
laws which refer to nature. As Hegel explains: 
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Against purely objective commands Jesus set something totally foreign to 
them, namely, the subjective in general; but he took up a different attitude to 
those laws which from varying points of view we call either moral or else 
civil commands. Since it is natural relations which these express in the form 
of commands, it is perverse to make them wholly or partly objective. Since 
laws are unifications of opposites in a concept, which thus leaves them as 
opposites while it exists itself in opposition to reality, it follows that the 
concept expresses a should [Sollen].
88
 
The first phrase deals with the opposition which Jesus is said to offer to the religious 
dimension of the Jewish spirit. Where the Jewish people took themselves to be the 
dutiful servants of abstract objectivity Jesus asserted the co-primacy of subjectivity. 
This is best understood as the reassertion of subjective inclination – grounded in 
reality – against religious duty, grounded in the idea of God. Recall here that there 
are two sides into which the whole can be divided which we will refer to, henceforth, 
using the pair thinking/being rather than idea/reality. 
Jesus also drew attention to the fact that moral and civil laws – that is, laws that refer 
to being – cannot be treated as in any way objective since they are conditioned by 
something finite. In particular, Hegel argues that they are generated by oppositions 
between individuals or groups in lived human existence. Rather than fight for 
mastery over a particular question, these opposed parties agree – in thought – upon a 
shared path of action. The product of this agreement is a moral law if it is agreed by 
all, or a civil law if it is agreed under pressure from political might. In both cases, it 
remains an open question whether the agreement will be lived out in reality (being). 
Thus, laws are always, for Hegel, unifications in a concept (thinking) and are always 
opposed to reality (being). This opposition to reality is expressed by a ‘should’. 
This treatment of law is fundamental to Hegel’s argument in SCF because it rules out 
the possibility that law can ever be the basis for the fundamental human task of 
reconciliation. Hegel also attributes this view to Jesus. At the time that he was 
writing TS, Balthasar may have found Hegel’s critique of Kantian moral philosophy 
of interest, as recent developments in moral theology had been generated by the 
latter. In particular, Alfons Auer’s emphasis on ‘autonomy’ – which is not analysed 
in this thesis – had recently taken up one of Kant’s central moral concepts.
89
 
Balthasar may have been interested in Hegel’s basic criticism that Kantian accounts 
of reconciliation around a moral law – let alone moral laws – are inherently 
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alienating. In other words, they represent the triumph of the objective (law/duty) over 
the subjective (inclination). Everyone involved in this kind of Kantian thinking is 
presupposing that they are internally divided between their duty and their inclination. 
Against this account, Hegel proposes the philosophy of love. This form of thinking 
recognises that all distinctions, including the distinction between duty (to obey laws) 
and inclination, are the product of human thinking and are not a sufficient basis to 
reconcile the whole. A thinker who follows Hegel on this point refuses to pursue 
reconciliation in a way that requires them to imagine that they are internally divided 
between their duty and their inclination. 
In SCF, Hegel uses the concepts of ‘love’ and ‘life’ in quite particular ways. Life is 
released once the one-sidedness of law and duty have been eliminated from thinking. 
Love is then the kind of relationship between human beings (‘differents’ in Hegel’s 
strained vocabulary) which is generated by life.
90
 As has already been mentioned, 
Jesus is presented as the teacher of life who inaugurates a community of love (the 
Church). However, Hegel gives divergent accounts of the agent who is loving and 
alive, on the one hand, and of the particular relationship between Jesus and the 
Jewish spirit, on the other.  
Maintaining his highly disturbing supersessionism, Hegel explains that it was 
impossible for the various factions within second temple Judaism to be reconciled in 
love.
91
 Thus, ‘enmities like those he [Jesus] sought to transcend can be overcome 
only by valour; they cannot be reconciled by love.’
92
 This introduces a striking 
account of evil which bears similarities to Balthasar’s account in the Nine 
Propositions. Briefly noted, the root of evil is not rule-breaking, nor enmity nor 
violence, but the rejection of the philosophy of love. In the particular case of second 
temple Judaism, the philosophy of love has been rejected so utterly that battle is 
apparently the only possible response, even from Jesus who is living the philosophy 
of love. 
The meaning of Hegel’s distinction between valour and love becomes clearer later in 
the text when Hegel gives his account of the life of love. In the present state of the 
world, such a life is confronted by what Hegel terms ‘fate’ [Schicksal]. This ‘appears 
to arise only through another’s deed’ but is in fact a kind of loving relation to the 
world. If one receives an ‘unjust attack’ then one can either hold onto one’s right or 
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one can give it up. The former option can take the form of ‘battle or submissive 
grief’. In the case of battle, one courageously enters into a defence of one’s right, 
whilst, in the case of submissive grief, one laments that one is unable to defend what 
belongs to oneself (i.e. one’s right). Both are therefore ways of retaining one’s 
right.
93
 Confusingly, battle is the response which Hegel earlier saw Jesus offering to 
the Jewish spirit. In this later part of the text, Hegel proposes that the path of the 
philosophy of love does not lie in the retention of one’s right. Rather, Hegel offers a 
stoical account of the life of love and argues that those who follow the path of love 
must refuse to hold onto their right in the manner of battle or submissive grief, but 
must accept their fate: ‘Every grief which thus results to him is so far just and is now 
his unhappy fate, a fate which he himself has consciously wrought; and it is his 
distinction to suffer justly, because he is raised so far above these rights that he 
willed to have them for enemies. Moreover, since this fate is rooted in himself, he 
can endure it, face it, because his griefs are not a pure passivity, the predominance of 
an alien being, but are produced by himself.’
94
 Those living this life of love cannot 
appeal to an external judge (who would be alien to them) and cannot hold onto their 
right (which is a kind of law) but actively suffer unhappiness for the purpose of 
holding themselves open to the free, loving reconciliation of the whole. 
This analysis will not explore the inconsistency between Hegel’s account of Jesus 
and his account of the life of love, although it promises an interesting avenue for 
future research. The primary benefit of setting out Hegel’s opposition between law 
and life/love is that it can be used to cast light on Balthasar’s approach to pluralism 
in TS and the Nine Propositions. For example, towards the end of his discussion of 
the Jewish spirit, Hegel revisits the prohibition on idolatry: ‘[b]y serving strange 
gods, they were untrue not to one of the laws which we call “laws of the land” 
[Staatsgestze] but to the principle of their entire legislation and their state…’.
95
 The 
point that Hegel is making at this moment is that the worship of other gods is a 
transgression of the absolute distinction, between Abraham’s ‘God’ and nature, 
which has generated the particular Jewish spirit. Indeed, when introducing the 
Mosaic law, Hegel explains that ‘[t]he principle of the entire legislation was the spirit 
inherited from his forefathers, i.e., was the infinite Object…’.
96
 Thus, when Hegel 
refers to the ‘principle’ of the Jews he is referring to the characteristic mark of their 
spirit: the priority of law, duty and objectivity over the Jewish people. Indeed, 
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towards the end of SCF Hegel summarises his account of the Jews with the claim 




This discussion of Hegel’s use of the concept of ‘principle’ is helpful because he 
uses it when he comes to contrast Christianity with his caricature of the Jewish spirit. 
It has already been noted that Hegel repeatedly emphasises that Jesus sets himself 
against the Jewish spirit in its entirety. However, it has not yet been noted that Hegel 
describes this relationship, at one point, as ‘a conflict of principles’.
98
 Jesus, on 
Hegel’s account, has diagnosed the inadequacy of law as a basis for reconciliation, 
recognising that it is grounded only in human thinking and not in reality (or being). 
As it becomes clearer to the Jewish people that Jesus is opposing the entire principle 
of their spirit, a conflict emerges between the new principle being proposed by Jesus 
(life of love) and the Jewish principle (law of ‘God’). This new principle is adequate 
to the task of reconciliation because it is not restricted to thought in the manner of 
law. 
Taken at its most general, this discussion of Hegel’s use of ‘principle’ assists the 
reader to interpret passages where Balthasar makes use of the term. For example, 
when Balthasar refers to Jesus Christ and Adam as the two principles of universal 
solidarity in Theo-Drama I, this can be read as a similar way of characterising spirits 
to that of Hegel in SCF.
99
 Balthasar contrasts the natural spirit of the whole (Adam) 
with the redeemed spirit of the whole (Christ) whilst Hegel contrasts the dutiful spirit 
of the Jews with the loving spirit taught by Christ. This method of cultural analysis is 




Accepting that Balthasar interprets communities in terms of their ‘principle’ or spirit, 
it is worth briefly commenting on Balthasar’s transition, in the course of the first part 
of TS, from using the concept of a ‘principle’ to that of a ‘criterion’. The prominence 
of ‘criterion’ in postconciliar moral theology was noted at the start of this section and 
Balthasar should be read in this light, i.e. switching from the concept of a ‘principle’ 
to a ‘criterion’ is Balthasar’s way of including contemporary debates about 
theological and moral criteria within his argument in TS about theological pluralism.  
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A more interesting comment is to notice the way in which Balthasar uses this method 
of analysis differently from Hegel in SCF. In TS, Balthasar’s advance towards ‘[t]he 
criterion of dogma’ reaches a different conclusion than Hegel’s principle of the life 
of love in SCF.
101
 Firstly, Balthasar argues that whilst ‘[m]an is always trying to 
assemble the multifarious aspects of truth under a single principle that he can grasp’, 
‘…we must give up the idea of possessing this principle ourselves.’
102
 Furthermore, 
Balthasar proposes that the Mystery of Christ is the criterion of the Christian church. 
This is more specific than Hegel’s principle of nonpersonal living beauty and, 
according to Balthasar, its mystery quality means that the principle cannot be 
reduced merely to an object in the world.
103
 This means that the Mystery of Christ 
cannot ever be completely grasped by any individual or community. 
Before further interpreting Balthasar’s claim in TS that the Mystery of Christ is the 
criterion of true theological pluralism it is helpful to rehearse Hegel’s critique of 
Christianity in SCF in a little more detail. Hegel applauds the Christian decision to 
recognise the significance of subjectivity in contrast to the Jewish service of 
objectivity. However, the Christian community ultimately fails to find ‘the middle 
course of beauty between extremes’.
104
 What the Christian community sought was a 
‘presentation of the love uniting the group’.
105
 For this purpose, Hegel argues, they 
gradually divinised Jesus, the founder of their way of life.
106
 However, the fact that 
Christians hold onto the humanity – which means the finitude – of Jesus Christ 
represents a passive submission to fate. There is simply no way in which the 
Christian community can unite with a man who is dead and, by holding onto this 
impossible desire, the community prevents the ‘coalescing’ of reality and spirit, 
being and thinking, into ‘pure nature’.
107
 Thus, it is the fate of the Christian religion 
never to reconcile the entirety of the whole of existence in love. According to Hegel, 
the road that would have been preferable for Christians to have taken is to worship 
Jesus as a means of worshipping the divinity of the whole. This reflects Hegel’s 
unorthodox doctrine of creation in which the fall of humanity is associated with 
Noah’s flood – a contingent disaster – and with his claim that Jesus taught that 
‘nature is greater than the temple’.
108
 If Christians were prepared to let go of the 
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worship of Christ in his contingent human nature then they would actively seek 
reconciliation (rather than passively desire the impossible) and end up at the position 
of Hegel. This latter position is that of an eighteenth century philosopher who is 
attempting to persuade his readers to give up their Kantian illusions of reconciliation 
by law and live the active and beautiful life of love. 
Hegel’s unorthodox characterisation of Old Testament Israel and the Christian 
church in SCF is a powerful and highly problematic analysis of Christian faith. In the 
light of Hegel’s analysis, Balthasar’s account of the criterion of the Mystery of Christ 
can be seen to be equally powerful and as maintaining orthodox doctrinal positions. 
One of the key features of Balthasar’s account, which we have already noted, is his 
attribution of a mystery quality to the criterion of the Mystery of Christ. Before 
probing this point further in the text of TS, we will first sketch Balthasar’s account of 
the knowledge of God in The Glory of the Lord VI (1967).
109
 This is helpful because 
it introduces the important and difficult concept of the ‘divine “I”’ which Balthasar 
also uses in TS. 
Balthasar’s account of the ‘divine “I”’ in Glory VI emerges out of his interpretation 
of glory in the Old Testament and the related, but consequential, themes of image 
and word.
110
 On the one hand, Balthasar argues that the glory of the Lord is the 
primary content of Scripture.
111
 At the same time, Balthasar insists that this is always 
and completely a divine glory because God does not in any way become ‘submerged 
in the biological sphere’.
112
 The theological challenge, then, is to articulate how the 
infinite, unknowable, transcendent God makes himself known in salvation history to 
finite creatures. 
According to Balthasar, to gain the knowledge of the divine glory of God it is 
necessary for finite creatures to be ‘transported’ (by God) beyond their natural state 
and to be given (by God) a ‘supernatural glance’ or ‘enlightened eyes’.
113
 Even then, 
however, this knowledge of the divine has two specific features. In the first place, the 
transportation of faith is always associated with finite sensory signs since: ‘there is 
no such thing as ‘purely spiritual’ revelations on God’s part.’
114
 This association is 
difficult to articulate because the sensory signs themselves are not the divine glory of 
God. However, they are the necessary accompaniment of the revelation of God and 
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call ‘the person addressed to ‘attention’ before the absolute subject that is making 
itself present to him’.
115
 
A second feature of this account is that the supernatural knowledge gained by the 
finite creature is of God’s glory. This paradoxical knowledge thus has all the 
characteristics of an experience and is an ‘undialogical presupposition’ upon which a 
dialogue between finite creatures and infinite God can be started.
116
 Indeed, it is only 
subsequently, after the experience of being overawed and transported, that the 
creature becomes constituted as a finite subject (imaging God’s infinite subjectivity) 




This account of the experience or knowledge of God in the Old Testament provides 
the context within which Balthasar introduces his concept of the ‘divine “I”’. The 
primary purpose of this concept appears to be to insist that the non-verbal primal and 
paradoxical experience of the glory of God provides a true basis for the knowledge 
of God, that is, of God’s nature.
118
 In developing this argument, Balthasar offers a 
tentative analogy between a human person and God. In the Old Testament account of 
a person, Balthasar notes that there is a connection between the glory or weightiness 
of a person and their self. Thus, ‘it is not only the mysterious external radiance that is 
designated as kabod [glory], but also the ‘radiant centre’ of the person himself, his ‘I’ 
or ‘self’ in its stateliness for himself and for others.’
119
 In other words, the imposing 
force of any particular person, as they appear in ordinary human interaction, is taken 
by Balthasar as being revelatory of their “I”, understood as their essential character 
and personhood. On the basis of this analysis, Balthasar is prepared to talk about the 
glory of God as the “imposing force” of God truly revealing the essential character 
and personhood of God, i.e. the ‘divine “I”’. Balthasar then goes on to fill out this 
concept of God’s self, by noting that it is a personal source of divine activity, and 
thereby accounting for the fact that it is God who initiates his revelation to the people 
of Israel. This activity takes the form of speaking and acting but always without 
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We will now return to TS and see how the ‘divine “I”’ and the criterion of the 
Mystery of Christ are used by Balthasar to address the question of true and false 
pluralism in doctrine. In the core metaphor of the symphony introduced above, the 
period corresponding to the Old Testament is that of the A note being sounded and 
the players gradually attuning themselves to this note. In the terms of Glory VI this 
can be interpreted as the beginning of God’s self-revelation by means of his glory. 
Once this has begun, there is an entirely new acting area between God and humanity 
– opened up by the experience of the Glory of the Lord – and one can either be inside 
or outside it. Thus, Balthasar argues that if a Christian was to ignore revelation and 
‘…seek his alleged salvation by turning exclusively to his fellow creatures …, such a 
Christian would, for himself, have already stepped outside the proper sphere of 
revelation.’
121
  This is an excellent anticipation of Balthasar’s argument in TS in 
which participation in the Mystery of Christ is the criterion of true pluralism in 
theology. 
There is, however, a difference between an active participation in Christ, described 
by Balthasar in TS, and an attention to, or receipt of, the glory of God in the Old 
Testament. This difference reflects the deepening of God’s self-revelation which 
takes place in the Mystery of Christ. As Balthasar explains it, ‘[t]he “I” of Jesus 
Christ is the measure of God’s distance from and nearness to man, that unimaginable 
nearness of him who is, and remains, even more unimaginably sublime above 
everything in the world…’.
122
 Put another way, the mystery of Christ, expressed in 
Christological doctrine, is the close association of God’s divine “I” and the human 
“I” of the person Jesus. This goes beyond the Old Testament experience in which 
numerous sensory signs are associated, in an ad hoc manner, with a ‘transported’ 
experience of the glory of the Lord. These are now replaced by a single specific 
sensory sign with which God’s divine “I” is in the closest possible association. Thus, 
‘the human “I” of Jesus Christ extends (in a way that is beyond our comprehension) 
into the being and the speech of a divine “I”…’.
123
 At the same time, Balthasar 
maintains that the divine “I” is still divine, and cannot be known in itself by finite 
knowers. It remains ever beyond the grasp of human creatures like pure white light 
after a beam has been refracted through a prism, or like the genius of a conductor 
who brings a symphony to life from a score and a set of players.  
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After establishing his account of the Mystery of Christ, Balthasar develops the 
argument that the “I” of Jesus Christ ‘is the organic and organising focus of truth.’
124
 
He goes on to express the consequence for pluralism for theology as follows: 
The principle of unity, which alone enables us to set the pluralist utterances in 
order, and hence to understand them, is not itself objectified in such a way 
that the uttering becomes the uttered. It can never be manipulated by man, by 
the theologian, for example, in an attempt to build a system of divine truth or 
of absolute knowledge from it. It remains the “I” of God in Christ, which can 
never be given to us in such a way that it comes to an end…
125
 
In this passage, Balthasar argues that the divine “I”, revealed definitively in Christ, is 
the principle of unity for the church and, by extension, for the world. It is thus 
capable of ‘setting the pluralist utterances in order’. Balthasar’s reference to 
objectification and uttering/uttered presupposes his account of the revelation of the 
divine “I” which we have just rehearsed from Glory VI. Specifically, Christians are 
able to gain true knowledge of the divine “I”, but this “I” always remains 
paradoxically beyond knowledge. This is the basis for Balthasar’s claim in the above 
passage that the principle of unity can never itself become ‘objectified’. Similarly, 
because the divine “I” can never be objectified, it manifests itself, in the form of the 
self-revelation of God, as an infinite uttering. This is reflected in the reference in the 
final quoted sentences to the fact that the “I” of God in Christ never ‘comes to an 
end’. It can also be understood, of course, as an allusion to the scriptural motif of 
Jesus Christ as the word of God. 
Balthasar’s reference, in the second sentence, to a ‘system… of absolute knowledge’ 
would seem to be a vague allusion to the philosophy of Hegel, possibly deliberately 
echoing the title of the concluding section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807). Whether or not this allusion is meant, Balthasar is clearly seeking to avoid a 
doctrinal rationalism which claims to have grasped the principle of Christian 
existence in thought such that it can work out a system, in thought, which is 
absolutely valid. Thus, Balthasar is emphasising the fact that whilst Christians have 
true knowledge about the measure of theological pluralism – i.e. the divine “I” which 
can be discerned in the Mystery of Christ – this is not a knowledge that overrides 
human spontaneity and inclination. Rather, it is a knowledge which brings order in 
the manner of a conductor of an orchestra. It is an order which requires a freedom 
and responsiveness in its exercise. Thus, when Balthasar refers to the Mystery of 
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Christ ‘setting the pluralist utterances in order’ this is not merely an order in thought, 
but also in lived reality through the body of Christ, the church. Similarly, any false 
pluralism will have to be both an expression of freedom of thought and a rejection of 
the community of practice which Christ has inaugurated. 
The section of Balthasar’s TS that remains to be discussed is his extension of his 
argument to the question of pluralism in moral theology. It is this extension which 
opens up the divergence between Balthasar and the majority of ITC commission 
members over the final three propositions of 1972. The section of TS on ethics 
occurs at the end of the first part and has a highly experimental feel. Indeed, 
Balthasar hints at one point that he is not entirely satisfied with this part of his 
argument.
126
 It begins with the assertion that the ‘mystery of Christ’ can be used to 
resolve the problem of moral pluralism in the same manner that it is used to resolve 
the problem of doctrinal pluralism: 
m. Ethics 
The criterion we have established is valid for dogmatics. It shows that the 
multiplicity of approximate forms of expression is perfectly normal, indeed 
indispensable. The Christian has no cause for alarm at this plurality. The 
mystery itself, in its maximality, serves as the critical instance selecting and 
grading the formulas, and the Church’s teaching office, supported by 




In this passage it is the concluding reference to ‘theoretical and practical direction’ 
which identifies the single response which Balthasar is offering to the two kinds of 
pluralism. The main innovation of this passage is the introduction of the ‘teaching 
office’ of the church into the discussion of pluralism for the first time. Here, 
Balthasar’s use of the technical term ‘direction’ [Weisung] is consistent with the 
conventions of this period, and is repeated in the Nine Propositions.
128
 More 
surprising, perhaps, is the absence of any reference to the people of God, after the 
manner of LG 12, who might also be able to apply the criterion by reaching a 
consensus on questions of faith and morals. 
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In other respects, Balthasar’s account of Christian ethics is an excellent repetition of 
the argument of LG which is discussed in the previous chapter. On the one hand, 
Balthasar accepts that there can only be one Christian ethics which is equivalent to 
the claim in chapter five of LG that there is only one call to holiness. On the other 
hand, Balthasar struggles to articulate the difference between religious, who have 
traditionally excelled in ascetical theology, and the lay faithful, who have been 
directed towards the teaching of moral theologians. It will be recalled that LG allows 
a distinct chapter on religious whilst emphasising the unity of the church. Balthasar 
takes up this position, but scrutinises the kind of ethical unity which might result 
from LG: ‘Is the church then to leave them [the faithful] to their own “consciences”, 
merely helping them on their way with some humanistic notion of love or social 




Balthasar’s response to his own concern is that the church must maintain ‘the 
stringency of the one commandment of love’ and he illustrates this stringency by 
reference to the ‘precise and hard conclusions [Folgerungen] of the Sermon on the 
Mount.’
130
 The strain in Balthasar’s argument is evident here. The reference to 
‘norms and commandments’ is weakened by a question mark, suggesting that 
Balthasar wishes to affirm certain moral claims whilst avoiding the absoluteness of 
law which was critiqued by Hegel in SCF. This commitment is further evident in the 
reference to the single ‘commandment of love’ (the only “commandment” that Hegel 
will allow) and the characterisation of the Sermon on the Mount as offering a series 
of logical inferences (“conclusions”) from that single commandment. Hegel, of 
course, has no problem with the idea that agents who learn to love might suffer due 
to their renunciation of right in the face of a still-hostile world. This is the aspect of 
Hegel’s argument which Balthasar wishes to use as a ground for the ‘stringency’ of 
Christian ethics and, thus, for the fact that difficult teaching from pope and bishops is 
something to be expected (an implicit comment on the Humanae vitae crisis.
131
) 
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In the final analysis, Balthasar’s experimental account of Christian ethics in TS 
lapses into two implausible formulations. In the first place, Balthasar argues that, 
whilst Jesus permanently embodied ‘the new law of love’, he also held ‘diverse 
attitudes’ towards different groups of people. In particular, Jesus laid ‘rigoristic 
requirements’ on his disciples and acted with ‘indulgent magnanimity’ towards 
sinners.
132
 Balthasar subsequently argues that ‘[t]he ages that, it was thought, put 
forward a double standard of morality (one for better and one for ordinary Christians) 
are basically those in which people believed they could manage with a single 
morality, applied analogically.’
133
 On this argument, there has never been a 
distinction between ascetical and moral theology, but only two ‘analogical’ readings 
of the requirements of love for different situations. If this was the case, of course, 
then there would have been no controversy over the ‘universal call to holiness’ in LG 
and no popular rejection of the legalism of the moral manuals. By claiming that 
moral theology and ascetical theology were analogues, Balthasar appears to be 
rewriting the laity’s practical experience of the moral manuals. These were not 
experienced as indulgent and magnanimous but as legal and obligatory. Balthasar’s 
desire to avoid criticising previous generations of moral theologians, an aspect of his 
commitment to the unity of the church, strains his credibility to the limit.
134
 
In the second place, however, Balthasar argues that there should now be, in the 
postconciliar period, only a single morality which is the single demand of love 
revealed by Christ. However, Balthasar then breaks with his own argument to 
suggest that the ‘Church can and must issue certain guidelines [Richtlinien]’.
135
 This 
is immediately followed by the reminder that the love of Christ is ‘indivisible’. 
However, once the teaching office has been permitted to issue guidelines which 
express the love of Christ, Balthasar appears to be drifting towards an account of 
moral law which is vulnerable to Hegelian critique. Either that or these guidelines 
simply articulate what is already the case and carry no connotation of obligation. 
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(iii) Balthasar’s disagreement with the ‘Christian moral knowledge’ research 
programme (1972-1974) 
Balthasar’s disagreement with the ITC’s ‘Christian moral knowledge’ research 
programme arises from his experimental proposal in TS that the Mystery of Christ is 
the criterion of Christian and non-Christian ethics, as well as the criterion of true and 
false doctrinal pluralism. We have already seen in the first section of this chapter that 
Balthasar played an active role in the discussions of the ITC up to 1972. We propose 
that the primary reason that Balthasar drafted the Nine Propositions in 1974 was to 
repair the work of the commission on moral theology. The purpose of this section is 
to trace the development of the ITC’s research programme on ‘the criteria for 
Christian moral knowledge’ from its beginning in 1969 in order to show how it is 
inconsistent with Balthasar’s proposal. Balthasar indicates his counter-proposal in TS 
and then drafts the Nine Propositions to try to convince his fellow commission 
members in 1974. 
The ITC first decided to pursue research into ‘the criteria for Christian moral 
knowledge’ at its 1969 assembly. As with their other theological investigations, the 
work was delegated to a subcommission, in this case under the presidency of 
Delhaye. The remainder of the subcommission comprised a dogmatic theologian 
(Lonergan), two biblical scholars (Feuillet and Schürmann) and a liturgist 
(Vagaggini).
136
 By commissioning research into Christian moral knowledge, the ITC 
addressed itself to a serious problem facing the church. In the previous chapter we 
identified a number of factors pressing on the discipline of moral theology. First, 
moral theologians had to deal with the popular and scholarly repudiation of the neo-
Scholastic manuals of moral theology. Second, the council endorsed a Christological 
shift in moral theology without explaining in detail what this might look like. A third 
pressure can then be added in 1968, namely the contradiction of the official report of 
the Pontifical Commission by the encyclical Humanae vitae. The decision of the ITC 
to initiate research into ‘the criteria for Christian moral knowledge’ eighteen months 
after this encyclical took the commission to the heart of the postconciliar debate 
regarding the future of moral theology. 
The previous chapter has discussed the brief use of the concept of ‘objective criteria’ 
in GS 51 which is subsequently given great prominence in the official report of the 
Pontifical Commission. The use of this concept in the official report marks a major 
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innovation in moral theology because it merges the divine and natural law into a 
single set of shared criteria for human action. At the same time, the report argues that 
these shared criteria are highly general and uses this to invent a realm of private 
application which is not open to scrutiny by the leadership of the church. In 
continuity with this report, the ITC research programme adopts the concept of 
‘criteria’ as a contemporary term of art for moral rules or laws. However, it also 
edges away from the report by insisting that these are criteria for Christian moral 
knowledge when the ‘objective criteria’ of the 1966 report are ambiguously natural 
and divine. The ITC also drops the word ‘objective’, indicating scepticism regarding 
the suitability of this kind of law for moral theology. 
There is very limited information available regarding the work undertaken by the 
subcommission during the period 1969-1974.  At one end, it is known which 
members were appointed to the subcommission in 1969. At the other end, there are a 
number of documents, and a small number of comments, which illuminate the 1974 
ITC assembly at which the subcommission presented its findings. Between these 
points stand only the three propositions on pluralism in morals which were agreed by 
the ITC in 1972. This is the only window into the beliefs of the ITC on moral 
theology during the five year period in which the subcommission carried out its 
research. It is also a point at which it is possible to observe a divergence between 
Balthasar and his fellow commission members. For this reason we will discuss these 
propositions in detail before turning to the events at the ITC assembly of 1974. 
The decision by the commission to comment on pluralism in morals before the 
Christian moral knowledge research programme had completed its work suggests 
that most commission members continued to believe that pluralism of moral teaching 
was a distinctive question from that of the criteria for Christian moral knowledge. 
The evidence from TS in the previous section shows that this was not Balthasar’s 
view. The most likely origin for the 1972 propositions on moral pluralism is Delhaye 
or his subcommission. In the first place, these propositions take a similar approach to 
the paper by Heinz Schürmann which was tabled by this subcommission in 1974 as a 
basis for agreement by the commission. There is also a similarity of approach 
between the argument of propositions thirteen to fifteen and a journal article by 
Delhaye on the authority of Christian conscience.
137
 Finally, Delhaye reports that he 
took responsibility for editing the ITC’s commentary on these three propositions.
138
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Nevertheless, our attribution of these propositions to Delhaye and his subcommission 
remains speculative. 
The three propositions on moral pluralism disclose a general sympathy on the part of 
the majority of the ITC for an amalgamation of neo-Scholasticism and a ‘faith-ethic’. 
The title of the Christian moral knowledge research programme has already 
suggested such a tendency and the 1972 propositions on moral pluralism – which 
were either carried unanimously or by a ‘large majority’ of commission members – 
conform to this tendency.
139
 As such, the commission will have been unsympathetic 
to the so-called Autonomous ethics evident in the work of Auer.
140
 Balthasar 
probably shared the ITC’s scepticism regarding autonomism, but his argument in TS 
shows that he was also dissatisfied with any faith-ethic that is put forward in terms of 
a plurality of rules (or criteria). There is only one criterion for Balthasar, namely, the 
Mystery of Christ. 
Having set them in context as far as possible, we will now interpret the three 
propositions on moral pluralism agreed by the commission in 1972. Consistent with 
their being drafted by a single theologian, or small group of theologians, they form a 
carefully structured unit: proposition thirteen treats moral pluralism and moral unity 
in general, proposition fourteen treats the unity of Christian morality and proposition 
fifteen treats pluralism in Christian morality: 
Pluralism and Unity in Morals 
13. Pluralism in morals appears first of all in the application of general 
principles to concrete circumstances, and it is accentuated when contacts 
occur between cultures that were ignorant of one another or as a result of 
rapid changes in society. 
A fundamental unity is manifested, however, in a common esteem for human 
dignity, carrying with it imperatives [normas imperitivas] for the conduct of 
human life. 
The conscience of every man expresses a certain number of fundamental 
demands (cf. Rom 2:14), which have been recognized in our times by public 
expressions of the essential human rights.
141
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As has already been noted, the first eight propositions from this series address 
themselves to the question of pluralism in Christian doctrine. This is in keeping with 
the object of Ratzinger’s subcommission, namely unity and pluralism in Christian 
faith. However, the discussion of pluralism in morals begins with a proposition 
addressed to moral pluralism in general (i.e. independently of the Christian faith). In 
doing so, it retains the traditional neo-Scholastic assumption that there is a natural 
morality which is shared by the whole of humankind and which is repeated in 
Christian morality.  
The three sections of this proposition are difficult to interpret together. The first is 
definitely related to the topic of pluralism in natural human morals and the second 
and third set out the unity of natural morals. This mirrors the relationship between 
propositions fourteen and fifteen which treat the unity and plurality of Christian 
morality respectively. The first section also identifies three factors which together 
“explain” the phenomenon of moral pluralism. The second two of these factors imply 
that pluralism is a temporary phenomenon which will be resolved once changes in 
society have been normalised and once different cultures have become more familiar 
with one another. This is an account in which pluralism in morals is a temporary 
deviation from set of natural moral norms. 
The initial reference to ‘the application of general principles to concrete 
circumstances’ differs from the other two factors because it is a kind of pluralism 
that is permanent. It would appear to repeat the argument of the 1966 official report 
of the Pontifical Commission to the extent that ‘general principles’ are communally 
recognised and agreed, but their application by individuals in their diverse 
circumstances generates a legitimate pluralism of practice. This means that, whilst 
instances of pluralism between groups are temporary (differences between cultures 
and within a society), pluralism has a permanent place in the practice of individuals. 
This endorsement of this aspect of the official report is a surprise given the ITC’s 
scepticism regarding the reports use of the term objective in ‘objective criteria’. 
In drafting this proposition, the ITC also adjudicate between the two readings of 
GS 16 which we set out in the second section of the previous chapter.
142
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proposition, the ITC interpret this factor as a set of laws rather than the voice of God. 
Moreover, in the third section of proposition thirteen, the ITC also identifies these 
laws (or, GS 16, ‘objective norms of morality’). According to the ITC the 
‘fundamental demands’ of conscience had recently been defined, with some 
approximation, in ‘public expressions of the essential human rights.’ Thus, the ITC 
interprets GS 16 in terms of a natural law morality in which all of humanity shares a 
set of fundamental laws. Any claim not to recognise these norms is merely 
temporary, and will be resolved by a more diligent investigation of conscience. 
However, there will always be some diversity in the application of these norms by 
individuals in their various circumstances. 
The final comment on proposition thirteen, then, is to interpret the account of the 
‘fundamental unity’ of morality given in the second section. This attributes unity not 
to a list of shared moral demands, located in conscience, but to a ‘common esteem 
for human dignity’. At one level, the inconsistency between this single criterion and 
the multiple demands of conscience might be put down to the desire of the ITC to 
harmonise their interpretation of GS 16 with the declaration on religious freedom 
(Dignitatis humanae). There may, however, be a little more to it. The reference to 
‘imperative norms’ ties the argument of the proposition together. The ‘general 
principles’ of the first section are the same as the ‘imperative norms’ of the second 
section and the ‘fundamental demands’ of the third. On this reading, all the sections 
agree that there is a fundamental unity in human morality grounded in what GS 16 
calls the ‘objective norms of morality’. However, the ‘common esteem’ hints at an 
alternative basis of unity which Balthasar develops in the Nine Propositions. It is 
even possible that Balthasar was responsible for inserting this reference into the 
proposition. The unity of humanity in a ‘common esteem’ is open to an interpretation 
along the lines of Hegel’s reconciliation of the world in ‘love’ or Balthasar’s 
reconciliation of the world in the Mystery of Christ. However, in the absence of a 
detailed account of the drafting of these propositions the suggestion that Balthasar 
contributed at this point must remain highly speculative. 
14. The unity of Christian morality is based on unchanging principles, 
contained in the Scriptures, clarified by Tradition, presented to each 
generation by the Magisterium. Let us recall the principal emphases: the 
teaching and example of the Son of God revealing the heart of his Father; 
conformity to his death and his Resurrection; life in the Spirit in the bosom of 




the Church, in faith, hope, and charity, so that we may be renewed according 
to the image of God.
143
 
This proposition turns from natural human morality to consider Christian morality. It 
is also the proposition which most obviously diverges from Balthasar’s account of 
the ‘criterion’ in TS. The question is: what is the basis for the unity of Christian 
morality? According to Balthasar, the unity of theology is the entire Mystery of 
Christ, and it is a grave error to claim to be able to fully grasp this principle. 
Proposition seven in this series of propositions from the ITC offers a variant on 
Balthasar’s argument when it characterises the criterion as the whole of the church’s 
‘normative pronouncements’. In this fourteenth proposition, however, the unity of 
Christian morality is a set of ‘unchanging principles, contained in the Scriptures’. 
This makes exactly the error which Balthasar identifies in TS, namely, claiming that 
the principle can be identified. It also shows a movement away from ‘criteria’ in the 
1969 research programme back towards the ‘objective criteria’ of the 1966 report. 
What else is ‘unchanging’ meant to imply? 
It is possible that Balthasar contributed to the second half of this proposition as the 
list closely parallels his argument in TS. In particular, the list of ‘unchanging 
principles’ reads more like a list of virtues than of laws or criteria. They also mark a 
reversal of the neo-Scholastic norm, in that, as a summary of Christian moral 
principles they are less specific than the general human morality listed in the 
previous proposition (human rights). 
15. The necessary unity of faith and communion does not hinder a diversity 
of vocations and of personal preferences in the manner of coming to terms 
with the mystery of Christ and of life. 
Christian liberty (Gal 5:1&13), far from implying a limitless pluralism, 
demands a struggle toward totally objective truth no less than patience with 
less robust consciences (cf. Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8). 
Respect for the autonomy of human values and legitimate responsibilities in 
this area carries with it the possibility of a variety of analyses and options on 
temporal matters for Christians. This variety is compatible with total 
obedience and love (cf. Gaudium et Spes 43).
144
 
The final proposition turns to the particular question facing the commission in 1972 
and gives an account of pluralism in Christian morality. In contrast to the natural 
human morality discussed in proposition thirteen, this proposition only envisages a 
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single source of Christian pluralism, namely, the different ways in which the 
unchanging principles of Christian morality might be applied by particular 
individuals. 
The second section of the proposition continues a trend that is evident in propositions 
one to eight, and in Balthasar’s TS, by prioritising unity over pluralism. In particular, 
the proclamation of the freedom of the Christian is constrained by the Christian 
commitment to truth. In the light of the reference to the ‘mystery of Christ’ in the 
first section of the proposition, the ‘truth’ referred to might simply be Jesus Christ 
(cf. Jn. 14:6) and then the proposition would be claiming that Christians are unified 
in their attempt to ‘put on Christ’ (Gal 3:27 cf. Rom 13:14). The only difficulty with 
this interpretation is that it is not entirely clear how the existential ‘struggle’ for truth 
relates to the gift of faith in Jesus Christ. 
The third section of the proposition is the most interesting because it addresses itself 
to the problem of the relationship between a shared and detailed human morality 
(human rights: proposition thirteen) and a vaguer Christian morality (proposition 
fourteen). As has already been noted, this is an innovation on the neo-Scholastic 
legacy to the extent that the Christian morality is less detailed than the natural human 
morality that it is said to repeat. What happens if an unchanging principle of 
Christian morality and a widely influential interpretation of human rights conflict 
with one another? (By the mid-twentieth century it is evidently impossible for moral 
theologians or the pope simply to select the philosophical account of the natural that 
they find most conducive to Christian morality.) 
In response to this problem, the ITC hints that pluralism in ‘temporal matters’ can 
coincide with a ‘total’ conformity to general Christian criteria such as ‘obedience’ 
and ‘love’. In doing so, the proposition would seem to be appealing to the suggestion 
in GS 43 ‘[l]et Christians …be proud of the opportunity to carry out their earthly 
activity in such a way as to integrate human, domestic, professional, scientific and 
technical enterprises with religious values, under whose supreme direction all things 
are ordered to the glory of God.’
145
 Further analysis of this reference requires a more 
detailed interpretation of GS than has been offered in the previous chapter. 
The basic divergence between Balthasar’s argument in TS and the propositions on 
moral pluralism agreed by the ITC in 1972 is the latter’s claim that Christians and 
human beings are unified on a set of rules. Balthasar’s approach can be interpreted in 
the light of Hegel’s SCF. Specifically, Balthasar maintains that human beings are 
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reconciled on a single principle. Where Balthasar considers this principle to be the 
Mystery of Christ, Hegel takes it to be nonpersonal living beauty.
146
 On this point, 
the ITC stand in continuity with the neo-Scholastic manuals in treating law as a 
suitable basis for reconciliation (with God and with one another). Having identified 
this difference, the chapter will conclude by introducing the ITC’s plenary assembly 
on moral theology in 1974. This is the assembly at which Balthasar tables the Nine 
Propositions in order to repair the 1972 propositions and (ambitiously) to redirect the 
debate in the church on the future of moral theology.  
There remains uncertainty regarding the title of the ITC’s 1974 assembly. Some 
years after the gathering, Delhaye identifies the title of the discussion as ‘Christian 
morality and norms’.
147
 However, there are other conflicting sources: the title of the 
1969 work programme is ‘the criteria for Christian moral knowledge’; in his address 
to the commission in 1974, Paul VI gives the 1969 research programme the title ‘the 
sources of Christian moral knowledge’; and Ratzinger summarises the gathering in 
1975 as debating ‘the question of the content and ground of the Christian ethos’.
148
 
This uncertainty is further exacerbated by Delhaye’s retrospective account of the 
work of the subcommission which ‘had carried on its research in a number of 
different directions: the use of Holy Scripture in Christian ethics; the teaching of the 
Magisterium (this point will be studied in a broader context in 1975); the criteria for 
the actus honestus; the meaning of Christian ethics; the use of the human 
sciences.’
149
 Despite the uncertain title, it is possible to match Delhaye’s list with the 
work that was completed. 
As the president of the Christian moral knowledge subcommission, Delhaye was 
responsible for preparing for the discussion at the 1974 assembly. Delhaye appears to 
have adopted what Yves Congar has described elsewhere as ‘a method of 
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 This included the commissioning of a large number of papers from 
non-members of the ITC which were included in a dossier circulated to commission 
members in advance of the 1974 assembly. Whilst it is possible to identify a number 
of the papers which were included in this dossier, a full list of the contents never 
appears to have been published. This means that it is unclear whether the 
propositions by Schürmann or Balthasar were circulated to commission members in 
advance. Nor is it possible to say when the dossier was circulated, or whether 
Balthasar was provoked to compose the Nine Propositions in response to what he 
read in the dossier (e.g. Schürmann’s four propositions?)
151
 Whilst these are 
interesting historical questions, they do not have a great bearing on the interpretation 
of the Nine Propositions because the divergence between Balthasar and the majority 
of the commission is already apparent in 1972.
152
 What the various fragmentary 
accounts of the dossier allow is an interpretation of Delhaye’s list of the topics 
investigated by, or on behalf of, the subcommission. Of these, Delhaye tells us that 
the work on ‘the teaching of the Magisterium’ was postponed for discussion in 1975. 
Second, most of the work on ‘the use of the human sciences’ was undertaken by 
theological advisors to the subcommission and published in Studia Moralia.
153
 Third, 
Delhaye describes Balthasar’s Nine Propositions as addressing ‘the fundamental 
principles and meaning of Christian ethics’.
154
 The reference to ‘fundamental 
principles’ is misleading as a summary of the Nine Propositions, but might have 
been influenced by the title of the collection in which Balthasar’s text was first 
published: Principles of Christian Morality.
155
 Moreover, the absence of comparable 
studies means that Delhaye’s reference to research into the ‘meaning of Christian 
ethics’ is probably a (retrospective) attempt to include Balthasar’s text within the 
work of the subcommission. This leaves only the ‘criteria for the actus honestus’ – 
which alludes to the initial 1969 research question – and ‘the use of Holy Scripture in 
Christian ethics’ on Delhaye’s list of investigated topics. These are linked in 
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proposition fourteen from 1972 (which refers to ‘unchanging principles’ which are 
‘contained in the Scriptures’) and probably formed the basis of Delhaye’s 
presentation to the full commission.
156
 In particular, Delhaye commissioned a study 
of morality in the Old Testament from advisors to the ITC, and a study of morality in 
the New Testament was drawn up by Schürmann.
157
 When the time came for 
Delhaye to present his research to the commission he appears to have circulated the 
dossier, and asked Schürmann to produce a set of propositions. The result is that the 
commission was asked to agree a set of four short propositions which are included 
within Schürmann’s research into the moral teaching of the New Testament. 
Before analysing Schürmann’s summary paper, with its four propositions, it is worth 
noting the initial contribution that was made to the proceedings of the 1974 assembly 
by Paul VI. We need not assume that the presence of the pope is simply due to the 
importance that moral theology had taken in the wake of Humanae vitae. The 1974 
assembly was also the first gathering of the commission’s second term and, a few 
months previously, the pope replaced more than half of the original members.
158
 
Thus, it is possible that Paul VI wished to meet the new commission in person in 
order to underline his commitment to the work that was being done (and possibly to 
strengthen the position or profile of the ITC). Nevertheless, a few of the new 
members were moral theologians and, for the first and last time, the pope chose to 
address the commission on the topic that was under discussion at that particular 
assembly. This lends credence to Hebblethwaite’s suggestion that Paul VI was 
looking to the commission for help on a topic which had caused him considerable 
difficulty.
159
 As the pope noted: ‘[n]o one can be unaware that the Christian science 
of morality is the subject of controversy, even as regards its principles.’
160
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In the middle of the pope’s address stands a quotation from the nineteenth century 
lay Catholic Alessandro Manzoni.
161
 This quotation offers a textbook account of the 
neo-Scholastic relation of nature and grace, with perhaps a slightly greater emphasis 
on the significance of Jesus Christ. On the one hand, humankind has a ‘natural 
knowledge’ of ‘the moral law’ which ‘is imperfect, changeable and obscure in many 
respects…’. On the other hand, ‘Jesus Christ wanted to build up and restructure [this 
knowledge]…’, which task he discharged with the help of ‘…a few principles which 
He called eternal and infallible, unique and universal.’
162
 This account forms the 
basis of the pope’s remarks and places him in substantial sympathy with proposition 
fourteen of 1972: ‘[t]he unity of Christian morality is based on unchanging 
principles, contained in the Scriptures, clarified by Tradition, presented to each 
generation by the Magisterium.’ In the course of his address the pope also sides with 
those who insist on the specificity of Christian morality when he observes that 
‘revelation presents us with a specific [propriam] and clearly defined way of life 
which the Church’s magisterium authentically interprets and applies to ever new 
circumstances.’
163
 In this way, the pope affirms the decision of the ITC in 1972 to 
avoid using the ‘objective criteria’ of the 1966 official report, but to try to identify 
specifically Christian criteria on the basis of the Scriptures. This address was 
delivered just before Balthasar introduces the Nine Propositions which seek to 
reopen the 1972 discussion. 
Where, perhaps, the pope can be said to differ from the ITC propositions of 1972 is 
in his description of non-Christian morality. The pope does not appear to share the 
view of the majority of the commission that humankind can discern fundamental 
moral truths (equated by the ITC with human rights) on the basis of conscience. 
Rather, as was noted above, the pope presents morality independent of Christianity 
as ‘imperfect, changeable and obscure’. On this point Balthasar will have been 
sympathetic to the pope. Indeed, Balthasar will also have been sympathetic to the 
way in which Manzoni grounds Catholic moral theology in the work of Jesus Christ. 
This moves in the direction of Balthasar’s identification of the Mystery of Christ as a 
criterion. However, Manzoni also refers to ‘the moral law’ as if it exists apart from 
Christ, and the pope offers variations on this theme when he refers to the ‘eternal and 
infallible’ principles of Christian morality and to ‘the very principles of the objective 
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 Indeed, the pope remains some distance from Balthasar’s account of 
Christ as the criterion when his remarks contrast the objectivity of moral principles 




The pope offered the ITC a fairly conventional account of moral theology. The pope 
challenges the claim implicit in Fuchs’ ethical proposal and the 1972 ITC 
propositions that natural law is fairly easy to discern. However, the pope places 
Christ at the heart of Christian morality where the neo-Scholastic manualists tended 
to start from the Old Testament law. Thus, the pope offers a kind of faith-ethic. 
However, it may not have been attractive to Balthasar because it continues to 
maintain that Christians can be reconciled on the basis of certain unchanging 
principles. A theme that was then taken up at the 1974 assembly in Schürmann’s four 
propositions which are the conclusions of the research undertaken by Delhaye’s 
subcommission.  
Schürmann’s paper appears to have been written with the 1969 research title in mind 
as it addresses itself to the ‘obligatory character’ of New Testament norms.
166
 
However, considerable care needs to be taken when approaching Schürmann’s paper 
because there are at least two different versions. This problem is exacerbated by the 
suggestion in the preface to Principles of Christian Morality that the collection 
contains two texts which were presented to the ITC at its 1974 assembly.
167
 In fact, 
the version of Schürmann’s paper published in this collection has been heavily 
revised in light of the discussions at the 1974 assembly. The original version of 
Schürmann’s paper, which was discussed by the ITC in 1974, is available online and 
in the collection edited by Sharkey.
168
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Schürmann’s text is very difficult to summarise. In keeping with the priorities of 
1969, but against the compromise of 1972, Schürmann is concerned to find law-like 
criteria for moral theology in the New Testament.
169
 Schürmann avoids any reference 
to objective criteria, but, like Fuchs in the 1966 official report, wishes to minimise 
any suggestion of moral laxity. For Schürmann, this means asserting that most New 
Testament teachings are eschatologically conditioned.
170
 Indeed, Schürmann 
produces a complex system of classification in order to determine which teachings 
are conditioned historically, which are conditioned eschatologically and which are 
some combination of the two. He summarises the result in the following four 
propositions: 
1. The conduct [Vita ratio] of Jesus is the example and the criterion of a 
love which serves and gives itself. 
2. The word of Jesus is the ultimate moral norm [norma]. 
3. Certain value judgments and certain norms [normae] are permanent by 
reason of their theological and eschatological foundations. 




In the first proposition Schürmann observes that the physical existence of Jesus must 
be as relevant to his revelatory character as any teaching. This is followed, in the 
second, with the observation that the teachings of Jesus – in which Jesus explains his 
deeds – are the ‘ultimate’ moral norm. In both the Latin and the German versions of 
the text the word ultimate has a connotation of the ‘final’ or ‘last’ word on the 
matter. This implies a kind of graduated approach in which the closer that a moral 
teaching gets to the lips of Jesus Christ, the more authoritative and obligatory it is (as 
if it is more divine). However, Schürmann adds a pneumatological qualification to 
this account when he also cites two points in the New Testament when Paul repeats a 
saying of Jesus and urges Christians to obey the intention, rather than the letter, of 
the teaching (1 Cor 9:14; 7:12-16).
172
 Schürmann goes on to add that ‘it must not be 
forgotten that the Spirit of truth, especially with regard to moral knowledge 
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[cognitionem], “will guide you into all the truth” (Jn 16:13)’
173
 This pneumatological 
qualification appears to serve two purposes: first it offers a guard against what 
Schürmann later calls ‘biblicist’ [biblicistico] thinking by insisting that it is not 
merely the literal text which is morally significant.
174
 Second, it provides a divine 
ground for those moral teachings of the New Testament which cannot be directly 
attributed to Jesus. Thus, Schürmann claims that the apostolic church was ‘marked in 
an exceptional manner by the Spirit of the Glorified Lord’.
175
 
Propositions three and four summarise Schürmann’s division of those New 
Testament moral teachings which are not directly attributable to Jesus Christ into 
three categories. The first category, which is covered by proposition three, contains 
those moral teachings which encourage the total love of God. These teachings are 
‘unconditionally founded on the eschatological reality of salvation’.
176
 The second 
and third categories, then, are all the moral teachings which relate to action and are 
covered by proposition four. (The ‘diversity of obligations’ refers to the difference 
between these two categories.)  The second category includes the command to love 
one’s neighbour, lists of virtues and vices, even ‘spiritual norms …formulated in 
very concrete terms’.
177
 These are all conditioned both historically and 
eschatologically and thus sometimes need to be read in ‘a modified or analagous 
manner’.
178
 The third category then contains teachings which are purely historically 
conditioned and which can no longer be considered to be valid. Schürmann only 
gives one example, but argues that this is enough to establish the category. 
Specifically, Schürmann argues that the New Testament subordination of women no 
longer applies since ‘the Holy Spirit has led contemporary Christianity, together with 




It is possible to make a number of theological criticisms of Schürmann’s scheme. 
This analysis will restrict itself to the problem of eschatological and historical 
conditioning. Schürmann works on the basis that the New Testament must be divided 
between these two kinds of conditioning, whilst admitting that there are a large 
number of teachings which appear to have a dual conditioning. At one point, 
Schürmann even refers to the “incarnation” of the commandment of love in ‘special 
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 However, the discussion of LG and of Fuchs in the previous 
chapter referred to the logic of Chalcedon which refuses to mix or separate the divine 
and human natures of Jesus Christ. Unfortunately, Schürmann’s classification of 
New Testament moral teachings appears to involve both mixing and separating. At 
the two extremes, the moral teachings which are purely grounded in history or 
unconditionally grounded in eschatology participate in the separation of divine 
(eschatological) and human (historical). In between these extremes, the moral 
teachings which are both eschatologically and historically conditioned participate in 
the mixing of divine and human in different degrees. This renders the classification 
unpersuasive. 
It is worth repeating that Schürmann’s paper faithfully attempts to locate ‘criteria for 
Christian moral knowledge’ as requested by the 1969 communiqué. However, the 
experience of the 1974 meeting led him to heavily revise the paper before consenting 
to publication in a small volume edited by Ratzinger. The other papers in the 
collection were Balthasar’s Nine Propositions and an essay by Ratzinger which had 
been published in L’Osservatore Romano shortly before the ITC’s 1974 assembly. In 
a note at the start of his contribution, Schürmann explains that his text has been 
‘slightly improved stylistically’ and that he had ‘learned from some of the 
contributions to the discussion and some of the solutions proposed.’
181
 This 
underreports the extent of his revisions and suggests that he did not expect the text 
discussed at the ITC meeting to be made public. (Sharkey does not explain from 
where his translation originates, but it is clear that he had access to the Latin text 
which is presently available on the website of the holy See.
182
) 
The changes which Schürmann made to his paper before publication provide one of 
the few pieces of evidence regarding the discussion at the 1974 meeting of the ITC. 
The most direct account is provided by Delhaye. In his preface to the French 
translation of the Nine Propositions, he explains that: ‘the members of the ITC, while 
they approved his [Balthasar’s] text “in generic form”, did not want simply to 
publish it in a collective report and so leave it anonymous.’
183
 This analysis is 
extremely polite and, as president of the moral theology subcommission, Delhaye is 
probably not the best witness to report on problems encountered during the meeting. 
Two of the obvious gaps in Delhaye’s account are that he provides no explanation as 
to how the situation arose in which two sets of propositions on the same subject were 
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presented to the commission for agreement. Secondly, Delhaye fails to explain why 
both Balthasar and Schürmann drafted lists of propositions unless they wished them 
to be adopted as conclusions by the commission. The joint preface to Ratzinger’s 
1975 essay collection can be used to confirm that the outcome was not what 
Schürmann or Balthasar desired: ‘[m]any pieces of mosaic were collected on that 
occasion, but they could not be assembled into a whole…’
184
  
Delhaye also reports that there was an official conclusion from the 1974 meeting 
comprising ‘two declarations and five theses’ which never appears to have been 
published.
185
 Nothing more is known about this other than what can be deduced from 
Delhaye’s report and the number of propositions and declarations does not fit neatly 
into the papers of either Schürmann or Balthasar. These two authors expressed 
disappointment regarding the outcome of the meeting in the 1975 Joint Preface, and 
Schürmann revised his paper in such a way as to remove the four propositions which 
he had proposed. This is not the action of a theologian who has just had them 
forwarded to the pope on behalf of the ITC. 
This discussion of the 1974 assembly shows that it was not a particularly receptive 
gathering for Balthasar’s Nine Propositions. A large number of commission 
members had just been changed, and some of the new members were moral 
theologians. Second, the ITC had agreed a set of propositions on moral pluralism in 
1972 which Balthasar was seeking to reopen. Third, the pope delivered an address 
which broadly supported the ITC propositions of 1972 – which he may well have 
read whilst preparing his address – and this will have lessened the chances that the 
ITC would reopen questions which had previously been decided. The remainder of 
the thesis evaluates whether this represents a missed opportunity. 
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Chapter 3: Reading the Nine Propositions – Preliminary Note and 
Section I 
Nine Propositions on Christian ethics (1974) 
“Preliminary Note” 
Section I. The fulfilment of ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in Christ 
1: Christ as the concrete norm 
2: The universality of the concrete norm 
3: The Christian meaning of the “golden rule” 
4: Sin 
Section II. The Old Testament elements of the synthesis to come 
5: The promise (Abraham) 
6: The law 
Section III. Fragments of extrabiblical ethics 
7: Conscience 
8: The pre-biblical natural order 
9: Post-Christian anthropological ethics
1
 
The previous two chapters have prepared the ground for our interpretation of 
Balthasar’s Nine Propositions. The propositional form is not widely used in 
contemporary theology and the English translators have not provided guidance for 
reading the text.
2
 The form of the text is determined by Balthasar’s intention that it 
would serve as a basis for agreement by the ITC at their 1974 assembly. As noted in 
the previous chapter, Ratzinger had only organised the production of a commentary 
on his 1972 propositions after they had been adopted by the commission.
3
 The 
disadvantage of this procedure is that it will have been unclear who was responsible 
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for drafting this commentary and what kind of authority it carried. Thus, when 
Balthasar decided to draft a text on Christian ethics for the 1974 assembly he also 
drafted short sections of commentary which he circulated alongside his nine 
propositions. By providing this commentary, Balthasar is helping the commission to 
evaluate his text and ensuring that the commission is aware of the interpretation 
which will be placed on the propositions in the event that they are agreed. 
No doubt Balthasar would have been delighted to have his entire text – propositions 
and commentary – formally adopted. However, the size of the commission and their 
support for a faith-ethic of ‘unchanging principles’ in 1972 rendered that outcome 
unlikely.
4
 It is much more likely that Balthasar was aiming for an outcome similar to 
that of 1972 in which his propositions were agreed by the ITC and his commentary 
was published alongside them under his own name. This is exactly what happened 
the year after the Nine Propositions when Otto Semmelroth and Karl Lehmann 
steered twelve propositions through the commission with the title ‘Theses on the 
relationship between the ecclesiastical magisterium and theology’. These 




On the basis of these considerations, we read the Nine Propositions assuming that 
Balthasar’s primary argument is included in the text of the propositions themselves 
and that these stand independently from the commentary. In this chapter and the 
next, therefore, we provide an interpretation of the nine individual propositions and 
only refer to the accompanying commentary (which we call ‘explanatory 
paragraphs’) to the extent that they cast light on these propositions. The exception to 
this procedure is a lengthy interpretation of the Preliminary Note in the first half of 
this chapter. In this note, Balthasar seeks to persuade his fellow commission 
members, and later his readers, that his propositions discharge the task of perfecting 
moral theology as requested by the council in OT 16. 
(i) Balthasar’s “Preliminary Note” 
Balthasar’s decision to submit the Nine Propositions for discussion at the 1974 
assembly is an unusual event in the history of the ITC as his paper enters into direct 
competition with the work of the relevant subcommission (the paper by Schürmann 
considered at the end of the previous chapter). There can be little doubt that 
Balthasar defended his text by arguing that his Nine Propositions better discharges 
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the task set by the council in OT 16 of perfecting moral theology. One source for this 
claim is the changes that Schürmann made to his paper between the 1974 ITC 
assembly and its 1975 publication.
6
 The version of Schürmann’s paper which was 
tabled for discussion in 1974 only refers to the constitutions on the sacred liturgy 
(Sacrosanctum concilium) and on divine revelation (Dei verbum).
7
 However, the 
heavily revised version of Schürmann’s paper that is published in 1975 includes six 
further references to the council, three of which are to OT 16.
8
 This suggests that the 
legacy of the council was a major point of discussion at the 1974 assembly and that 
Schürmann was either criticised for not attending to OT 16, or was persuaded by 
Balthasar that such attention was warranted. 
A second source for this claim, then, is the fact that Balthasar structures the first two 
paragraphs of his preliminary note around the instruction in OT 16 that ‘the other 
theological subjects should be renewed through a more vivid contact with the 
Mystery of Christ and the history of salvation.’
9
 Balthasar’s first paragraph indicates 
that the Mystery of Christ is central to the argument of the Nine Propositions and the 
second paragraph indicates that the Nine Propositions is structured according to 
salvation-history. The Nine Propositions is not a list, such as the 1972 ITC 




Balthasar’s implicit claim that the Nine Propositions fulfils the instructions of OT 16 
more fully than either Schürmann, or the experimental proposal of Fuchs discussed 
in the first chapter, has considerable merit. This is due primarily to Balthasar’s 
treatment of law in Christian ethics. To take the example of Fuchs, it is noted in the 
first chapter that the official report of the Pontifical Commission privileges GS 51 
over OT 16. Fuchs and his co-authors draw on the apparent references to natural law 
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in GS 51 when it refers to general ‘objective criteria’ which are shared by the whole 
of humanity. By 1968, Fuchs is also seen to argue that Christian faith in the Mystery 
of Christ provides greater motivation for ethical living, but does not alter the content 
of the natural ethical criteria. This places Fuchs in tension with Häring, 
acknowledged today as a prominent representative of the preconciliar Christological 
shift, who criticises ‘the incredible idea that the moral teaching of the New 




Balthasar’s Nine Propositions is able to do greater justice to OT 16 than Fuchs 
because it is not as concerned about the place of natural law in postconciliar moral 
theology. Balthasar undertakes to perfect moral theology, as the council text requires, 
by giving an account which derives more directly from the gospel (i.e. the Mystery 
of Christ). Fuchs is held back from this by his additional desire to maintain a 
prominent place for natural law within postconciliar moral theology. Balthasar can 
also be seen to conform more effectively than Fuchs to the instruction in OT 16 that 
moral theology ‘draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture’.
12
 By definition, 
natural law is drawn from a source other than scripture. The effect of Fuchs’ 
promotion of natural law, then, is to downplay the significance of scripture. That is to 
say, scripture is all about motivation and exhortation but has nothing to contribute to 
the natural norms of moral action. Mirroring this concern with natural law, then, is 
Schürmann’s faith-ethic which hunts for the apparently unchanging moral laws of the 
New Testament. Balthasar avoids both of these strategies and provides a more 
plausible interpretation of this council teaching. Rather than treat it simply as an 
exhortation to quote more scripture, Balthasar interprets it as a comment on the 
history of moral theology. It is noted in chapter one that when Häring drafted this 
part of the text it was intended as a comment on the neo-Scholastic moral manuals. It 
is also argued in section one that the manuals tended to focus on the Old Testament 
law and delegate the New Testament to the discipline of ascetical theology. The 
instruction that moral theology draw more fully on scripture would thus seem to be 
directed at the range of scriptural influence on the discipline. Balthasar fulfils this 
requirement by placing the Mystery of Christ at the centre of his account of 
postconciliar moral theology. Since the whole of scripture testifies to the Mystery of 
Christ, Balthasar is ensuring that the whole of scripture is included within his 
account of moral theology. This meets the requirement of the council and avoids the 
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problem of identifying the moral bits of scripture, or the objective moral application 
of various scriptures. 
The final instruction of OT 16 is that postconciliar moral theology ‘should throw 
light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring 
forth fruit in charity for the life of the world.’
13
 This is another point which Balthasar 
is able to endorse wholeheartedly due to his well-developed concepts of mission and 
personhood. Balthasar’s use of these concepts is very helpful to know when reading 
the Nine Propositions and we will now rehearse some of their main features as set 
out in his Theo-Drama III (1978).
14
 
In the discussion of Glory VI in the previous chapter, we showed that Balthasar has 
an account of the human individual which he extends tentatively to the person of 
God. Just as the human individual is composed of an “I” and a presence or 
weightiness, so is God conceived as a divine “I” and a divine glory.
15
 Balthasar 
argues that God reveals himself in the Old Testament primarily by his glory, but also 
by his divine “I” which lies behind or within his glory. Israel gains true knowledge of 
God, but this is always accompanied by sensory manifestations which are required to 
capture the attention of finite human knowers.
16
 A finite individual can know the 
sensory manifestations straightforwardly because they are on his or her creaturely 
level. However, it is only by the work of God that an individual is “transported” to a 
state in which they can “see” the divine glory of God and ultimately discern the 
divine “I” of God.
17
 
In the last chapter we also showed, from the text of TS, that Balthasar interprets 
Jesus Christ as the most profound association of a sensory phenomenon, the 
humanity of Jesus, and of God, the divinity of Jesus. By attending to the mysterious 
life of Christ, the believer is drawn into the supernatural, yet paradoxical, knowledge 
of God.
18
 In Theo-Drama III, Balthasar elaborates on the consequences of this 
encounter of humanity with God, in Jesus Christ, making prominent use of the 
concepts of mission and person. Balthasar summarises his account of what ‘…makes 
conscious subjects into persons in the Christian sense’ as follows: 
It is when God addresses a conscious subject, tells him who he is and what he 
means to the eternal God of truth and shows him the purpose of his existence 
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– that is, imparts a distinctive and divinely authorised mission – that we can 
say of a conscious subject that he is a “person”. This is what happened, 
archetypically, in the case of Jesus Christ, when he was given his eternal 
“definition” – “You are my beloved Son.”
19
 
The first sentence in this passage reveals a close connection, for Balthasar, between 
becoming a person in the Christian sense and being given a ‘divinely authorised’ and 
bespoke mission. Without a divine mission, an individual is merely a ‘conscious 
subject’, operating at the level of natural creaturely existence. Once a mission has 
been provided, the conscious subject is elevated into personhood, and can be said to 
have received – using the language of OT 16 – an ‘elevated vocation’ from God. 
In the second sentence, Balthasar then refers to the archetypal missioning of Jesus 
Christ at his baptism by the Father. The word archetypal is important here because it 
points to the distinction between the universal mission of Jesus Christ, the second 
person of the Trinity, and the mission of other conscious subjects called by God. It is 
also worth noting that the baptism scene in scripture involves the holy Spirit. This is 
reflected in Balthasar’s argument that divine missions are made present to conscious 
subjects by the holy Spirit: ‘the Holy Spirit …gives us both things at once: a concrete 
plan of the future, in accordance with our own mission and hence with our own 
personality, and the inner free spontaneity to carry out, recall and follow this plan.’
20
 
Our reading of Hegel’s SCF in the previous chapter can help us to understand the 
role that the holy Spirit is playing in the gift of a divine mission to an individual. 
Specifically, Hegel critiques the claim that humanity can be reconciled in law on the 
grounds that law is restricted to thought. A similar objection might be raised about 
the gift of a mission to an individual by God from outside. Balthasar’s account of the 
holy Spirit in Theo-Drama III passage could then be read as a response this problem 
because the gift of a mission includes the gift of an ‘inner free spontaneity’ – that is 
of inclination – as well as of a concrete plan, made present in thought. Thus, when 
the individual receives a mission they receive both inclination (spontaneity) and 
thought (concrete plan). Missions are therefore not restricted to the realms of 
thinking or being but include both. Moreover, Balthasar stresses this aspect of his 
account, in the case of Jesus, by pointing out that the latter owes ‘…his entire being 
to the heavenly Father who has sent him.’
21
 Looked at from the perspective of 
Hegel’s account of law in SCF, Balthasar’s deployment of the concept of mission has 
an advantage over other postconciliar accounts of moral theology, which depend on 
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objective moral rules, in that it does not conceive of right living purely in conformity 
to something thought but in something lived. 
Returning to the question of the archetypal quality of the universal mission of Jesus 
takes us into the heart of Balthasar’s account of mission and personhood.
22
 In the 
event of Jesus’ baptism it is possible to see God working in three ways: through the 
Father, God is authorising the mission of Jesus Christ; through the Son, God receives 
the mission having bound himself into a mysterious union with the man Jesus Christ; 
through the Spirit, God makes the mission present to the Son, in his divinity and his 
humanity, in the form of a concrete plan and of the inclination to follow this plan. 
Taken together the baptism of Jesus constitutes the unique historical process in 
which God himself takes on a divine mission for the salvation of the world. It also 
means that, on account of the unity of God, Jesus’ identity ‘must be Trinitarian: in 
order to be himself he needs the Father and the Spirit.’
23
 
The process by which the archetypal mission of Jesus is subsequently extended to the 
whole of humanity can be considered from two directions. In the first place, 
Balthasar stresses the New Testament concept of being found “in Christ” to talk 
about how all humanity is invited to participate in Jesus’ mission of the saving and 
healing of the world. Thus, a ‘…personality and mission, specifically designed for 
and tailored to each individual, are always a form of participation, through grace, in 
the unique universal mission of Jesus.’
24
 On the other hand, there is also a proper 
pluralism among missions – rather as there is a proper pluralism among the players 
in an orchestra. This pluralism has a limit and Balthasar considers the period of the 
Apostles’ preaching and supervision to establish a plurality of perspectives on 
Christ’s mission which form ‘an adequate basis for theological reflection down 
through all the centuries…’.
25
  Thus, Balthasar’s account of mission and person in 
Theo-Drama III is consistent with the metaphor of the orchestra found in TS.
26
 There 
is a legitimate pluralism in right human action, this is reflected in a diversity of 
individual bespoke missions which harmonise with each other and with the mission 
of Christ. Clearly there is a question as to how well one is living out, or performing, 
one’s mission. Then, at the limit, true pluralism is constrained by the question as to 
whether one is cooperating with or resisting the work of God, or, to put this in the 
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Returning to our discussion of the text of OT 16, then, the final element is the 
reference in the text to the ‘obligation’ to bear fruit. This can easily sound as though 
there are a set of duties, or at least a duty, which is imposed on Christians as a 
consequence of their faith. This might at first appear to pose a problem for 
Balthasar’s account of moral theology. After all, it was noted in chapter one that 
Häring originally recommended ‘mission’ and this was later substituted with the term 
‘obligation’.
28
 However, the foregoing account of mission shows a way in which 
Balthasar might agree that the Christian faces an obligation to bear fruit. Crucially, 
this is not the ‘obligation’ of obeying ‘timelessly valid laws’ for conduct – as is the 
case for Schürmann and Fuchs – but the obligation of accepting a bespoke personal 
mission from God.
29
 As Balthasar will make clear at a number of points in the Nine 
Propositions, the Christian does not face an abstract obligation, such as an obligation 
to keep a particular law, principle or criterion. Thus, whilst Schürmann searches for 
Christian legal obligations in scripture, and Fuchs retains a set of natural legal 
obligations, Balthasar proposes a personal obligation in the form of a mission which 
includes both a concrete plan and the inclination to want to follow it. Balthasar’s 
version of the ‘obligation’ thus draws on one’s full and free personality to achieve 
something that is simultaneously entirely satisfying (creaturely) and holy (divine). 
This discussion of Balthasar’s use of OT 16 supports our primary claim that his Nine 
Propositions responds directly to the task set for moral theologians by the council. 
The extent and the difficulty of this task has not been given much attention in the 
English language secondary literature since the council. The analysis also generates 
questions regarding the thinking of the ITC members who refused to endorse 
Balthasar’s Nine Propositions wholeheartedly. Was this merely a refusal by the 
commission to adjudicate between Balthasar and Schürmann? Did the commission 
members disagree with Balthasar that OT 16 was an important instruction for moral 
theologians regarding the future of their discipline? Probably not given that 
Schürmann added references to his paper after the meeting. What other objections 
did the ITC have to Balthasar’s propositions? Or did they elect to send the Nine 
Propositions out for study with the intention of returning to the question of 
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postconciliar moral theology in later years? If this latter point is correct then there is 
no evidence that the commission ever returned to this research question. 
Preliminary Note: Paragraph One 
The Christian who lives by faith has the right to ground his ethical 
activity [sittliches Handeln] on his faith. Since faith’s content – 
namely, Jesus Christ, the revealer of a love that is triune and divine – 
has adopted both the form and the guilt of the First Adam, as well as 
the constrictions, perplexities and decisions of the latter’s existence, 
the Christian is in no danger of failing to find the First Adam, and 
hence his own ethical [ethische] problems, in the Second. Jesus, for 
instance, had to choose between his Father and his family: “Son, why 
have you treated us so?” (Luke 2:48). So the Christian will make the 
weighty decisions of his life from the perspective of Christ, i.e. by 
faith. An ethic [Ethik] that sets out from the brilliance of the light of 
revelation and works backward to the deficient preliminary stages, 
cannot actually be labelled “descending” (as opposed to an ethics, 
which “ascends” from its foundation in anthropology). 
[1] We noted above that Balthasar’s first paragraph acknowledges the instruction of 
OT 16 by focusing on the Mystery of Christ. In doing so, the first sentence of the 
paragraph adopts the perspective which Balthasar has already defined in TS, namely, 
a perspective ‘within the all-embracing mystery [of Christ].’
30
 However, Balthasar 
offers a pithier summary of this perspective when he refers to it as ‘faith’. The 
sentence also conforms to the personal focus of OT 16 (‘vocation’) talking in terms 
of the entire ‘ethical activity’ of the person of faith rather than in terms of discrete 
acts which is the perspective of the moral manuals. 
By far the hardest term to interpret in the first sentence is Balthasar’s reference to 
‘right’. The reader might be tempted to read this as a reference to the contemporary 
framework of universal human rights.
31
 This reading would involve Balthasar – as a 
theologian – staking a claim on behalf of all Christians to their right to religious 
freedom. However, this reading is rendered impossible once it is recognised that 
Balthasar’s proposal for postconciliar moral theology is based on the account of 
mission rehearsed above. Such an interpretation is also vulnerable to the Hegelian 
critique of law in SCF, which we have already used to cast light on some aspects of 
Balthasar’s ethical proposal. From the perspective of Hegel’s SCF universal human 
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rights are not, in themselves, an adequate basis for global reconciliation because they 
are restricted to thought. The strengths and weaknesses of this analysis of human 
rights would be an interesting topic for future research. 
We will be using Hegel’s SCF to help us to interpret Balthasar’s Nine Propositions 
on a number of occasions in this chapter and the next. This was the primary purpose 
of interpreting this eighteenth century text in the last chapter. Understanding Hegel’s 
argument in SCF helps the reader to recognise some of the argumentative moves that 
Balthasar makes in his very dense Nine Propositions. We also noted in the previous 
chapter that Balthasar had read Hegel’s SCF because he paraphrases a section in his 
Theo-Drama I published in 1973.
32
 We do not claim in this thesis that Hegel’s SCF 
was a major influence on Balthasar’s Nine Propositions, or that Balthasar drew on 
Hegel’s text when developing his fundamental proposal for postconciliar moral 
theology. However, there are two points in the explanatory paragraphs to the Nine 
Propositions where Balthasar does appear to have drawn on SCF. First, in an 
explanatory paragraph to proposition seven, Balthasar criticises Kant’s categorical 
imperative for opposing ‘abstract “duty” [Pflicht] against the “inclination” [Neigung] 
of the senses…’ (7.e3). In SCF, Hegel makes an identical argument when he claims 
that ‘[t]he opposition of duty [Pflicht] to inclination [Neigung] has found its 
unification in the modifications of love, i.e., in the virtues.’
33
 Secondly, Balthasar 
offers a taxonomy of mistaken responses to law which he provides in the second 
explanatory paragraph of proposition six. This is discussed more fully in our 
interpretation of proposition six in chapter four. In essence, however, Hegel provides 
in SCF a dense account of the inadequate attempts to reconcile the world exhibited 
by the Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes at the time of Jesus. In 6.e2 Balthasar 
paraphrases this taxonomy whilst replacing the names of the early Jewish sects with 
various modern philosophers. Given that Hegel uses his discussion of the Jewish 
spirit as a proxy for his critique of Kantian moral philosophy, Balthasar’s alterations 
are consistent with Hegel’s original meaning. Balthasar argues that modern life has 
fragmented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the same way that Hegel 
argued that the Jewish spirit had fragmented into sects at the time of Jesus.  
Of course, neither of these apparent allusions proves that that there is a relationship 
of dependence between Balthasar’s proposal for postconciliar moral theology in the 
Nine Propositions and Hegel’s SCF. The investigation of Balthasar’s relationship 
with the philosophy of Hegel would be an interesting topic for future research. 
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Having explained, then, that Balthasar’s account of mission precludes the 
interpretation of ‘right’ in the preliminary note as an allusion to universal human 
rights, what role is the term actually playing? Here there would appear to be two 
answers. In the first place, it may be an allusion to the Declaration on Religious 
Liberty (Dignitatis humanae) from Vatican II. This declaration is not discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis and will not be subject to detailed scrutiny here. However, 
it makes prominent use of the concept of ‘right’ when it states that ‘[t]he Vatican 
Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom.’
34
 By 
alluding to this statement, Balthasar cannot be treating the text as an endorsement of 
universal human rights. Rather, Balthasar is interpreting this ‘right’ as something like 
the spiritual ‘right’ to be reconciled with God. This is a rather circular use in which a 
right is claimed against God on the basis of the salvation given by God. 
Nevertheless, it is an interpretative possibility. Balthasar may have been encouraged 
in this interpretation by the Declaration’s account of the aspirations of Christian 
believers: ‘the principle of religious liberty contributes in no small way to the 
development of a situation in which men can without hindrance be invited to the 
Christian faith, embrace it of their own free will and give it practical expression in 
every sphere of their lives.’
35
 Here the reference to ‘practical expression’ would seem 
to echo Balthasar’s claim that the ‘ethical activity’ of the Christian is grounded in 
faith. 
However, in the second place, it is also possible that Balthasar imagined that the 
‘right’ of the Christian can be claimed against the principle, or spirit, of the world. 
Such an interpretation can be elucidated using Hegel’s argument in SCF. In the 
previous chapter it is noted that Hegel distinguishes between a stoical account of the 
life of love and an account of Jesus’ contesting with the Jewish spirit. In the former, 
Hegel argues that the life of love requires the renunciation of one’s right in favour of 
an active embrace of suffering. In the latter, which Balthasar is invoking at this point, 
Jesus ‘contests’ [bekämpfte] for his right with the Jewish spirit into which he had 
been born.
36
 The explanation that Hegel gives for the different responses is that 
‘when the whole of the community becomes an object of contempt’ it is permitted to 
contest rather than to endure.
37
 In other words, if one is opposed to the principle or 
spirit of a community then it is required to contest it, even if one is practicing the life 
of love.  
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Balthasar makes substantial use of the distinction between the revelation of God and 
the world in the Nine Propositions. This has already been noted in passing when 
Balthasar claims that Christian ethics ‘…comes forth from and depends on the 
mystery of Christ, which is the centre of the history of salvation as well as of the 
history of man.’
38
 On the one hand there is the ‘history of salvation,’ on the other 
hand there is the ‘history of man’. Balthasar goes on to make considerable use of 
New Testament apocalyptic in support of this distinction. In this context, the ‘right’ 
of the Christian would appear to be the right to participate in the history of salvation 
rather than the history of man. It does not have any specific ethical implications 
other than to highlight the significance of the confession of faith in Jesus Christ and 
participation in his body, the Church. 
This use of ‘right’ by Balthasar remains stubbornly difficult to interpret. If we 
continue to use SCF to cast light on Balthasar’s meaning then we will recall that the 
problem with taking up one’s right, and the reason that Hegel advocates stoicism, is 
that it presupposes an alien ‘law’ which will measure one’s relationship with one’s 
fellow human beings. When rights are being invoked, true reconciliation, life and 
love will never be realised. However, Hegel allows the exception that, when a whole 
spirit is lifeless, contest, fighting for your rights, is the correct response. The contrast 
that Balthasar draws in the fourth proposition between the spirit of Christ and the 
spirit of the world can be read in these terms. Thus, Balthasar appears to be 
introducing a spirit of the world as an object of Christian contempt. Against this 
spirit, Christians take up the right of faith in Christ. Within the community, however, 
Balthasar maintains that Christians practice the stoical active suffering which holds 
open the path to true life and reconciliation. Thus, the contrast between the spirit of 
Christ and the spirit of the world is equivalent, in the Nine Propositions, to the 
distinction between true and false pluralism in TS. 
[2] The second sentence provides Balthasar’s answer to the 1969 ITC research 
question. In response to the search for the ‘criteria of Christian moral knowledge,’ 
Balthasar presents Jesus Christ. In doing so, the sentence again repeats Balthasar’s 
claim in TS that the Mystery of Christ is the criterion for ethics as well as for 
doctrine. Indeed, the whole sentence reproduces arguments which have already been 
identified in our discussion of TS in chapter two. The question of ‘content’ is the 
question of ‘knowledge’. In TS, Balthasar cautions that the mystery quality of Christ 
means that he is never fully graspable.
39
 However, the presence of Jesus Christ in 
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human history means that he can be known. In SCF, Hegel offers the principle of 
‘nonpersonal living beauty’ which has no concrete form.
40
 This is not a problem for 
Christians because their principle, Jesus Christ, has concrete form. On the other 
hand, Hegel’s objection that the worship of a contingent man introduces a permanent 
division into the whole of nature (because the desire to be reconciled with a dead 
man can never be satisfied) is ameliorated by the Christian claim that Christ is alive 
and is ungraspably present by his Spirit.
41
 
The presence of Christ by the Spirit is indicated in the reference to the ‘triune and 
divine’ love. This is the satisfaction of the Christian desire to be reconciled with 
Jesus Christ. However, the main emphasis of the sentence is on the full humanity of 
Jesus Christ. Balthasar’s emphasis on this point may be contrasted with Hegel’s 
argument in SCF. The human Jesus brings ‘form’ [Gestalt] to the Christian religion, 
which is the same term that Hegel uses in SCF to refer to the Holy of Holies as the 
concrete focus of the Jewish spirit.
42
 However, in contrast to Hegel, Jesus Christ also 
brings ‘the form and the guilt’ (our emphasis). That is, by his ‘form’ Jesus provides a 
knowable focus for the reconciliation of the whole (a resolution to the problem posed 
by Hegel in SCF) and by his ‘guilt’ Jesus enters into solidarity with Israel (preparing 
to resolve what Balthasar understands to be the Old Testament problem). More 
specifically, Jesus enters complete solidarity with Israel’s existence under law. 
(Balthasar uses the term guilt because he refuses to attribute ‘sin’ to Jesus in 
accordance with the teaching of the council of Chalcedon that Jesus is ‘like us in all 
respects except for sin’ and with Hebrews 4:15.
43
) Thus, both the universal problem 
of the reconciliation of the world in love and the new biblical problem of guilty law-
breaking are transformed by the Mystery of Christ. 
[3] The third sentence presents itself as an illustration of the full humanity of Jesus 
Christ. It also casts light on what Balthasar considers to be the purpose of moral 
theology in the postconciliar period. In keeping with his distinction between the 
Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of the world, the choice which Jesus is said to have 
faced in Luke 2:48 is between God and the world (represented by Father and family). 
Interestingly, it is difficult to see why this scriptural story is an ‘ethical problem’ and 
how Jesus might be said to have had a choice? In the first place, Balthasar insists that 
there is a conflict of demands, but there is no suggestion in scripture that Jesus 
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disobeyed his parents. Instead, there appears to be a mismatch between the 
expectations of Jesus and the expectations of his parents. Indeed, the primary 
purpose of the story in Luke is as an example of God’s gift of understanding to Mary. 
After Jesus learns of their concern he acts obediently towards them and, presumably, 
allayed their frustration. The result is that Mary ‘treasured all these things in her 
heart’ (Lk. 2:51; NRSV). Balthasar, however, gives an account in the Nine 
Propositions of the importance of obedience to God as an alternative to 
disobedience. Thus, he reads the story as an example of an ethical problem of 
contrasting demands between God and the world in order to argue that ethical 
Christians always act in conformity to the call of God in Christ. 
[4] The fourth sentence recapitulates the argument of the first three, emphasising the 
importance of the perspective of faith – being found in Christ – for Christian ethical 
existence. One way to conceive of this is to recall the metaphor of an orchestra that 
Balthasar develops in TS. As the player of a particular instrument, it is only by 
attending to the conductor, Jesus Christ, that one can rightly discern how to make the 
big musical decisions like when to commence and when to cease playing a particular 
note or musical phrase.
44
 
[5] The fifth sentence of the paragraph marks a transition in the argument from a 
positive account of Balthasar’s argument into a negative attempt to clarify possible 
misunderstandings. This negative task continues into the second paragraph. The 
reason for including the fifth sentence in the first paragraph, however, is simply that 
it refers to the Mystery of Christ. Balthasar’s main concern is to prevent the Nine 
Propositions from being read in a manner analogous to a Christology ‘from above’ 
or ‘from below’, i.e. in a highly polarising way. This distinction is often used in 
discussions of Christology at this time.
45
 However, it is ruled out by Balthasar’s 
concept of the mission of Jesus Christ rehearsed above. Jesus Christ is not merely a 
human being, nor merely divine, but is the inclusion of a human being within the 
divine life of God, such that the former allows one to be transported in a way that 
gives knowledge of the latter. Jesus Christ gives ordinary human knowers access to 
the principle of divine love whilst, on the other hand, this principle of divine love 
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remains paradoxically ever beyond knowledge. Balthasar’s response to the question 
“from above” and “from below” is to say that neither is adequate, on its own, to the 
task of interpreting the Mystery of Christ. 
Preliminary Note: Paragraph Two 
Nor can this ethics be accused of being unhistorical 
[Ungeschichtlichkeit] in that it treats the Gospel before the Old 
Testament law. The way is determined and illuminated by the goal 
one has in view, and this applies particularly to this unique way of 
salvation-history, which only attains its goal as a result of the dialectic 
between discontinuity and surpassing [Überbietung] (stressed by 
Paul) and inner fulfilment (stressed by Matthew and James). 
Naturally, from an historico-chronological [historisch-chronologisch] 
point of view, propositions 5 and 6 should come before the 
Christological ones, and propositions 7 – 9 before the latter. But the 
Christian lives in the “last age” [Endzeit] and must continually 
struggle to get beyond that in him which belongs to the preliminary 
stage and into the ultimately valid [End-Gültige]. Thus, it is more (not 
less) necessary for Christ, too, to live out his obedience to the Father, 
not merely at the level of prophetic immediacy, but by keeping the 
law and by “faith” in the promise. And the Christian follows him in 
this. 
The second paragraph of the preliminary note comprises five sentences in German 
and six sentences in English.
46
 It outlines the way in which Balthasar has organised 
his propositions on the pattern of the history of salvation. Salvation history is the 
second element, after the Mystery of Christ, in Balthasar’s claim that the Nine 
Propositions is perfecting moral theology in the manner requested by the council in 
OT 16. On a structural level, the paragraph addresses the Nine Propositions as a 
whole. On the one hand, it discusses the relationship between Old Testament ethics 
and Christian ethics. This is also the relationship between Section I (propositions 1-
4) and Section II (5-6) of the Nine Propositions. On the other hand, it addresses the 
relationship between biblical ethics and extrabiblical ethics. This is the relationship 
between Sections I & II (1-6) and Section III (7-9).
47
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[1] The first sentence picks up from the final sentence of the previous paragraph by 
defending Balthasar’s text from a second misinterpretation. The final sentence of the 
previous paragraph urges readers not to subordinate the Nine Propositions to the 
Christological categories “from above” or “from below”. This sentence addresses the 
potential criticism that the Nine Propositions are ‘unhistorical’. In the final section of 
the previous chapter, it is argued that the question of historical conditioning is one of 
Schürmann’s main concerns in his 1974 submission to the ITC. This question had 
also been addressed in the ITC’s 1972 propositions regarding doctrine. In the words 
of proposition ten of 1972: ‘Dogmatic formulations must be considered as responses 
to precise questions, and it is in this sense that they remain always true.’ This does 
not use the word ‘history’ but it makes clear that doctrine is inseparable from the 
asking of questions, which is an historical activity. Doctrine can “develop” to the 
extent that the questions being asked can change. The proposition concludes with a 
carefully balanced formula ‘today’s answers always presuppose in some way those 
of yesterday, although they cannot be reduced to them.’
48
 The following year, a CDF 
declaration admitted that ‘[d]ifficulties arise also from the historical condition that 
affects the expression of revelation’.
49
 
As with the question of “from above”/“from below” in the previous paragraph, 
Balthasar wishes to avoid a polarised reading of his text. The ITC’s 1972 
propositions admit that today’s answers presuppose yesterday’s (continuity), but that 
it is necessary to keep asking and answering new doctrinal questions (discontinuity). 
The CDF offers a more cautious formula, stating that doctrinal statements might be 
expressed incompletely at one point in time, only to be rendered more complete by a 
future answer. Finally, Schürmann argues that most moral statements are 
simultaneously conditioned by history and by eschatology. Each of these 
formulations seeks to articulate the manner in which theological statements are 
identical through time and yet subject to variation. 
Balthasar improves on the treatment of this problem by assuming that all statements 
are historically conditioned. Thus, instead of asking whether statements are 
historically conditioned, Balthasar asks what kind of history they are conditioned by, 
and here he distinguishes between salvation-history (sentence two) and chronological 
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history (sentence three). This distinction might be criticised for taking ‘chronological 
history’ too seriously as a kind of natural time, however we will not be able to pursue 
this line of thought any further in this thesis. Whether or not it is ultimately 
successful, the distinction is a great improvement on the formulations of the ITC in 
1972, the CDF in 1973, and Schürmann in 1974, because it attributes the unity of 
salvation history to God. 
In light of this discussion, the sophistication of Balthasar’s defence against the 
charge of being ‘unhistorical’ becomes clear. The council fathers instructed moral 
theologians to take greater account of salvation history, and this is exactly what 
Balthasar is doing in the Nine Propositions. His account accepts that all knowledge is 
historically conditioned. Those who might read him as ‘unhistorical’ are confusing 
his theological critique of chronological history for a critique of history as such. Such 
critics, Balthasar explains, are profoundly mistaken about his text. 
A final comment to make on this sentence is to consider the significance of the 
example which Balthasar provides: namely, the comparison of the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ and the Old Testament law. This is a little surprising given that the structure of 
the Nine Propositions places propositions 1-4 (Section I) before propositions 5-6 
(Section II). Surely Balthasar simply means to say that he is treating the Gospel 
(Section I) before the Old Testament (Section II)? The answer would appear to be 
that Balthasar has neo-Scholastic moral theologians in view. As noted in chapter one, 
the neo-Scholastic manuals tended to be dominated by the concept of law drawing 
their authority from the mosaic legislation. Thus, Balthasar is drawing attention to 
the fact that his argument in the Nine Propositions gives a theological explanation for 
the popular repudiation of the neo-Scholastic moral manuals. 
[2] The second sentence develops Balthasar’s account of salvation history, which has 
been introduced briefly above. The first part of the sentence juxtaposes a general 
statement about different kinds of ‘way’ with a specific statement about ‘this unique 
way of salvation history’. This kind of language can be interpreted using Hegel’s 
SCF. Towards the beginning of this text, Hegel claims that, after the Noahic flood, 
humankind ‘…strove by various ways to revert from barbarism… to[wards] the unity 
which had been broken…’.
50
 Balthasar appears to be using ‘way’ in a similar manner 
to Hegel as it refers to a historical process by which reconciliation with God 
(Balthasar) or the whole (Hegel) is brought into effect. 
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The second part of the sentence is difficult to interpret, but provides important detail 
regarding the relationship between the various propositions. The two published 
English translations disagree regarding the relationship of inner fulfilment and 
dialectic in this sentence. Graham Harrison takes the view that discontinuity is on 
one side of the dialectic and surpassing/inner fulfilment are on the other, whilst 
Elders and Baker identify a dialectic between discontinuity and surpassing and 
consider inner fulfilment to be a separate, supplementary, thought. The Latin text 
available on the website of the holy See appears to vindicate Elders and Baker and 
the version of Harrison’s text quoted above has been amended accordingly (as we 
note in the appendix, the latter appears not to have made any use of the Latin text).
51
 
This translation also fits with the general fact that the Pauline scriptures are more 
attentive to the relationship between Old and New Testaments than those of Matthew 
and James. 
In the Latin text the references to biblical authors are not in parentheses and Matthew 
and James are summarised with the term ‘fulfilment’ rather than ‘inner fulfilment’. 
The primary consequence of the addition of the word ‘inner’ appears to be a greater 
emphasis by Balthasar on the transformation of inclination by Jesus Christ. This 
point will become clearer in the interpretation of the propositions below. Otherwise, 
by quoting the biblical authors at this point, Balthasar is claiming that the argument 
of the Nine Propositions is drawn from a wide range of New Testament scriptures. 
This is a helpful addition to his claim to be fulfilling the instruction of OT 16 that 
postconciliar moral theology: ‘should draw more fully on the teaching of holy 
Scripture’. The claims also provide an explanation for the titles of the first two 
sections: Section I ‘The fulfilment of ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in Christ’ and 
Section II ‘The Old Testament elements of the synthesis to come’. 
Despite the fact that these two titles make historical claims (‘fulfilment’ and 
‘synthesis’) it is difficult to see how they harmonise with one another. The references 
to the biblical authors in the preliminary note resolve this problem as the titles can be 
understood as two ways of characterising salvation-history.  Specifically, Balthasar is 
claiming that Matthew and James characterise salvation-history in terms of 
fulfilment, whilst Paul characterises it in terms of dialectic. Both of these parallel 
accounts are scriptural and, thus, Balthasar includes them both in his propositions. 
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The implications of these characterisations for the relationship between Section I and 
Section II will be discussed further below. 
[3] The third sentence is the point at which Balthasar introduces what was termed 
above ‘chronological history’. Balthasar’s use of the term ‘naturally’ emphasises that 
this is history considered apart from biblical revelation. It is interesting to notice, 
however, that Balthasar’s ‘historico-chronological’ ordering of the propositions is 
highly argumentative. In particular, Balthasar claims that proposition seven 
(‘conscience’), and proposition nine (‘Post-Christian anthropological ethics’) should 
be considered as chronologically prior to Old Testament ethics. In what sense is this 
either chronological or natural? 
The point which Balthasar is arguing is that it is possible for the sophistication of 
human ethics to go backwards as well as forwards. According to Balthasar, Christian 
ethical life is the ‘unique’ way towards the reconciliation of the world. The gospel is 
thus treated first, despite the fact that the historical events reported occurred around 
two thousand years ago. Taken as a whole, the Nine Propositions flows in a kind of 
downward movement from Christian ethical life (Section I), through Old Testament 
ethical life (Section II) to Extrabiblical ethics (Section III). However, Balthasar also 
believes that the revelation of God in Christ has transformed the natural history of 
the world. Thus, it is not possible simply to return to the forms of ethics which were 
around before the time of Jesus Christ. Balthasar discusses this explicitly in one of 
the explanatory paragraphs when he notes that a simple regression to Old Testament 
ethics is impossible. When ‘…there is a consciousness of the fulfilment in Christ, 
what we find is an absolutist caricature of Old Testament ethics; …’ (6.e3). Thus, 
when Balthasar refers to proposition nine as chronologically prior to Christian ethics, 
he is making a claim of the following kind: anthropological ethics is on the same 
level of sophistication as pre-Old Testament ethics. However, when Balthasar refers 
to proposition eight (The pre-biblical natural order) as chronologically prior, he 
means it both literally and at the level of the sophistication of the argument. 
It is suggested in the discussion of the previous sentence that Balthasar’s distinction 
between salvation-history and chronological history may not ultimately prove 
persuasive. The discussion of this sentence provides a further support for this 
suggestion. The Anglican theologian John Milbank has criticised Balthasar in 
passing, and on the basis of different texts, for occasional lapses into a neo-
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Scholastic distinction between grace and nature.
52
 If the Nine Propositions and Theo-
Drama I are representative of Balthasar’s wider work then this would appear to be a 
major understatement. In both of these texts the distinction between nature and grace 
is deeply written into the structure of the argument. However, Milbank makes his 
point in the course of a study of Balthasar’s fellow ITC member and former teacher, 
Henri de Lubac.
53
 In a discussion of de Lubac’s theology, Jean-Yves Lacoste 
criticises the neo-Scholastic account of philosophy as ‘an ideal, yet highly unstable, 
arrangement.’ Philosophers simply do not produce the kind of philosophy which 
theology expects or requires: ‘At the end of the day the only philosophies that would 
fulfil correctly the programme theology had set for them would be philosophies 
composed by theologians themselves or under their supervision.’
54
 Regrettably, 
Balthasar’s chronological account of natural ethics in Section III falls into the latter 
category: it is a ‘natural’ account of ethics which is carefully supervised by theology. 
This is most transparent in the case of proposition seven (conscience) which is 
discussed in chapter four. Is Balthasar’s account of the self-consciousness of the 
individual the deepest philosophical insight into human existence? Or does it form 
the obverse of Balthasar’s absolute recommendation of Christian ethical life? 
[4] The fourth sentence presupposes Balthasar’s prior distinction between the two 
stages of biblical ethics. In particular, Balthasar reiterates that Christian ethics is the 
pinnacle of ethics because it is the product of the “last age”. It is also an attempt by 
Balthasar to find a point of continuity with the ITC’s 1972 propositions on moral 
pluralism. It might even have been Balthasar himself who included within 
proposition fifteen the phrase: ‘Christian liberty …demands a struggle toward totally 
objective truth no less than patience with less robust consciences (cf. Rom 14:15; 1 
Cor 8).’
55
 It is also the case that Philippe Delhaye refers to propositions ten to twelve 
of 1972 – the propositions on doctrine – as pursuing the question of the ‘ultimate 
validity’ [Endgültigkeit] of dogmatic formulae.
56
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[5+6] The final two sentences put the argument of the paragraph to work in the 
person of Jesus Christ, summarising Balthasar’s twofold interest in the Mystery of 
Christ and salvation history. Balthasar refers to Jesus by the title Christ (i.e. 
Messiah), which emphasises that Jesus has a pre-history among the Old Testament 
people of God as the object of a prophetic promise, and Jesus is presented as the first 
Christian who gets deeper than the ‘preliminary stage’ of Old Testament ethics. In 
broader terms, Jesus inaugurates the unique Sittlichkeit of the Christian religion. 
To understand the relationship that Balthasar is imagining between Jesus Christ and 
the Old Testament it is helpful to consider the approach taken by Hegel in SCF. In a 
discussion of Mt. 5:17-20, Hegel interprets Jesus as teaching: ‘not that laws 
disappear but that they must be kept through a righteousness of a new kind, in which 
there is more than is in the righteousness of the sons of duty and which is more 
complete because it supplements the deficiency in the laws.’
57
 This provides a 
helpful way of interpreting Balthasar’s claim in this sentence of the preliminary note 
that Jesus is keeping the law. In the Old Testament there is, on the one hand, 
‘prophetic immediacy’, and on the other hand, the promise of God and the law of 
God. These can be approximated to an individual’s spontaneous inclination and their 
adherence to the law (which is present in thinking). On this account, Balthasar’s 
point is not that faith in the promise, and keeping of the Old Testament law, is no 
longer necessary for Jesus. Rather, Balthasar is drawing on his account of mission 
and person, rehearsed earlier in this chapter, to claim that Jesus is fulfilling the will 
of God by fulfilling his mission, which includes both his (real) inclination and his 
(thought) keeping of the law. The gospel of Matthew calls this situation of supra-
dutiful adherence ‘fulfilment’ (Gk. pleroma
58
). 
It is worth repeating that Balthasar’s account of Jesus Christ differs here from that of 
Hegel. Specifically, Hegel interprets the call of Abraham as the development of a 
new way of thinking about the world, not as a call from the God who is revealing 
himself to the world. As a theologian, Balthasar maintains the latter: the promise is 
made by God to Abraham and his descendants. However, Balthasar places quotation 
marks around the term “faith”, when applied to Christ, because Jesus is the fulfilment 
of the promise at the same time that he is remaining faithful to it. 
A final comment is to note that Balthasar juxtaposes Jesus Christ with God as Father 
in these sentences. This repeats Balthasar’s distinction between Jesus and the Father 
in the third sentence of the previous paragraph. It is helpful to recall the account of 
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Jesus Baptism from Theo-Drama III discussed at the start of this chapter. 
Specifically, Balthasar is referring to Jesus as a mysterious whole – the Mystery of 
Christ – but he is also presupposing that it is impossible to talk about God the Son 
without reference to the other two persons of the trinity. Thus, as well as talking 
about the way in which Jesus stands in continuity and discontinuity with the Old 
Testament, Balthasar frames the new stage of God’s self-revelation in terms of the 
relationship of between God the Father and God the Son. The role of the holy Spirit 
is implicit – giving Jesus Christ the immediate inclination to fulfil the law which 
characterises his transformative and revelatory act. God the Father gives a mission 
which includes, and stands in continuity with, “faith” in the promise and the keeping 
of the law. Thus, Jesus Christ is obedient to the Father, and in doing so – more than 
ever – has “faith” in the promise and keeps God’s law. 
Preliminary Note: Paragraph Three 
Our propositions are highly summary in form and leave many essential 
matters undiscussed. Thus the Church, for instance, is only referred to 
obliquely: there is no mention of her sacraments, of the relationship to 
her official authority. Similarly, there is no discussion of the casuistic 
decisions, with their wide implications, that face today’s Church and 
which she must take within the framework of the decisions of 
humanity [menschheitlicher Entscheidungen]. 
The third and final paragraph of the preliminary note marks a change of tone. 
Balthasar is no longer summarising his argument in the Nine Propositions regarding 
Christian ethical life, nor showing how this conforms to the teaching of OT 16. Here 
Balthasar speaks in his own voice and details some of the shortcomings of his text. 
When reading this paragraph it is important to recall the difference, explained at the 
start of the chapter, between the propositions and the explanatory paragraphs. When 
Balthasar refers to ‘[o]ur propositions’ he means the nine short propositions which 
will be interpreted in the remainder of this chapter and the next. He is not referring to 
the explanatory paragraphs. The ‘oblique’ reference to the church is thus Balthasar’s 
reference to fulfilled ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. In the second section of the previous 
chapter it is shown that Balthasar gives the church the name ‘participation, 





 This account of the church as the fulfilment of biblical ethics is 
presupposed by Balthasar’s argument in Section I, especially in proposition two. 
Balthasar then lists three topics which are not discussed in the text of his 
propositions: these are the sacraments, the teaching authority of the pope and 
bishops, and the ‘casuistic decisions’ facing the church. The first two of these topics 
are discussed in the explanatory paragraphs. It is thus possible to specify Balthasar’s 
belief that the sacraments and liturgical worship are fundamental to the reception of 
the holy Spirit and that they give Christian ethical life its basis in reality (1.e1 and 
1.e2b). It is also possible to specify Balthasar’s revised version of his claim in TS 
that the church might still issue moral guidelines which, for reasons that we will 
rehearse in the interpretation of proposition one, cannot be considered to be objective 
laws. Here, Balthasar argues that ‘…the Church’s directives …can (and often must) 
appear hard and legalistic to those who are imperfect, just as the Father’s will seemed 
to the Crucified’ (1.e3). A full interpretation of this passage would require comment 
on Balthasar’s use of the term ‘directives’ [Weisungen] and his reference to the 
relationship of Father and Son at the crucifixion. We will simply recall from the 
previous chapter that ‘directives’ is being used during this period of Catholic moral 
theology as a way of referring to the official teaching of the church.
60
  
In the Latin version of this sentence the directives [normarum] of the church can 
appear to be ‘obligatory’, whilst in German the directives can appear ‘legalistic’ 
[gesetzhaft]. In both cases, however, Balthasar insists that this can only ‘appear’ to 
be the case. This reflects his argument that, in Christ, Christians are obedient to 
bespoke personal missions from God and not to abstract laws which are restricted to 
thought. Christians who continue to treat Christian moral direction as abstract laws 
are mistakenly imagining that their inclination must be in opposition to the personal 
will of God for them. 
The third topic, then, which Balthasar excludes from the text of the propositions 
themselves are the ‘casuistic decisions’ facing the church. An important feature of 
casuistry is that it operates on the basis of question and answer. A question is raised 
about a case and a decision is taken regarding the answer that will be given. Thus, 
the answer is specific to the particular case. Balthasar’s description of the church as 
faced with ‘casuistic decisions’ maintains his opposition to the idea that the church 
teaches absolute, or timelessly valid, moral laws. Rather, the church responds to the 
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questions (cases) generated by Christian life in the world today. This description also 
maintains the line that Balthasar took with regards to the 1972 propositions of the 
ITC. It is the proposition on doctrinal formulations (proposition ten) which insists on 
a question and answer approach to doctrine. The propositions on moral pluralism 
presupposed a series of universal moral demands (conscience/human rights; 
proposition thirteen) and, in the case of the church, a series of ‘unchanging 
principles’ (proposition fourteen). By using the term ‘casuistic decisions’ Balthasar 
again advances his view that doctrine and morals should be treated theologically in 
the same way. 
The final phrase of the paragraph is not present in the Latin version and will be 
interpreted by reference to Balthasar’s argument in Theo-Drama I.
61
 The concept of a 
‘framework’ is an important component of Balthasar’s discussion of Hegel in Theo-
Drama I. It is worth briefly summarising the argument in this volume of the trilogy 
as it confirms that the argument of the Nine Propositions is consistent with aspects of 
Balthasar’s wider theology. The argument of Theo-Drama I can be summarised in 
terms which we have already introduced. In the first place, Balthasar distinguishes 
between the Christian church and the world in a manner that we have compared to 
Hegel’s distinction in SCF between the Christian spirit and the rest of human 
existence. In the second place, again consistent with SCF, Balthasar distinguishes 
between reflection (thinking) and reality (being). Taking these points of commonality 
with Hegel for granted, Balthasar argues in Part I of Theo-Drama I that there is an 
analogy (rather than an opposition) between the church and the history of drama. 
Balthasar’s aim is to establish that the Church provides the definitive form of drama 
because it is a kind of dramatic reflection that is actually lived. Thus, the church 
combines thinking and being in a way that was not previously possible (e.g. in 
antique Athenian drama). In Part II Balthasar investigates what he takes to be the 
dramatic dimension of human existence in its non-biblical form. Balthasar argues 
that, taken in this form, theatre is a kind of reflection (thinking) which accompanies 
the “play” of human existence (being).
62
 The volume concludes in Part III with a 
provisional analysis of the state of the world’s investigation of its dramatic 
dimension. To what extent is the world conscious of the dramatic dimension of 
existence? To what extent is the world caught up in illusion? To what extent is the 
world allowing the dramatic dimension of existence to be perfected by Christian 
revelation? The outcome of this analysis is the preparation of readers for Balthasar’s 
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subsequent reflection on the Christian religion as the definitive drama that includes 
both thinking and being. 
In the first part of Theo-Drama I, Hegel is identified as the primary source of 
objection to Balthasar’s claim that human existence is inherently dramatic.
63
 The 
details of Hegel’s objection to drama are less important than the manner in which 
Balthasar discusses them. Specifically, Balthasar claims that Hegel is partially 
responsible for the contemporary phenomenon of the ‘loss of the framework’, even 
though Hegel tries to repair a general ‘loss of the image’ in Enlightenment 
philosophy. In a provocative sentence, Balthasar identifies the academic disciplines 
of sociology and psychology as the contemporary expressions of these two 
problems.
64
 Balthasar’s particular criticism of Hegel is that, by accepting the 
‘identity of God and man’, the latter is responsible for recovering the image (man) at 




This account of Balthasar’s critique of Hegel casts light on the comment at the end of 
the German version of paragraph three that the Church must take casuistic decisions 
‘within the framework of the decisions of humanity’. It is possible to imagine a time 
– perhaps in the medieval period – when the church took decisions within a Christian 
framework. Today, partly as a result of Hegel’s philosophy, the church is faced with 
a situation in which the framework has been fragmented and its casuistic task has 
become far harder. This is a very European account of the world. It is also quite hard 
to interpret. A charitable reading would be that Balthasar is proposing that the 
bishops of the church take up their freedom and respond to the particular questions 
being asked in their particular churches. To support this interpretation, however, 
requires a greater understanding of Balthasar’s view of the papacy than we are 
offering in this thesis.
66
 A less charitable reading would be that Balthasar is 
defending Paul VI in the context of the lingering controversy over Humanae vitae. 
Specifically, Balthasar is hinting that the loss of the Christian cultural framework is 
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causing particular difficulties for the exercise of the office of the pope and that 
theologians should show greater sympathy. 
(ii) Section I: The fulfilment of ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in Christ (propositions 1-
4) 
In the Latin version of the Nine Propositions, the title of Section I reads simply ‘[t]he 
fulfilment of reality in Christ’.
67
 The interpretation of Hegel’s SCF can help us to 
understand Balthasar’s meaning here. As we have noted a number of times, in SCF 
‘reality’ [Wirklichkeit] is the opposite of ‘idea’ and together these form the only 
possible division within the ‘whole’ of lived existence.
68
  In this thesis we have been 
referring to this distinction using the terms being and thinking. Using this distinction 
to interpret Balthasar’s title, one can see that the claim that Christ fulfils ‘reality’ 
(being) rules out the possibility that the only impact of Christ is on the way that 
people think. Indeed, in Theo-Drama I Balthasar claims that Hegel himself never 
managed to avoid offering an account of reconciliation which was not restricted to 
thinking. Specifically, Balthasar argues that Hegel’s concept of ‘ethical life’ 
[Sittlichkeit] is merely a ‘concrete, absolute (divine) idea’.
69
 Balthasar argues that 
this is an improvement over the philosophical tradition which begins with Kant and 
deploys the concept of a ‘nonconcrete absolute’.
70
 However, Jesus Christ inaugurates 
the reconciliation of the world in both reality (being) and idea (thinking). Thus, when 
Balthasar claims in the Latin title of Section I that Christ fulfils ‘reality’ he is arguing 
that his is superior to, among many others, the account of reconciliation offered by 
Hegel. Christians participate in a real ethical life inaugurated by Christ, they do not 
merely have the idea of such an ethical life. This analysis also explains why 
Balthasar is able to replace ‘reality’ with Sittlichkeit in the German version without 
changing his meaning. The state of ethical life in reality – and not merely in thought 
– is the vision of a healed and reconciled world. Thus, when Jesus fulfils reality he is 
also establishing real ethical life.
71
 
Another feature of the Latin title is that the term ‘fulfilment’ [adimpletio] repeats the 
claim in the second paragraph of the Latin preliminary note that the Gospel ‘fulfils’ 
[adimpletio] the Old Testament law. This latter claim is attributed to Matthew/James 
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and is accompanied by the claim that Paul advocates a relationship of ‘surpassing’ 
[superatio]. The repeated use of adimpletio supports the previous claim that the title 
of Section I summarises the relationship between Old and New Testaments as found 
in Matthew/James, whilst the title of Section II gives a Pauline account of the same 
relationship. 
Understanding the relationship between the first four propositions is a challenging 
task. Our interpretation assumes that the first proposition is the foundational claim, 
establishing the Mystery of Christ at the centre of Balthasar’s attempt to articulate a 
persuasive postconciliar moral theology. Propositions two and three then explore two 
themes from the first proposition in more detail: proposition two looks at the 
Christian ethics from the perspective of the inner fulfilment of human persons, whilst 
proposition three looks particularly at the new understanding of law in Christian 
ethics. Finally, proposition four addresses itself to the opposite of the foundational 
claim – the Mystery of Christ – namely, to sin. As Balthasar explains in Glory VI, sin 
‘in the biblical sense’ is the name given to the force that is revealed by, and in 
opposition to, the glory of the Lord.
72
 As the incarnation of God, Jesus Christ reveals 
and destroys sin in a unique and definitive way. 
1: Christ as the concrete norm 
Christian ethics must be elaborated from Jesus Christ since, as the Son 
of the Father, he fulfilled the whole will of God (i.e., every “ought” 
[Gesollte]) in the world. He did this “for us”, so that from him, the 
fulfilled concrete norm of all ethical [sittlichen] action, we might 
receive the freedom to fulfil God’s will and to live according to our 
purpose [Bestimmung] as free children of the Father. 
The title of the first proposition places the Mystery of Christ at the centre of 
Christian ethics. This is in conformity with the instruction of OT 16, with Balthasar’s 
earlier experiment in TS (see previous chapter) and with the preconciliar 
‘christological shift’ in moral theology which Keenan and Gallagher attribute to 
Häring.
73
 Even in TS, Balthasar is not the first theologian to consider Jesus Christ as 
the norm or criterion of Christian living.
74
 However, Balthasar develops the claim 
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rigorously and consistently throughout his writings from this period. Thus, in TS, 
Balthasar claims that ‘[r]adiating from him …and ceaselessly circling around his 
mystery, paths lead off in all directions’.
75
 This is with reference to the plurality of 
accounts of Jesus Christ that can be found in the New Testament. Whilst in Theo-
Drama I Balthasar uses the metaphor of a magnet: ‘[a]ll it [the reader] needs is the 
magnet to align the iron filings and assemble them – into a Christology, a doctrine of 
the Trinity, an ecclesial and Christian doctrine of how to live’.
76
 Given Balthasar’s 
claim in TS that ‘the doctrines of the Trinity and the Church …are both inseparable 
from Christology’ the magnet metaphor only reaffirms that the Mystery of Christ is 
the centre of Balthasar’s theological project.
77
 
Having established that the Mystery of Christ is at the centre of theology and of 
Christian ethics, another interpretative question is to ask what it means for Christ to 
be a ‘norm’? Balthasar’s use of this term is an innovation on TS in which he referred 
to Christ as a ‘criterion’ in which one participates. Whilst there is no change in the 
way in which Balthasar is interpreting the Mystery of Christ, the switch to the term 
‘norm’ shows a broadening field of view. Balthasar’s use of ‘criterion’ in TS is a 
product of his engagement with the ITC work programme on ‘the criteria of 
Christian moral knowledge’. In particular, it emphasises Balthasar’s claim that there 
are not a plurality of criteria but a single criterion, namely, Christ. ‘Norm’, by 
contrast, alludes consciously or unconsciously to Häring’s claim at the start of The 
Law of Christ (1954): ‘The principle, the norm, the centre, and the goal of Christian 
Moral Theology is Christ.’
78
 It also seems that ‘norm’ was a more common term in 
moral theology than ‘criterion’.
79
 Certainly, by the time Edward T. Oakes met with 
Balthasar to discuss moral theology in the early 1980s, Balthasar was referring to 
ethics as ‘the problem of norms’.
80
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A more interesting interpretative question, then, is what it means for the Mystery of 
Christ to be ‘the concrete norm’ of Christian ethics. Here the basic outline of the 
argument does not differ significantly from the account of the ‘criterion’ in TS. On 
the one hand, as Balthasar makes clear in the first paragraph of the preliminary note, 
one can only do Christian ethics from the perspective of Christ. This means that 
Jesus Christ is a norm against which one establishes whether or not one is Christian. 
On the other hand, the norm of Christ is open to a plurality of interpretations and, as 
a person called by God in Christ, one is able to respond to this norm in accordance 
with the bespoke demands of your individual mission. 
Turning to the argument of the first proposition, which is a single sentence in 
German, Balthasar insists that Christ transforms Gesollte into Christian ethical life. 
This is the same transition as that from Old Testament law to Christian ethics, 
referred to in the second paragraph of the preliminary note and discussed briefly in 
the interpretation of that paragraph above. 
From the prior tradition of Catholic moral theology, Balthasar’s argument can be 
seen to break with the discipline’s legal assumptions. In the first place, Balthasar’s 
argument rejects the approach of the preconciliar moral manuals to the extent that the 
latter pick out the legal texts from scripture as the basis for their discipline. Balthasar 
insists that Christian ethics must be grounded in Jesus Christ, who has surpassed or 
fulfilled the Old Testament Mosaic legislation. In the second place, Balthasar’s 
argument also breaks with the legal approach of the leading postconciliar 
formulations of moral theology: the ‘unchanging principles’ of the 1972 ITC 
propositions and the ‘objective criteria’ of the 1966 Official Report. Balthasar is fully 
aware that moral theologians are in danger of celebrating the demise of the 
“legalistic” moral manuals only to reintroduce a new absolute moral law in the name 
of faith in Christ (faith-ethic) or of human freedom (autonomous ethic). The events 
of 1972-1974 reveal that Balthasar was in a small minority of theologians on the 
commission who grasped the faith-ethic side of this problem, and he was the only 
theologian from either side who drafted a text in an attempt to overcome it. 
Balthasar’s unique approach has not yet been recognised in the English language 
secondary literature. 
A deeper, and more interesting, approach to the argument is to read it in terms of 
Hegel’s account of law in SCF. As rehearsed on a number of occasions, Hegel argues 
that law is restricted to thinking and can only reconcile the world in thought. People, 
on the other hand, participate in both thinking and being. Thus, law is not suitable to 
the task of reconciling the ‘whole’ of lived existence, a task which requires the 
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agreement of people in both belief and practice. Hegel calls those people who 
understand his argument regarding the inadequacy of law “living”, and the quality of 
their common reconciled life is “love”.
81
 Those people who are not alive, and this 
includes problematically those who participate in the Jewish spirit, place themselves 
under law in the sense that the latter expresses an objectivity which determines their 
subjectivity.
82




If Balthasar were to advance this early Hegelian account of law in the Nine 
Propositions then he would end up advocating a substantial identity between 
Christian ethics and stoic philosophy. By claiming that law, and the invocation of 
‘right’, is nearly always a failure of love, Hegel offers a highly stoical account of 
love in which the suffering of unjust actions is to be actively embraced.
84
 Only ‘when 
the whole of the community becomes an object of contempt’ does Hegel permit one 
to fight for one’s right rather than to endure.
85
 However, even in Hegel’s ideal state, 
which is associated with the early teaching of Jesus, there is no suggestion that laws 
disappear. As we have already seen, Hegel explains that it is: ‘not that laws disappear 
but that they must be kept through a righteousness of a new kind, in which there is 
more than is in the righteousness of the sons of duty and which is more complete 
because it supplements the deficiency in the laws.’
86
 This ‘righteousness of a new 
kind’ is a good way into Balthasar’s treatment of Christ as a norm in proposition one.  
The fundamental difference between Balthasar’s and Hegel’s account of law in the 
first proposition turns on the former’s use of the term Gesollte. Hegel, it has already 
been noted, claims that the true reconciliation of the world, as taught by Jesus Christ, 
will eliminate all shoulds (Sölle), whilst Balthasar describes the work of Jesus Christ 
using a plural noun created from the past participle of sollen (Gesollte). This implies 
that – in contrast to the argument of Hegel in SCF – Balthasar believes that sollen 
retains a place in Christian ethics. The difference appears to be due primarily to the 
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active role that Balthasar attributes to God and his self-revelation. Balthasar does not 
take Hegel’s negative view of the Old Testament law, but accepts this as the 
determination of Israel’s subjectivity by the objective (i.e. universal) revelation of 
God. This is a good situation, on Balthasar’s account, because it opens up the 
possibility of knowing and responding to God. However, the situation is improved by 
the concrete norm of Christ because the latter makes available the possibility of 
participating in Christ’s divine mission. Where a Christian is pursuing their divine 
mission, they are still responding to God, but are doing so as a unity of inclination 
and thought. The liberation wrought by Christ is the ability to respond to God not 
just by keeping the law (thought) but by also being inclined (reality) to do the will of 
God. 
For the sake of clarity, it is worth reiterating that Balthasar considers the Old 
Testament biblical law to be an example of ‘Gesollte’. Thus, in Theo-Drama I, 
Balthasar contrasts the demands of ‘timelessly valid laws’ for Christian conduct with 
the ethical demand posed in the immediacy of a situation (“situation ethics”).
87
 Both 
of these accounts of Christian ethical conduct are transformed by the Mystery of 
Christ. Instead, Balthasar proposes an account of Christian ethical life that depends 
upon his concept of a bespoke personal mission that participates in Christ’s 
archetypal mission. Thus, in the course of a general account of drama in Theo-
Drama I Balthasar argues that: ‘[t]he “ought” [Soll] that burns in the hero’s heart, 
that for which he must freely strive, is not some categorical imperative that threatens 
him from above; it must indwell him most intimately as his most personal task…’.
88
 
This is the kind of sollen which is generated by a divine mission and which Balthasar 
has in mind in the first proposition. Christians receive a bespoke personal sollen, or 
mission, from God. This includes the Old Testament law, in that it is consistent with 
the law’s revelation of God’s character and expectation, but it is a ‘personal task’ that 
is not restricted to either inclination or thought, but includes both. Due to the fact that 
all individual missions also participate, in some sense, in Christ’s archetypal mission, 
Balthasar can also make the general claim in the first proposition that Christians ‘live 
according to our purpose as free children of the Father’. 
Balthasar’s argument is sophisticated and it is worth noting that it involves a 
substantial account of freedom. God does not merely set a series of universal 
(objective) moral laws against which Christians will be measured, but provides each 
individual Christian with a mission that draws on their full range of skills and 
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aptitudes. Nevertheless, we wonder whether Balthasar’s account can be criticised for 
exacerbating a tendency to prioritise the community over the individual? This 
prioritisation is certainly evident in Hegel’s SCF. Hegel’s one-sided focus on the 
problem of individualism is evident in his treatment of community in SCF. This can 
be shown in two ways. First, it is noted in the previous chapter that there is an 
inconsistency between, on the one hand, Hegel’s account of Jesus’ relationship to the 
Jewish spirit and, on the other hand, Hegel’s account of the life of love. The latter is 
labelled as stoical and involves the active acceptance of suffering in order to hold 
open the possibility of the reconciliation of the world in love. However, Hegel also 
approves of Jesus’ decision to ‘contest’ [bekämpfte] with a Jewish spirit which could 
be ‘overcome only by valour.’
89
 This account prioritises the community over the 
individual. Hegel considers it consistent with love to contest for the common good, 
but inconsistent with love to contest for the individual good. Might there not be 
situations in which a community is colluding in the unjust treatment of an individual? 
The second way in which Hegel prioritises the community is in his account of the 
loss of the state of nature in the flood. The primary consequence of this loss is that of 
disunity and all of Hegel’s accounts of individuality are controlled by the need to 
recover community. This is most obvious in his treatment of the tower of Babel, 
reported in Genesis 11. Hegel offers an apocryphal account of this event, drawing on 
the work of Josephus, in which the tower was constructed under the direction of 
Nimrod. Hegel argues that Noah had tried to reconcile all of the objects in the world 
by positing a ‘being’ which was master of them (i.e. God).
90
 In comparison to Noah’s 
supreme ‘being’, the forces that caused the flood are mere thoughts and not to be 
feared. By contrast, Nimrod met the same problem of vulnerability with his own 
force. Thus, ‘[h]e united men after they had become mistrustful, estranged from one 
another, and now ready to scatter. But the unity he gave them was not a reversion to 
a cheerful social life [Geselligkeit] in which they trusted nature and one another; he 
kept them together indeed, but by force. …In this battle against need, therefore, the 




Hegel’s account of Nimrod, in which the tower of Babel is built as a defence against 
need, is highly sophisticated. Both Noah and Nimrod are faced with a situation in 
which they are vulnerable due to a loss of unity. Noah responds by imagining a 
secure unity in the thought of a supreme being, Nimrod, by establishing one in 
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reality, symbolised by a tower. However, scripture represents Noah as remaining 
loyal to God (Gen 6:9). Moreover, an orthodox doctrine of God takes him to be prior 
to and independent of nature. Such a claim is ruled out by Hegel in SCF who treats 
the ‘whole’ of human existence as the most basic element in his argument. Similarly, 
the account of the tower of Babel is presented as a communal exercise in scripture 
(Gen 11:3-4) and the scattering of the people as a work of God (Gen 11:8). Thus, the 
confusion of a particular community in a particular situation is reported in scripture 
as an act of love towards the individuals involved. 
Hegel’s account of Noah and Nimrod attributes to them greater agency than 
scripture. Indeed, the latter figure is imported from an apocryphal source for the 
purpose of taking responsibility for the tower of Babel. This attribution of 
responsibility results in the obfuscation of the communal dimension of social 
problems. This continues when Hegel comes to analyse the problems facing the 
Jewish spirit at the time of Jesus: 
Men of commoner soul, though of strong passions, comprehended the fate of 
the Jewish people only partially; hence they were not calm enough either to 
let its waves carry them along passively and unconsciously and so just to 
swim with the tide or, alternatively, to await the further development 
necessary before a stronger power could be associated with their efforts. The 
result was that they outran the fermentation of the whole and fell without 
honour and without achievement.
92
 
This passage maintains that for the majority of individuals, those of ‘commoner 
soul’, the options are to conform to the practices of their community or to wait for a 
‘stronger power’. This stronger power is expected to emerge as the result of a natural 
process (‘fermentation’) which cannot be interrupted. Hegel avoids making the 
Scriptural argument that a community can collude with its leaders and can share 
responsibility for their failings (cf. Rev 2 and 3). 
There is nothing in Hegel’s SCF to say that he allowed the community, or the whole, 
to determine the individual. Hegel is quite careful to imagine reconciliation to be a 
free movement by individuals into a unity of love. However, it is fair to say that 
Hegel is prepared to countenance the suffering of individuals (stoic) whilst he 
laments the suffering of the whole (disunity). This is consistent with his claim that he 
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2: The universality of the concrete norm 
The norm of Christ’s concrete existence is personal and, as such, 
universal, since he makes the Father’s love comprehensively and 
completely present to the world: he embraces all the differences 
between human beings and their ethical [ethischen] situations and 
unites all persons (in their uniqueness and freedom) in his own person, 
having authority over them in the Holy Spirit of freedom in order to 
lead them all into the Father’s kingdom. 
The second proposition elaborates on the argument of the first, that is, the part of the 
first proposition that deals with the new Christian ethical life that is generated and 
governed by the concrete norm of Jesus Christ. The proposition characterises the 
norm of Christ as both personal and universal, it introduces the concept of love for 
the first time and it refers to all three persons of the Trinity. 
The first phrase of the proposition characterises the norm of Christ as both personal 
and universal. The previous analysis of Hegel’s SCF helps one to interpret the 
significance of a personal, rather than a legal, norm. Legal norms, according to 
Hegel, are restricted to thought and are therefore an inadequate basis for the 
reconciliation of the world. However, Balthasar has argued that the personal norm of 
the ‘concrete existence’ of Christ is enacted in history (being) and is not restricted 
merely to thought. The concrete norm of Christ therefore goes beyond the distinction 
between thinking and being and offers a basis for reconciliation which includes both. 
Interestingly, the concrete norm of Christ is an option for reconciliation which Hegel 
himself rejects in SCF due to the problem of death. As we saw in chapter two, 
Hegel’s principle for the reconciliation of the whole world in SCF is explicitly non-
personal as it is impossible for the whole to be reconciled by someone who can die.
94
 
Balthasar’s account of Christian ethical life is working in a Christian theological 
discourse which, unlike Hegel in SCF, does not treat death as an absolute limit on the 
possibility of reconciliation. 
Balthasar’s second characteristic for the norm of Christ in this proposition is 
universality. This is a point with which Hegel would agree, to the extent that any 
persuasive account of reconciliation is inadequate if it is only able to apply to a 
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subset of the whole. However, it is also a point which raises theological questions. 
How does the universality of the concrete norm of Christ deepen or challenge the 
particular call of God to Israel through Abraham? And how does the Christian 
affirmation of the universality of Christ relate to other competing claims in the world 
about the true principle of reconciliation? 
We will approach Balthasar’s claim for universality by means of Balthasar’s 1973 
essay ‘Experience of God in the Bible’.
95
 This essay reads as a prototype for the Nine 
Propositions as it is similarly structured, dealing with the relation between the New 
Testament and “nonbiblical” man, as well as between the New and Old Testaments. 
The primary difference between EGB and the Nine Propositions is that the former 
begins from nonbiblical man and works via the Old to the New Testaments. These 
are presented as steps towards a fully Christian understanding of existence. In the 
Nine Propositions, by contrast, Balthasar works in the opposite direction from the 
concrete norm of Christ to “extrabiblical” man (propositions seven to nine).  
In EGB, Balthasar makes two claims which are directly relevant to the first phrase of 
the proposition. Firstly, that it is the self-revelation of God in the Old Testament that 
reveals for the first time that God is personal.
96
 Second, that the revelation of God to 
Israel has already taken on a universal dimension, with Israel standing in for the 
whole of humanity.
97
 In this way, Balthasar goes on to argue that the revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ gives the self-revelation of God its definitive form. 
According to Balthasar’s argument in EGB, persons outside of the biblical revelation 
have what he calls a ‘religious problem’. Specifically, nonbiblical man is only able to 
ascertain that he is not ‘the whole’ of existence.
98
 There is thus no way in which 
nonbiblical man can work out in advance that there is a God who is personal and 
who created the world. For this reason, the self-revelation of the infinite and free 
God and the election of Israel takes on a profound significance. Where previously 
nonbiblical man might speculate about a God who was ‘free from the world’, Israel 
now encountered a God who was ‘free for the world’, taking the initiative to actively 
reveal himself to his chosen people.
99
  
On this account, the ‘universality’ of Christ is a consequence of the sovereignty of 
the God who reveals himself to Israel and, through them, to the world. More 
specifically, universality does not originate with Christ, as the self-revelation of God 
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in the Old Testament is already opening up new possibilities of profound 
significance to the whole of creation. However, Christ transforms and integrates the 
universality found in the Old Testament – the prophets, the promise and the law – 
and focuses them into a single personal norm for the first time. The way in which 
Christ draws together and deepens the Old Testament experience of God is captured 
in the proposition by the claim that he makes God’s love present to the world 
‘comprehensively and completely’. 
The second phrase of the proposition refers to the embrace of all differences by Jesus 
Christ. This is very similar to the idea expressed by Balthasar in TS using the 
metaphor of a symphony. All of the players in the orchestra are different, and there is 
a vast array of different instruments. These are then drawn together by the conductor 
– Christ – and unite in the playing of a symphony.
100
 None of the players in an 
orchestra lose their individuality and each is free to play their part as skilfully and 
beautifully as possible. However, they all depend upon the conductor for direction 
and coherence. 
Finally, the proposition refers to the ‘authority’ of Christ over individual Christians 
in the first Trinitarian formula of the Nine Propositions. When interpreting this 
phrase it is helpful to recall Balthasar’s Trinitarian account of Jesus’ baptism in 
Theo-Drama III which was discussed earlier in this chapter as the point at which 
Jesus receives his mission from the Father. Specifically, Balthasar argued that the 
Mystery of Christ depends upon the action of all three persons of the Trinity: the 
Father is the source of the divine mission, whilst the Spirit makes the mission present 
to Jesus in thought (concrete plan) and inclination. The role of God the Son is to 
receive the mission and to give himself to it in obedience to the Father. In this 
context, it is possible to see how the same Trinitarian process is being imagined in 
the case of individual Christians in proposition two. In the case of the individual 
Christian they participate in the archetypal mission of the Son, hence the authority of 
Christ. Similarly to Christ, the mission can only be made present ‘in the Holy Spirit 
of freedom’, who gives the free and spontaneous inclination to obey the mission, as 
well as its concrete content at any given moment. Finally the Father stands as the 
source and goal of the whole drama of created existence. 
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3: The Christian meaning of the “golden rule” 
The “golden rule” (Mt. 7:12; Lk. 6:31) in the mouth of Christ and in 
the context of the Sermon on the Mount can only be described as 
summing up the law and the prophets, because it grounds the 
reciprocal expectation [Erwarten] and offering [Gewähren] of the 
members of Christ on the gift of God (i.e., Christ). Thus, it goes 
beyond mere humanitarianism and involves the interpersonal exchange 
of divine life. 
The third proposition explores in more detail the implications of Balthasar’s 
argument for an understanding of moral law. By choosing to talk about the “golden 
rule” Balthasar is addressing some of the Kantian tendencies in moral theology. 
Balthasar’s argument is that it is incorrect to separate moral theology from doctrinal 
theology in the way that Kant separates practical and pure reason and that the ITC 
separated the questions in their 1972 propositions on pluralism. When the Sermon on 
the Mount offers the golden rule as a summary of the Old Testament law (most 
explicit in Matthew) this must not be read as a free-standing Christian categorical 
imperative, independent from the concrete existence of Jesus Christ. Rather, it is only 
because this gospel teaching is grounded ‘on the gift of God’ that this rule can be 
described as a summary of the Old Testament law. The account of the Old Testament 
law must be redefined by the Mystery of Christ in its entirety and not merely by one 
scriptural teaching used in different contexts in Matthew and Luke. 
The reference to Jesus Christ as the ‘gift of God’ invites questions about the way in 
which Balthasar is interpreting God’s Trinitarian nature. The Catholic theologian 
Nicholas Lash has glossed the Trinitarian principle of appropriation as holding that: 
‘whatever God does which is not-God is done indefinably by all three persons.’
101
 
According to this principle, all of the gifts of God – creating, saving, sanctifying – 
are given indivisibly by all three persons of the Godhead. Thus, to identify Jesus 
Christ as the ‘gift of God’ invites a question about whether the latter is ultimately 
separable from God and man. Clearly Balthasar does not separate the Son from the 
Father, but it would be interesting to establish in more detail why Balthasar does not 
say, at this point, that Jesus Christ, in his divinity, gives himself as the ground of a 
new community. 
The proposition concludes with a rhetorical contrast between ‘mere 
humanitarianism’ and ‘interpersonal …divine life’. This claim develops a contrast 
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which has been implicit in the first and second propositions between humans with 
faith (Christians) and humans without (non-Christians). Here, for the first time, non-
Christians are given the specific categorisation of ‘mere humanitarians’. The term 
‘mere’ indicates that Balthasar is presupposing that Christians are more than 
humanitarians. In the terms Balthasar has been seen to use in Glory VI, this might be 
because they have been “transported” by grace and are now informed by their 
experience of the glory of the Lord.
102
 Whilst in the terms of Theo-Drama III this 





Only where [Erst wo] God’s love goes “to the end” does human guilt 
manifest itself as sin, its disposition [Gesinnung] arising from a 
positively anti-godly [widergöttlichen] Spirit. 
The brevity of the fourth proposition serves to emphasise the absurdity and 
meaninglessness of the human rejection of God. Balthasar is certainly not open to the 
charge levelled against the neo-Scholastic moral manuals by MacNamara that he 
‘…had in mind only the determination of serious moral fault with a view to the 
confession of sins in the sacrament of penance.’
104
 Despite its brevity, however, the 
account of sin which Balthasar provides can be elaborated further and shown to be 
determined by a number of the structural factors operative in the Nine Propositions 
as a whole. 
Balthasar focuses his account of sin on Jesus Christ: “to the end” is a quotation from 
John 13:1. It marks an important moment in the movement of the gospel towards the 
passion of Christ: ‘…Jesus knew that his hour had come to depart from this world 
and go to the Father. Having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to 
the end’ (NRSV). This passage clearly attributes love to Jesus and Balthasar does not 
repeat the term ‘Father’s love’ which he claims was revealed in Jesus (prop 2). 
Instead, consistent with the Trinitarian principle of appropriation, Balthasar argues 
that Jesus, in his divine nature, expresses the love of God for humankind in his 
acceptance of crucifixion. 
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The reference to ‘human guilt’ in the first phrase highlights an important theme in 
the Nine Propositions as a whole. Quite correctly, Balthasar presupposes that ‘sin’ is 
the refusal of the gift of God. Thus, the council of Chalcedon added the teaching 
noted in the discussion of the first paragraph of the preliminary note that Jesus is 
‘like us in all respects except sin’.
105
 Jesus, who is God in his divine nature, cannot 
sin without denying the intimate coexistence of his divine and human natures. Hence, 
Balthasar’s careful claim in the preliminary note that Jesus took on the ‘guilt’ of 
Adam, and not his sin. Similarly, in the explanatory paragraph, Balthasar reaffirms 
his argument that Jesus Christ transforms the relation of Israel to the Old Testament 
law by arguing that sin cannot be a consequence of ‘the infringement of a mere “law” 
(in Judaism)…’ (4.e1). Rather, because sin is the rejection of God, the rejection of 
Jesus Christ is manifestly sinful. 
Balthasar’s emphasis on the crucifixion of Jesus Christ (‘the end’), not forgetting his 
famous emphasis on the significance of Jesus’ descent into hell, repeating the 
Apostles’ creed, is closely involved with his account of sin. In the first paragraph of 
the preliminary note Balthasar draws attention to the full humanity of Jesus Christ. 
Balthasar also stresses the solidarity of Jesus with humankind in TS.
106
 Thus, 
Balthasar appears to interpret Jesus’ willing embrace of death as the perfection of his 
solidarity with humankind and of the revelation of the love of God. Put another way, 
God is prepared to endure the meaninglessness of a finite human death in order to 
reveal to the world his power and desire to save humankind. This account reflects 
Balthasar’s insistence in the Nine Propositions that Christianity is the religion of real, 
as well as thought, reconciliation. Balthasar’s assumption that, without Jesus Christ, 
death is an intractable problem for humankind is made more evident in an 
explanatory paragraph to proposition nine in which Balthasar states that ‘…death 
destroys the possibility of a synthesis between the individual’s personal fulfilment 
and his social integration’ (9.e3). Crucial to this claim by Balthasar is that it is only 
the Christian religion which brings meaning to human existence by solving the 
general problem posed to all human individuals by death. 
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Chapter 4: Reading the Nine Propositions – Sections II and III 
Section II. The Old Testament elements of the synthesis to come 
5: The promise (Abraham) 
6: The law 
Section III. Fragments of extrabiblical ethics 
7: Conscience 
8: The pre-biblical natural order 
9: Post-Christian anthropological ethics 
The interpretation of Section I in the previous chapter sets out Balthasar’s proposal 
for postconciliar Christian ethics. Through the gift of faith in Christ, Christians 
participate in the unified ethical life of the body of Christ, i.e. the church. As 
participants in a living body Christians are not subordinated to any objective laws but 
are united in their free acceptance of the personal spiritual norm of Jesus Christ 
(faith). This manifests itself for each person as a bespoke personal mission within the 
life of the body of Christ (a divine ‘should’). The primary task of this chapter is to 
explain how Balthasar’s final five propositions contribute to this account of Christian 
ethical life.  
Balthasar’s two main purposes in Section II are to show how the Old Testament 
marks an improvement over the previous ethical situation and to show how it 
anticipates the Christian ethical life which Balthasar has detailed in Section I. Then, 
in Section III Balthasar uses his account of ethics outside of the biblical revelation to 
critique the concepts of conscience, of virtue, of natural law, of natural order and of 
anthropology. We interpret Section III primarily as an intervention in the 
postconciliar debate regarding the future of moral theology and we show how these 
critiques all depend upon the two tasks which Balthasar has discharged in Section II.   
Before offering our interpretation of these propositions, we comment on a serious 
problem hanging over any direct use of Hegel’s critique of law. In chapter two we 
noted in passing that Hegel’s argument in SCF is supersessionist. The fact that 
Balthasar’s argument in Sections II and III shares similarities with Hegel’s critique 
of law raises the question of supersessionism. In the interpretation of the propositions 
we show that Balthasar is clearly aware of the problem of supersessionism. However, 
we are not ultimately able to adjudicate on the question of supersessionism because 
we are unclear about whether Balthasar grants reality to the contemporary Jewish 
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spirit, or, indeed, to other biblical and nonbiblical religions. This is an important 
topic for future research. 
(i) Section II: Old Testament elements of the synthesis to come (propositions 5-
6) 
The previous chapter has shown that Hegel’s argument in SCF can be used to cast 
considerable light on Balthasar’s argument in the Nine Propositions. As we also 
noted in the previous chapter, Balthasar refers to Hegel’s SCF twice in Theo-
Drama I, published the year before the Nine Propositions was discussed by the ITC. 
In both of these references to SCF, Balthasar claims that he shares Hegel’s 
understanding of the transition from the Old to the New Testaments. In the first 
reference Balthasar claims that Hegel accepts ‘the Christian idea of the vanquished 
(Jewish) duality between man and (divine, alien) fate’.
1
 Then, in the second 
reference, Balthasar claims that: ‘[w]hile Hegel correctly describes the way the Old 
Covenant is transcended [Übersteig], the uniqueness of Jesus disappears in the 
dialectical process.’
2
 Thus, on the one hand, Balthasar and Hegel apparently share an 
understanding of the transition from the Old to the New Testament. On the other 
hand, Balthasar notes that Hegel’s ‘dialectical process’ does not retain the unique 
significance of Jesus.  
Balthasar’s claim to share his account of the transition of the Old to the New 
Testament with Hegel is concerning because the latter’s account of the Jewish spirit 
is supersessionist. Thus, before offering an interpretation of propositions five and six 
we will rehearse Hegel’s supersessionism in SCF in some detail. In diagnosing this 
supersessionism we have learned from the Anglican philosophical theologian 
Nicholas Adams to distinguish between two kinds of dialectic.
3
 Adams draws this 
distinction whilst interpreting a section from Hegel’s late work Science of Logic. In 
this text, Adams claims that Hegel is concerned to show that dialectic is generally put 
to a negative use. Negative dialectic disrupts what is the case in favour of a new and 
unchallenged result: the dialectician begins with an initial claim. He introduces a 
second claim which disrupts the first. A third claim is then added to represent the 
result of calling the first claim into question with the second. Negative dialectic is a 
good logical tool in many situations. However, the third claim is never treated 
critically in the way that the first and second claims are. Thus, arguments which use 
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negative dialectic presuppose the need to disrupt the initial state of affairs. Although 
Adams’ does not make this connection, when negative dialectic is used to account 
for the transition from Old to New Testaments then the account is supersessionist. 
More generally, negative dialectic might, for polemical purposes, be called 
“Whiggish dialectic”. 
In contrast to negative dialectic, Hegel’s ‘logic of the concept’, which we call 
positive dialectic in this analysis, pays greater attention to the third term. Thus, 
‘[w]here people mistakenly see only bloody-minded opposition in dialectic, Hegel 
sees difference, which is the expression of relation. … [Positive dialectic] is not the 
addition of a third term in a series, on the same level as the first two. It is the 
expression of the “unity” of the first two terms. …This unity, this pair, is the third 
term’.
4
 Adams makes clear elsewhere in his study that this positive use of dialectic is 
the logical tool which was adopted by the council fathers at Chalcedon, in 451 A.D., 
for their Christological formulation (“Chalcedonian logic”).
5
 Jesus’ humanity and 
Jesus’ divinity do not give way to a third term on the same level, but are held 
together, unmixed and unseparated, in a relationship of inseparable difference. We 
have been referring to this Chalcedonian account of Jesus, the third term in a positive 
dialectic of his divinity and his humanity, as the Mystery of Christ. Moreover, 




Hegel’s Science of Logic was published between 1812 and 1816, whilst SCF was 
composed in 1798-1799.
7
 It seems likely that Hegel developed in his understanding 
of dialectic in the intervening years as SCF is structured around an unresolved 
negative dialectic. This is the source of its supersessionism. In the first place, Hegel 
defines the Jewish spirit, the spirit of Abraham, as enslaved to the absolute object 
(‘God’). Specifically, Hegel presents Abraham’s separation of himself from the rest 
of the world as the invention of the Jewish ‘fate’. Fate here has a very specific 
meaning. When Abraham ‘snaps the bonds of communal life and love’ in order to 
follow the absolute God, he enters into a struggle against his fate.
8
 The reason for the 
battle, or the struggle, which Abraham initiates is not apparent at the start of SCF. 
However, it can be interpreted in the light of later parts of Hegel’s argument. 
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According to Hegel’s later description, fate is ‘produced’ by ‘a departure from that 
united life which is neither regulated by law nor at variance with law’.
9
 Abraham, it 
was noted in chapter two, inherits a situation in which humanity has lost confidence 
in nature as the result of the Noahic flood. However, rather than accept the fact that 
his community has reconciled with nature and awaits the reconciliation of the other 
human spirits (this is the Greek response of which Hegel approves
10
), Abraham 
separates himself from everything and everyone: ‘[t]he whole world Abraham 
regarded simply as his opposite’.
11
 In doing so, Abraham destroys life. This is due to 
his claim that the whole of the rest of the world (apart from himself) is lifeless, 
sustained only by the fiat of his God. The struggle, then, is due to the fact that 
Abraham needs the world in order to survive but, at the same time, cannot accept that 
the world is alive. Thus, Abraham inconsistently plunders from the world what he 
needs to survive in the course of a permanent battle. The ‘fate’ against which 
Abraham struggles is thus: ‘a power which he himself has armed, of an enemy made 
an enemy by himself.’
12
 
Hegel’s account of the Jewish spirit in SCF is grounded in this fundamental 
opposition between Abraham and the rest of the world. Hegel argues that Jacob later 
‘succumbed’ to his fate (the fate of Abraham) by settling down and forming a nation. 
This might be taken as an admission, by Jacob, of the life that is present in the world, 
and as blurring the distinction between himself and the rest. However, Hegel 
explains that Jacob took this action ‘through stress of circumstances, and by 
accident’ and so the Jewish spirit continued to struggle against its fate even once it 
had formed a nation with a land.
13
 Whenever the Jewish nation became stronger 
‘they exercised their dominion mercilessly with the most revolting and harshest 
tyranny, and utterly extirpated all life…’.
14
 This is because they did not consider the 
rest of the world to be alive. Ultimately, Hegel argues that ‘[t]he state of 
independence, linked to universal hostility, could not persist; it is too opposed to 
nature.’
15
 This is Hegel’s account of the fragmented state in which the Jewish spirit is 
found at the time of Jesus. In a profoundly disturbing sentence, Hegel also claims 
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that ‘[t]he subsequent circumstances of the Jewish people up to the mean, abject, 
wretched circumstances in which they still are today, have all of them been simply 
consequences and elaborations of their original fate.’
16
 
On Hegel’s account, the Jewish spirit of Abraham is fundamentally deficient. The 
deficiency is generated by Abraham’s decision to separate himself, in thought, from 
the rest of nature (world) and enter into a permanent struggle with it to establish the 
truth of his beliefs. This account of the Jewish determination by the absolute object 
forms the first term in Hegel’s negative (supersessionist) dialectic to which the 
Christian spirit’s belief in subjectivity forms the second. Indeed, Hegel explicitly 
identifies this dialectic when he defines ‘the sole synthesis; the antitheses are the 
Jewish nation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the world and the rest of the human 
race.’
17
 Thus, Hegel presents Jesus as a Jewish negative dialectician who reads his 
history in the manner just rehearsed. On the one hand, Jesus is born into the Jewish 
spirit and inherits a deficient (non-beautiful) state of affairs.
18
 On the other hand, as 
noted in chapter three, Jesus enters into a ‘contest’ [bekämpfte] with the Jewish spirit 
in which ‘the whole of the [Jewish] community becomes an object of contempt’.
19
 
This is because Jesus shares Hegel’s analysis, just rehearsed, regarding the 
deficiency of the Jewish spirit. Jesus’ response, representing the rest of the world, is 
to juxtapose ‘the subjective in general’ to the ‘purely objective commands’ which 
Moses had drawn out from Abraham’s absolute object.
20
 Thus, Jesus insists upon the 
second term of Hegel’s dialectic (subjectivity), challenging the real separation of the 
Jewish spirit from the rest of nature.  
Hegel’s point is that Jesus intends to reconcile the Jewish spirit with the rest of 
nature, a reconciliation which Hegel glosses as ‘nonpersonal living beauty’.
21
 
However, Jesus’ assertion of a spirit of subjectivity against the objectivity of Jewish 
law is met with ‘indifference…[which] soon turned into hatred.’
22
 At this point in 
Hegel’s account Jesus despairs and passively accepts the rule of the hostile Jewish 
state. From this point on his ministry is only directed at individuals.
23
 Hegel presents 
this as a situation in which the Jewish state rules everything but allows Jesus and his 
followers the possibility of existence. A better outcome, if Jesus had been more 
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successful in his original fight, would have been the establishment of a new 
reconciled community of Jesus, his followers (who are Jewish), and the rest of the 
Jews, in which the opposition of the Jewish state was only a ‘possibility’.
24
 This 
would have been the ‘synthesis’ of the Jewish spirit and the world which Hegel 
announced as the solution to the first action of Abraham.
25
 
Hegel’s account of Jesus’ disciples after the founder’s death spells out the living 
negative dialectic. At first the new Christian community is in a state of juxtaposition 
with the Jewish spirit. The Christian spirit is characterised by subjectivity and the 
Jewish spirit, because it is characterised by objectivity, is considered to be the 
‘enemy’. In this situation, the Christian community is ‘the extreme opposite of the 
Jewish spirit.’ Hegel describes this as a failure to take ‘the middle course of beauty 
between the extremes.’
26
 Then, as noted in the previous chapter, the Christian 
community gradually turns Jesus into the objective representation of their spirit of 
unity. This is an attempt to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity. However, the 
Christians mistakenly introduce a permanent division into the whole of nature by 
their desire to be reconciled with a dead man.
27
 Thus the Christian spirit which has 
dominated the history of Europe down to Hegel’s time fails to resolve the synthesis 
of the rest of the world and the Jewish spirit. Like the Jewish spirit, the Christian 
spirit suffers from a severe deficiency. It is this deficiency that Hegel claims to be 
diagnosing and which leads him to advocate what appears to be pantheism, i.e. the 




Within this account, Hegel is supersessionist towards the Jewish spirit and towards 
the Christian spirit in favour of his desired pantheist result. In the form of 
‘subjectivity’ the Christian spirit is introduced to the Jewish spirit as a second term in 
order to generate the result of a reconciled whole. Neither the Jewish spirit 
(objectivity) nor the Christian spirit (subjectivity) is of any interest once this result 
has been produced. This is objectionable to orthodox Christians (who do not consider 
the worship of Jesus in his humanity to be a mistake) and to Jews. 
Hegel’s supersessionism raises a question as to how Balthasar would distinguish 
himself from the argument of SCF. The short answer is that Balthasar does not 
diagnose the objectivity of the Old Testament law as a mistake in the thinking of 
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Abraham but as the sign of a possible future reconciliation. At the same time it will 
be seen in Section III that Balthasar attributes a ‘religious problem’ to human nature 
apart from the biblical revelation.
29
 This has the effect of reorganising the dialectic. 
Where Hegel moves from the Jewish spirit, to the Christian spirit, to ‘nonpersonal 
living beauty’, Balthasar moves from the natural spirit, to the Jewish spirit, to the 
Christian spirit. Moreover, Balthasar argues that the Jewish people are not defined by 
the objectivity of the law, but by their inclusion in the promise of God. We are 
optimistic that this might be sufficient to deal with the supersessionism of Judaism 
and Christianity in Hegel’s SCF. However, this would depend upon whether 
Balthasar considers the contemporary Jewish spirit to be a real way of reconciling the 
world, or whether, like Hegel, he considers it to be necessarily deficient to the task. 
There is not enough evidence in the Nine Propositions to be sure as Balthasar makes 
no comment on other biblical religions (and only refers to nonbiblical religions in 
passing in 8.e3). We must leave the final adjudication of this question to future 
researchers. 
5: The promise (Abraham) 
The ethical [sittliche] subject (Abraham) is constituted by the call of 
God and by obedience to this call (Heb 11:8). 
1. Following the act of obedience, the inner meaning of the call shows 
itself to be an unimaginable, universal promise (“all nations”, yet 
concentrated in a personal way: semini tuo, Gal 3:16). The name of 
him who is obedient is identical with his mission (Gen 17:1-8); since 
both promise and fulfilment come from God, Abraham is given a 
supernatural fruitfulness. 
2. Obedience is faith in God and hence the appropriate response 
(Gen 15:6), involving not only the spirit, but the flesh also 
(Gen 17:13). Thus, obedience must go to the lengths of giving back the 
fruit that grace had bestowed (Gen 22). 
3. Abraham exists in an obedience that, looking up to the 
(unattainable) stars, awaits what has been promised. 
[5] As mentioned in the introduction, Balthasar offers a theological account of the 
relationship between Old and New Testaments. This differs considerably from 
Hegel’s philosophical account in SCF. These differences can be described in at least 
two ways. Firstly, they can be described as an assertion of the sovereignty of God. 
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The Methodist theologian Stephen Wigley suggests that Balthasar owes his account 
of the Old Testament to Karl Barth.
30
 Whilst this claim sounds plausible, we will not 
examine it in any detail. 
The second way of describing the supplement is as an example of what we will call 
positive theology. As we have noted on a number of occasions in this thesis, Hegel 
offers a privative account of evil in SCF. Before the Noahic flood, nature (the 
‘whole’) is in harmony. After the flood, human beings lose their faith in nature: they 
confront one another with hostility and adopt a number of inadequate approaches to 
reconciliation. Thus, Hegel’s account of salvation involves human beings acting out 
of love rather than hostility. This assumes that all the problems in the world are 
negative; they are privations on an otherwise harmonious natural unity. Balthasar 
supplements this negative account by allowing God a positive role. This can be used 
to correct Hegel’s claim that God cannot have personality because he cannot stand in 
opposition to humanity.
31
 Balthasar interprets the self-revelation of God in the Old 
Testament as precisely that, a relationship of opposition between divinity and 
humanity, and suggests that it poses a question for human beings. Do we accept or 
reject the people of God (Old Testament), and do we accept or reject Jesus Christ 
(New Testament)? 
Balthasar’s oppositional approach to salvation-history gives a very different account 
of Abraham than that provided by Hegel. Whilst Abraham is separated from the rest 
of the world, this is not as a result of abstraction from life and enslavement to his 
own absolute Object, but as a result of his transportation into a relationship with the 
sovereign and personal God. This differs from Hegel’s account of the problem facing 
the Jewish spirit. The new problem is that of a new concept of personhood, of which 
Abraham is the first example. This personhood is defined by God, after his own 
image, which is revealed by his “great deeds” for Israel. God’s great deeds are 
subsequently summarised in the law. A point of similarity between Balthasar and 
Hegel, then, is that the law (which is restricted to thought) is an inadequate basis for 
reconciliation. However, on Balthasar’s theological argument, this law is both an 
inadequate basis for reconciliation (anticipating the New Testament) and an 
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improvement on the previous situation in which the reconciliation of person and 
community was not even available as a desire (surpassing the natural human spirit). 
Like the Old Testment law, the definition of personhood also has two dimensions. 
On the one hand, Abraham is freed from his previous distraction and given a mission 
from God which is utterly fulfilling. On the other hand, Abraham is also a 
prefiguration of Jesus Christ who is the Second Adam. This latter point means that 
Balthasar must safeguard the future significance of Christ by showing how the Old 
Testament figure of Abraham is not yet able to participate fully in a unified ethical 
life. In the text of proposition five Balthasar approaches this complex task in a 
number of ways. Firstly, God is referred to in proposition five in his Triunity, 
respecting the principle of appropriation. However, as noted in the interpretation of 
Section I, Jesus Christ is said to be ‘the archetype of perfect obedience to God the 
Father’ (2.e1). Thus, the obedience that Abraham shows to the Triune God shadows 
a more intimate obedience to the Father inaugurated by Jesus Christ. This 
distinguishes the levels of intimacy with God available to Old Testament Israel and 
to Christians. Without this change of levels, Balthasar cannot maintain the 
significance of the work of Christ. Secondly, Balthasar refuses to use the term ‘love’ 
in Section II, emphasising that it is only with Jesus Christ, ‘who makes the Father’s 
love comprehensively and completely present to the world’ (2), that love becomes 
evident to the world. Thirdly, Balthasar’s account of Abraham shadows events in the 
life of Christ. Thus, 5.1 shadows the advent of Christ, 5.2 shadows the passion of 
Christ, and 5.3 shadows the Christian eschatological expectation. Finally, it is also 
possible to read the sections in terms of the Pauline triad of 1 Cor 13:13: ‘faith, hope 
and love’. In this case, Balthasar takes them in the order ‘love’ (5.1), ‘faith’ (5.2) and 
‘hope’ (5.3). However, Balthasar does not actually use the terms ‘love’ and ‘hope’ as 
that would fail to emphasise the distinction between Old and New Testaments. The 
only exception is ‘faith’ which Balthasar cannot avoid using because it is clearly 
attributed to Abraham in Hebrews 11. 
The various argumentative requirements which Balthasar places on the story of 
Abraham – God’s invention of personhood and the anticipation of Christian ethical 
life – exerts a heavy influence on Balthasar’s interpretation of scripture. In particular, 
Balthasar’s reference to the ‘obedience’ of Abraham in Heb 11:8 is not a good 
summary of this New Testament passage. The main point of the writer to the 
Hebrews is to remind his readers that Abraham believed the promise of God (faith). 
Out of this account, Balthasar picks the single reference to Abraham’s obedience 
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because it fits with his claim that the Old Testament experience is only an 
anticipation of the full loving participation in God’s life made available in Christ. 
[5.1] This section of the proposition has just been identified as the anticipation of the 
advent of Christ and of love. These themes are indicated by the sudden appearance of 
God and by the discussion of the depth and generosity of the promise which 
Abraham receives. Moreover, the reference to Gal 3:16 alludes to Paul’s argument 
that the language of the promise anticipates Jesus Christ.
32
 Specifically, God 
promises the land of Canaan to Abraham and his offspring, where offspring is used 
in the singular, suggesting a particular descendent. God also promises, in Gen 18:18 
and 22:18 that all of the nations of the earth will be blessed through Abraham and his 
descendants. Thus, Balthasar shows that his interpretation of the Old Testament in 
Section II can find scriptural support. 
Balthasar’s reference to the name of Abraham (changed from Abram during the 
bestowal of the promise) explicitly invokes his theology of mission. Mission, 
understood as the gift of a divine ‘should’, is the form whereby the person 
participates in Christian ethical life (Section I). The ascription of names is a regular 
interest of scripture, from Adam’s naming of the animals (Gen 2:19), to God’s 
naming of Abraham (Gen 17:5), through Jesus naming of Peter (Mk 3:16; Lk 6:14; 
Jn 1:42), to the unique names handed out by God to ‘those who overcome’ 
(Rev 2:17). Balthasar’s Christian definition of a bespoke divine ‘should’ might be 
understood best in terms of the latter. In the case of Abraham, the particular mission 
is part of his prefiguration of Jesus Christ, who completes the definitive mission. 
The final phrase of 5.1 might be read as an allusion to OT 16. In the discussion of the 
preliminary note in chapter three it was suggested that Balthasar can only talk about 
Christian obligation in terms of a bespoke personal mission from God. However, the 
reference to obligation in OT 16, a curious variant of Häring’s reported draft text, 
might be read as though there are a set of duties, or at least a duty, which is imposed 
on Christians as a consequence of their faith. This is incorrect because God’s mission 
requires the full participation of the entire person (the holy Spirit provides that there 
is no need to sacrifice inclination in order to pursue it as a duty). This point is 
substantiated in proposition five where Balthasar places Abraham’s mission within 
the context of the wider work of God. It is God who promises to make the mission 
satisfying and it is a ‘supernatural fruitfulness’ that results. Whilst Abraham is fully 
engaged in acting out his mission, and whilst his actions are not empty, the ultimate 
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success of the mission is the gift of God. In terms of scripture, Balthasar’s reference 
to fruitfulness is grounded in God’s promise to Abraham in Gen 17:6 that he ‘will 
make you exceedingly fruitful’ (NRSV). 
[5.2] This section of the proposition has been identified as the anticipation of the 
passion and crucifixion of Christ (in the history of Christ) and of faith (in the Pauline 
triad). The reference to Gen 22 shows that Balthasar is drawing a parallel between 
the story of Abraham and Isaac and the death of Christ. The approach taken by 
Abraham in obedience to God is the approach taken by God the Father when he gives 
up his Son to death on the Cross. The ethical point, here, would seem to be that God 
asks Abraham (before the event) to do what he himself will do in his greatest deed. 
However, it might also be related to the point in Theo-Drama I where Balthasar 
refers to the occasional requirement of an act of obedience as ‘indispensable if we 
are to call an act genuinely human’.
33
 It is thus a kind of real baptism into the 
covenant with God.  
There is no mention of obedience in Gen 15:6, only of the righteousness of 
Abraham’s belief. Balthasar’s gloss on this passage would seem to be determined by 
his claim that God gives spiritual ‘shoulds’ to humankind. The converse of a spiritual 
‘should’ is necessarily spiritual obedience. However, it is only sin – the rejection of 
God and life – that is not included within the bespoke personal mission. The middle 
reference to Gen 17:13 establishes that belief or faith in God does not divide the 
human person in the manner of duty or law. Thus, Abraham’s obedience is entire, 
including his spirit and his body. 
[5.3] This section of the proposition has been identified as the anticipation of the 
Christian eschatological expectation and of hope. The metaphor of the stars is 
developed imaginatively to reiterate the point that the fulfilment of God’s promise to 
Abraham awaits a fulfilment which only God can provide. 
6: The law 
The giving of the law at Sinai goes beyond the promise to Abraham in 
that – though in a provisional manner, from outside and above [außen 
und oben] – it expressly reveals God’s inner disposition [Gesinnung] 
in order to deepen the covenant response to him: “I am holy, so you 
should [sollt] also be holy” [Lev 19:2]. This “should”, which is 
grounded in God’s inner being, has man’s inner disposition in view. 
That man can respond to this “should” follows from the absolute 
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truthfulness of the God who offers man the covenant (Rom 7:12). This 
truthfulness is not matched by the same absolute truthfulness on the 
part of man; it is only latent in the promise (to Abraham) that is 
announced in a new and more precise form as a prophetic promise. 
The context of the sixth proposition is a development of the fifth. The law that is 
given at Sinai goes ‘beyond the promise’ in order ‘to deepen the covenant response 
to [God]’. Thus, the law results in the promise being ‘announced in a new and more 
precise form as a prophetic promise’. This reflects the theological claim that the Old 
Testament covenant is part of the single work of the triune God. The change is part 
of a progressive self-revelation by God to humankind in preparation for the ultimate 
revelation in Jesus Christ. 
However, as noted earlier, God’s revelation of himself to humankind through Israel 
produces, in the first instance, a ‘two-sided’ spirit. In the case of the promise to 
Abraham the two sides are God and the individual person. This contrast is then 
sharpened (‘deepened’) by the definition of God’s ‘inner disposition’ on the basis of 
his great deeds. (Balthasar notes in the first explanatory paragraph that this is not a 
case of imitating the essence of God but of ‘responding to his conduct as manifested 
in his “great deeds” toward Israel’ (6.e1).) However, in expressing the main features 
of these deeds in law (a form of thought) it becomes clear that the promise is 
“prophetic” because it speaks of a necessary future unification of inclination and 
duty in the people of God. 
The formulation of the Old Testament law which Balthasar offers shares similarities 
with Hegel’s account of fate and of law in SCF. In proposition five, Balthasar’s 
argument is comparable to Hegel’s account of fate as the opposition between life and 
life. According to Balthasar, God’s call to Abraham is the call from personal life 
(God) to new personal life (Abraham). It is the beginning of salvation-history: God’s 
reconciliation of all created life within the ethical life of the church. However, the 
problem of the guilt of Abraham and his posterity is revealed once the law implicit in 
God’s saving “great deeds” is spelled out. Thus, Balthasar insists that law is second 
to life (being). The law given to Moses on Sinai specifies in thought the kind of 
“person” that God is and thus the kind of persons that he is calling Israel to be. 
The second half of the proposition elaborates on the situation after the giving of the 
law on Sinai. The law offers to Israel a path out of their guilt into the unified ethical 
life of God. Balthasar argues that this is asserted by God in Leviticus 19:2, supported 
by the latter’s ‘absolute truthfulness’. In Theo-Drama I, Balthasar states that: ‘the 
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perception maybe beautiful and the utterance true, but only the act can be good.’
34
 
Thus, despite the fact that Rom 7:12 describes the law as ‘just and good’, Balthasar 
uses the word ‘truthfulness’ in order to distinguish between law and action. This is 
another example of Balthasar’s argumentative concerns heavily determining his 
reading of scripture. By referring to ‘truthfulness’ Balthasar is pointing out that laws 
are utterances (i.e. they are restricted to thinking) and require complementing by 
good action. Then, in highlighting God’s ‘absolute truthfulness’, Balthasar provides 
his interpretation of Rom 7:12, claiming that this particular law is a flawless guide to 
the good human action that would reconcile the world. 
The absence of ‘absolute truthfulness’ on the part of man signifies the emergence of 
‘guilt’. The problem is not simply that man fails to do the good set out in the law, but 
that he promises, in the form of Israel, that he will do this good. That is, the covenant 
is an agreement in thought that is intended to reconcile man and God. By not acting 
in accordance with his word, man shows that he is untruthful and incurs guilt. In an 
explanatory paragraph to the fourth proposition, Balthasar points out that ‘the 
infringement of a mere “law”’ (4.e1) is the source of guilt in Jewish history. This is 
obviously highly problematic as an account of Judaism. However, it forms part of 
Balthasar’s argument that the guilt revealed by the law is transformed, or revealed to 
be, sin when humankind rejects God in Christ. 
This interpretation of proposition six has seen that Balthasar’s account of the Old 
Testament law shares some similarities with Hegel’s argument in SCF. Balthasar 
shares the view that Israel is determined by its law, he shares the view that ‘law’ only 
allows reconciliation in thought and he shares the view that such laws generate a 
‘should’. However, Balthasar does not repeat Hegel in calling the Israelites enslaved. 
Quite the reverse, Balthasar treats the ‘law’ as a gift from God which improves the 
human situation. Specifically, the call of Abraham and the subsequent law provides a 
way and a desire for humankind to become reconciled with each other and with God. 
This is not previously available as humanity was not aware of the problem of the 
relationship between the individual and the community (because there was no 
account of the person) or of the availability of the creator and sustainer of the world 
for personal relationship. God has therefore raised the human situation by revealing 
himself in this, in retrospect provisional, way. 
The implications of Balthasar’s argument are twofold. Firstly, Balthasar would 
presumably dispute Hegel’s assumption that humanity has the power to reconcile 
themselves with nature. Balthasar argues that, in the absence of the divine law which 
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reveals certain spiritual pathologies, humanity would necessarily remain in a state of 
mutual hostility. This is Balthasar’s incorporation of the doctrine of original sin. 
However, it is also required by the inability of Israel to keep the law. 
Secondly, Balthasar would dispute Hegel’s claim that ‘should’ is always an obstacle 
to reconciliation. Where the ‘should’ is divine, which means that it is ‘grounded in 
God’s inner being’, then it is a source of life. Whilst Balthasar might accept Hegel’s 
critique of law, he would reject Hegel’s claim that there is no moral ‘should’. This 
has already been observed in the discussion of proposition one in the previous 
chapter where Balthasar claimed that Jesus eliminated all ‘Gesollte’ rather than all 
‘Sölle’. Instead, Balthasar argues that the gift of the law to Israel is also the 
revelation of the inadequacy of the present human disposition. Thus, at the same time 
as raising Israel’s hopes regarding the reconciliation of person and community, God 
also reveals a problem which will only be resolved in Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ, 
God provides a mission and (made present by the Spirit) the unity of duty and 
inclination required to fulfil it. Thus, the holy Spirit gives a “should” (mission) in 
which there is no internal division. If one looks at these missions from the 
perspective of the law, one will see that they conform to the law, but this law has 
been fulfilled so far as the Christian person is concerned. Their mission draws, in the 
most satisfactory way, on their entire person, and in constellation with other 
missions, forms the united divine ethical life of the Church. Offering resistance to 
God’s gift of a mission becomes, then, the definition of sin. 
In the third explanatory paragraph of proposition six Balthasar claims that there is a 
recognisable distinction between Old Testament ethics and nonbiblical natural ethics. 
This distinction is determined by theological concerns. As has been seen, Balthasar 
appears to avoid supersessionism by defining a role for the Old Testament that is 
superior to nonbiblical ethics such as can be found (in Hegel’s SCF) in the Greek 
spirit. However, in identifying a particular insight (personhood) with the call of 
Abraham, Balthasar is making a neo-Scholastic claim. Personhood is latent in 
creation in a vague form but is only made explicit by the call of God. Moreover, in 
the context of Theo-Drama I, Balthasar is happy to express this Old Testament 
insight in philosophical terms: 
…man’s conscience must be in touch with things as they are: the two poles, 
personal inwardness on the one hand and relation to one’s environment and 
one’s fellow men on the other (the poles of conscience and norm), are 
necessary if we are to have a starting point indicating both the 
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imperfectability of all intramundane Good and the direction in which we must 
seek the transcendental, absolute norm.
35
 
This passage joins the interpretation of proposition seven below with the discussion 
in Section II.  Balthasar’s concern in this passage is that ‘[m]odern heroes do not 
seek an absolute Good…’. This is literary criticism on the basis of Balthasar’s 
theology. The absolute Good is to do the work of God which is completed in 
individual personal missions, participating in the archetypal mission of Jesus Christ. 
However, Balthasar is talking about modern drama in which ‘faith in the promise 
fulfilled’ has disappeared. So Balthasar instead sets out the Old Testament position 
which hoped for, and awaits, the fulfilment of the promise to Abraham. (The active 
verb ‘seek’ reflects the fact that modern drama takes place after the fulfilment of the 
Old Testament promise.) Unsurprisingly, this Old Testament position is dualistic, 
contrasting ‘personal inwardness’ and ‘relation to one’s environment and one’s 
fellow men’. These are equivalent to the definition of personality (proposition five) 
and the specification of a law (proposition six).  
In this passage the pairs of terms conscience/norm and personal inwardness/relation 
to environment and men are synonymous. The neo-Scholastic claim is that they 
mirror the distinction which Balthasar has just been seen to draw in Section II of the 
Nine Propositions. Thus, the Old Testament dualism is a basis on which to correct 
the radical openness (fragmentation) of modern drama, and draw it back in the 
direction of Christian ethics. Once the distinction between conscience/norm has been 
accepted then the Old Testament can be read. Once the Old Testament can be read 
then Jesus Christ can be seen to be the fulfilment. 
A more surprising feature of Balthasar’s argument is the fact that conscience and 
norm are paired with one another when, in the Nine Propositions, they are separated. 
Jesus Christ is the ‘norm’ (proposition one) and ‘conscience’ is extrabiblical 
(proposition seven). Balthasar’s reason for placing ‘conscience’ in Section III will be 
shown below to depend upon his dispute with the ITC propositions of 1972. 
However, the passage from Theo-Drama I draws attention to the fact that the 
emphasis of Section I is on norm rather than conscience. As Balthasar makes clear in 
the explanatory paragraphs, the norm of Christ can only be interpreted with the eyes 
of the Spirit (1.e2n – ‘divinity’). This is the pole of ‘norm’ (nonbiblical) or ‘law’ 
(Old Testament). On the other hand, the norm of Christ ‘makes himself present as the 
sole norm in every particular relationship, in every situation’ (3.e3). This is the pole 
of ‘conscience’ (nonbiblical) or ‘Promise’ (Old Testament). However, whilst 
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Balthasar clearly believes that norm and conscience, Promise and law, are reconciled 
within the ethical life of the Church, the propositions in Section I emphasise the pole 
of ‘norm’ and ‘law’. This may be due to a concern which Balthasar had to emphasise 
the continuing relevance of external order in a period of church history when the 
freedom of the individual Christian was receiving attention and generating some 
anxiety and conflict. 
A final comment to make on proposition six relates to Balthasar’s taxonomy of 
nineteenth and twentieth century ethics in the second explanatory paragraph. This is 
Balthasar’s main engagement with philosophy as he only makes a single (oblique) 
reference to any philosopher in the text of the propositions themselves (proposition 
seven below). As noted at the start of the previous chapter, it is also a re-authored 
version of Hegel’s taxonomy of sects in Second Temple Judaism in SCF.  Hegel’s 
taxonomy is generated by the fragmentation of the Jewish spirit under the pressure of 
its battle with the rest of nature. As noted above, Hegel argues that the Jewish spirit 
was simply ‘too opposed to nature’ to be able to continue in its original form.
36
 
Hegel goes on to argue that the Second Temple sects were a consequence of this real 
fragmentation: ‘[t]o flee from this grim reality, men sought consolation in ideas…’. 
Hegel lists the ‘ordinary Jews’, the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the Essenes. Each 
of these groups marks an attempt in thought to avoid admitting the real elimination 
of the distinction between the Jews and the rest of the world. Thus, the ordinary Jews 
sought consolation ‘in the hope of the coming Messiah; the Pharisees sought it in the 
business of serving and doing the will of the objective Being… the Sadducees sought 
it in the entire multiplicity of their existence …. [and] the Essenes sought it in an 
eternal entity, in a fraternity which would ban all property…’.
37
 
In Balthasar’s explanatory paragraph to proposition six the Pharisees, Sadducees and 
Essenes are replaced by neo-Kantianism/Scheler/Kant (6.e2a), Kafka/Bloch/Freud 
(6.e2b) and Marx (6.e2c). The influence of Hegel’s text is evident in the critique that 
Balthasar offers to each of these groups, (he even includes the Pharisees in 6.e2a). In 
the case of Hegel’s taxonomy, the sects are all attempts in thought to suppress the 
real disintegration of the Jewish spirit. Thus, by taking over this taxonomy Balthasar 
argues that the nineteenth and twentieth century ethics which he discusses are 
attempts in thought to suppress the real disintegration of the Christian spirit. 
However, Balthasar slightly alters the argument. For Hegel, the Jewish sects are 
inadequate to the task of reconciling the Jewish spirit with the rest of the world in 
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reality (the task which, in Hegel’s account, Jesus attempts.) For Balthasar, however, 
the modern attempts to think about ethics are caricatures of Old Testament ethics. 
They have lost faith in Jesus Christ, but they recognise the concept of guilt which has 
been taught to humanity by God through the Old Testament. Thus, they attest 
indirectly to Christian ethical life: Kantians recognise a law which forms the 
community, but in doing so supress inclination in the name of duty. This is the way 
of the Pharisees in Hegel’s taxonomy. Kafka/Bloch/Freud dissolve the law ‘into the 
flux of the movement of promise and hope’ (6.e2b). Like Hegel’s Sadducees, this 
sees them as giving up on the problem of the community and moving aimlessly from 
one situation to the next. Finally, Marx follows the Essenes by seeking the 
reconciliation of the world in the ‘human collective’, effectively abolishing the 
‘uniqueness of the person’ which is made definitive in Christ. Like Hegel, Balthasar 
presents all of these scholars as offering inadequate alternatives (in thought) to the 
real reconciliation of the world in Jesus Christ. However, rather than claiming that 
these scholars are all merely consoling themselves in thought, Balthasar affirms their 
concern with guilt as an echo of God’s revelation through Abraham and Israel. 
(ii) Section III: Fragments of extrabiblical ethics (propositions 7-9) 
On first reading, the use of the term ‘fragments’ in the title of Section III can be 
difficult to interpret. The metaphor of an orchestra, which was introduced in the 
discussion of Balthasar’s TS in chapter two, can be of some assistance. In this 
metaphor, Balthasar imagines the world of human existence as an orchestra which 
has just taken its seat. The players start to play to themselves before someone strikes 
an A on the piano and the cacophony begins to attune to this note. Balthasar 
explicitly links this note to the emergence of the promise of God to Abraham and 
offers the scene as a metaphor for the history of the world.
38
 Using this metaphor, the 
‘fragments’ in Section III can be read as fragments of music from particular players 
or sections of the orchestra which are not yet attuned either to the promise of God, or 
to its fulfilment in the mystery of Christ. 
Another avenue for interpretation is to compare Balthasar’s use of ‘fragments’ in 
Section III with Hegel’s account of world history in SCF. Where Balthasar’s 
metaphor of an orchestra opens in a situation of discord, Hegel gives an account of 
the discord’s origin. Specifically, Hegel argues that humanity disintegrated into 
hostile groups following the loss of the state of nature in the Noahic flood. 
Immediately following this flood humankind ‘…strove by various ways to revert 
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from barbarism… to[wards] the unity which had been broken…’.
39
 Hegel can only 
imagine one ‘way’ which can succeed in this task, namely the philosophy of love. 
This way is identified by Jesus Christ, although neither he, nor his followers, are able 
to realise the reconciliation of the world. Hegel contrasts this way of love, in SCF, 
with many other ‘ways’ which are inadequate in some manner or another. In 
rehearsing this account, it is interesting to note that both Balthasar and Hegel 
imagine a world comprising fragments (Balthasar) or ways (Hegel) which fail to 
reconcile the whole. This account of Balthasar’s fragments was suggested in a 
preliminary way earlier in the thesis when we referred to Section III as a catalogue of 
the more interesting inadequate ‘ways’ to reconcile the world. Where Balthasar’s 
Nine Propositions and Hegel’s SCF can be clearly distinguished, of course, is in their 
concept of the path to reconciliation. This is the way of love as made possible by 
Christ’s real existence (Balthasar) compared to the life of love taught by Jesus 
(Hegel). 
There are, however, two further complications when interpreting Balthasar’s 
fragments in Section III. The first of these arises from Balthasar’s claim in the third 
paragraph of the preliminary note that the three kinds of ethics discussed in 
Section III are historically prior to the Christian revelation. This is flatly contradicted 
by the presence of the ‘post-Christian’ proposition nine. This proposition is definitely 
not an attempt to reconcile the world that started before the biblical revelation, not 
least because it makes reference to the term ‘person,’ the invention of which is a 
consequence of God’s call to Abraham. This led us to suggest that Balthasar’s claim 
should be interpreted in terms of the theological significance of the propositions, 
rather than in terms of historical chronology. Like propositions seven and eight, 
proposition nine is theologically prior to Old Testament ethics because it takes no 
account of the biblical revelation. This means that the chronological location of the 
final three propositions will be determined by their content: proposition eight is pre-
biblical, proposition nine is post-Christian, whilst proposition seven applies to the 
whole of history. 
Recalling our analysis in the second section of chapter two, it is possible to say a 
little more about the difference between Balthasar’s and Hegel’s use of the concept 
of fragments and their proposals for the reconciliation of the world. In Theo-Drama I 
Balthasar claims that Hegel’s philosophy of love is only capable of reconciling the 
world in thought not in reality (being). Christianity can repair this lack because Jesus 
Christ, the fully human concrete norm, provides a concrete instantiation of divine 
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love. This argument lies behind Balthasar’s claim in the second paragraph of the 
preliminary note that salvation-history is the ‘unique way’ to reconcile the world. 
The consequence for our interpretation of Section III is that Balthasar does not, in 
fact, consider that there are any alternative ‘ways’ to reconcile the world, in the sense 
of real groups of people forming around alternative approaches. Apart from the 
Christian church, there are only groups of people who are seeking ‘consolation in 
ideas’ like the sects of second temple Judaism.
40
 These sects are characterised by a 
dependence upon the Jewish spirit but each fails in a different way to grasp the whole 
of this spirit and the relationship to the rest of the world. 
The critique of Hegel in Theo-Drama I, and the lack of reference to non-Christian 
religions in the Nine Propositions, hints that, for Balthasar, ‘reality’ is only present 
explicitly in the Church, with the possible exception of other ‘biblical’ religions. This 
suggestion is highly problematic.
41
 However, we will not examine it further in this 
thesis. We will instead focus on interpreting what we consider to be Balthasar’s 
primary aim in Section III, namely, to comment on the debate regarding the future of 
postconciliar moral theology. In other words, whilst Balthasar presents Section III as 
a comment on the world beyond the borders of the church, we propose that his 
primary concern remains the question of the future of moral theology. This is a 
suitable aim for a text which is being proposed as a mini-constitution for 
postconciliar moral theology. Balthasar approaches this task by attributing accounts 
of Christian ethics that he considers to be inadequate to non-Christians. This is a 
similar approach to that which Balthasar adopted towards the neo-Scholastic moral 
manuals which he criticised by means of his discussion of Old Testament ethics. In 
this case, Balthasar pursues critiques of conscience, natural law and (implicitly) 
virtue ethics (proposition seven), natural order ethics (proposition eight) and 
anthropological ethics (proposition nine). 
Balthasar’s approach might seem a little strange and is easy to misunderstand. It is 
important therefore to recognise, and we will try to explicate, that Balthasar is 
engaged in an argument against the use of these various fragments, he is not simply 
declaring them to be non-Christian. The basis of the argument is that the various 
fragments are ‘ideas’ which fail to grasp the whole of Christian ethics, i.e. the 
Christian ethical life of Section I. Moreover, Balthasar hints that this ethical life is 
the understanding of Christian ethics that has been believed throughout the history of 
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 In light of these arguments, the main reason that Balthasar adopts such 
an indirect approach would appear to be, first, because he does not want himself, or 
the ITC, to get drawn into a public confrontation and, second, because he does not 
wish to provide a text which can be used by the CDF to launch disciplinary 
investigations (should it be adopted). 
In concluding this discussion of Balthasar’s purpose in Section III, we will comment 
briefly on Balthasar’s use of the unusual term ‘extrabiblical’. The term ‘extra’ 
invokes a substantial debate at the council which originated in a memo by Cardinal 
Suenens in March 1962.
43
 In this memo, Suenens argues that the council has to 
address the church ‘ad extra, that is the Church as it faces the world of today …[and] 
ad intra, that is the Church in itself…’.
44
 This pair of terms is often referred to over 
the years of the council and will have been very familiar to Balthasar’s fellow 
commission members. Balthasar, however, puts a different meaning on the term 
when, in the title of Section III, he does not adopt the perspective of the church as 
looking towards the world (‘ad extra’), but talks about the world which stands 
outside (‘extra’) and against the church. This reflects a residual commitment to the 
neo-Scholastic division between an order of nature and an order of grace (not, it must 
be stressed, natural and biblical law). 
Balthasar’s residual neo-Scholasticism will be discussed further in our interpretation 
of proposition seven. For the moment we recall our argument in chapter three that 
Balthasar’s 1973 essay EGB can be read as a prototype for the Nine Propositions. 
Like the Nine Propositions, EGB is divided into three sections, although the order is 
reversed. The sections of EGB are described as nonbiblical, Old Testament and New 
Testament.
45
 Thus, Balthasar begins his essay with what he claims to be the 
‘nonbiblical’ experience of God and concludes with the experience of God in the 
Christian New Testament. What, then, provokes Balthasar to replace the term 
‘nonbiblical’ in EGB with the term ‘extrabiblical’ in the Nine Propositions? We 
suggest that the term ‘extrabiblical’ is a more historical term which allows for 
Balthasar’s claim in the Nine Propositions that the biblical revelation has an effect 
beyond the boundaries of the church. The suggestion is that there is not a single 
‘nonbiblical’ ethics which can be compared with biblical ethics, but a series of 
fragments of ethics which have different relationships to the biblical revelation. For 
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example, proposition nine refers to a ‘post-Christian’ ethics which has only come 
into existence as a consequence of the biblical revelation. On this account, 
‘extrabiblical’ is a more suitable term for fragments of ethics which do not confess 
Christ, but which have nevertheless been obliquely influenced by him. However this 
historical connotation, which draws attention to the historical location of the three 
propositions as kinds of ‘way,’ is not entirely representative of the section. Balthasar 
retains a neo-Scholastic account of a parallel between a natural experience of a 
religious problem and the Christian experience of the triune God. 
7: Conscience 
1. (Extrabiblical) man awakes to theoretico-practical self-
consciousness thanks to a free and loving call on the part of his fellow 
man. In responding, he experiences (in the cogito/sum) both the 
perspicuity [Gelichtetsein] of reality as such (which is true and good), 
which in opening itself up sets man free, and the fact that his freedom 
has a social character.* 
2. Man’s whole constitution is unconditionally (necessitate naturalis 
inclinationis: de Ver 22, 5) oriented towards the good as it reveals 
itself in a transcendental light (synderesis, primal-conscience); 
inclinations [Geneigtheiten] towards the good exist even in the sensual 
parts of his spirit-directed essence. 
Man cannot be prevented from following, albeit covertly, the light that 
beckons to him, neither by its eventual withdrawal, nor by being 
distracted by immediately available goods, nor even when the gift 
quality of the good is obscured by sin. Thus, even pagans will be 
judged ‘through Jesus Christ according to my gospel’ (Rom 2:16). 
3. Abstract formulations of man’s attraction to the good in terms of 
“natural law” – for example, the “categorical imperative” governing 
relations between fellow men – are derivative and have “reference-
character”. 




The discussion of the section title sets the terms in which our interpretation of this 
proposition will proceed. Despite the fact that the proposition is notionally aimed at 
non-Christian ethics, we have asserted that Balthasar is engaging in a dispute with 
his fellow theologians regarding the role of conscience in postconciliar moral 
theology. This is intended to complement his dispute with the neo-Scholastic moral 
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manuals in Section II and to strengthen the case for his account of Christian ethical 
life in Section I. 
Balthasar pursues his dispute in conversation with GS 16 and with the interpretation 
of this passage by the ITC in proposition thirteen of 1972. The analysis of these two 
texts in chapters one and two will thus guide our interpretation of this proposition. 
We begin by summarising our account of this prior discussion. In chapter one we 
argue that GS 16 uses the term ‘conscience’ to refer to the consciousness of the 
individual. This is the same use that Balthasar makes of the term in this proposition 
(see the reference to ‘self-consciousness’ in the first sentence). Drawing on the work 
of McDonough, we argue that there are two inconsistent readings of GS 16 which 
depend upon whether the “factor” located within consciousness is a ‘law’ or the 
‘voice’ of God. We argue that moral theologians need to adjudicate between these 
two readings of the council text. Then in chapter two we show that the ITC offer 
such an adjudication in 1972, siding with the first of the interpretations. The ITC 
argues that there are a set of ‘fundamental demands’ contained within conscience and 
equates these with the ‘public expressions of the essential human rights.’
47
 The ITC 
also innovates on the teaching of GS 16 by discussing conscience in a proposition on 
general human ethics but not in its propositions on Christian ethics. 
We further argue in chapter two that Balthasar’s dissatisfaction with the ITC’s 1972 
propositions is one of the primary reasons that he drafts the Nine Propositions. Thus, 
one of the tasks of the Nine Propositions is to offer an interpretation of GS 16 that 
improves on that provided by the ITC. We suggest that Balthasar is highly successful 
in discharging this task. At the root of his counter-argument is a decision to side with 
the second interpretation of the “factor” in GS 16. This is the interpretation which 
takes the “factor” to be a ‘voice’ and which draws primarily on the late changes 
made to the council text by Häring. Balthasar’s alternative interpretation is consistent 
with his account of Christian ethical life in Section I which we have discussed in 
conversation with Hegel’s critique of law in SCF. 
Hegel, it will be recalled, distinguishes between an objective law, which specifies in 
thought what the subject must do in practice, and a living command. Where a law is 
objective, it determines the action of the subject in advance by means of a ‘should’. 
Where a “law” is in fact a living command, it simply articulates, in the form of 
thought, a particular moment in the harmonious life of love. Confusion is caused 
when the same word ‘law’ is used to refer to an objective law (which Hegel 
critiques) and a living command. In SCF, Hegel tries to avoid this confusion by only 
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using ‘law’ to refer to ‘objective law’ and using ‘command’ to refer to the living 
description. We have largely followed this practice in our thesis. In postconciliar 
moral theology, a similar distinction appears to have been drawn between moral laws 
and moral directions [Weisungen]. 
To illustrate a living command one might consider Jesus’ instruction to his disciples 
to turn the other cheek (Mt 5:39; Lk 6:29). According to Balthasar and Hegel, Jesus 
here is simply describing what the active life of love looks like. Another might be 
Jesus’ sending of the seventy-two followers on a mission (Luke 10:1). In both of 
these cases, the disciples do not obey these commands out of duty, and against their 
inclination, but because they understand and desire to take the path towards a 
reconciled community of love. Reading GS 16 through this account of the reconciled 
life of love, Balthasar would argue that the voice of God in conscience is not issuing 
objective laws but living commands summarised by a bespoke personal mission. 
There is no loss to the individual who follows this command, as God does not require 
the sacrifice of inclination to duty. The only sacrifice that God requires, the sacrifice 
implied by the divine “should” of the bespoke personal mission, is the sacrifice of 
what is opposed to him, i.e. sin. This is no loss at all. 
Whilst Balthasar prioritises the account of the ‘voice’ of God in GS 16, he also has 
an account of the reference to the ‘law,’ which is discovered ‘[d]eep within’ 
conscience. As Balthasar claims in the title of proposition one, Jesus Christ is the 
concrete norm (law/command/instruction) of Christian ethics. Obviously, any 
description of Jesus Christ as a law is metaphorical. Jesus is only objective in the 
sense that anything opposed to him is sin and humanity already wishes to discard 
this. The law of Christ is, on Balthasar’s understanding, the law of being brought to 
life in God. As an interpretation of GS 16, Balthasar’s account also has the advantage 
that all of the references to ‘law’ in GS 16 are in the singular. Thus, Balthasar’s 
account of the voice of God in consciousness and the ‘law’ of Christ offers a 
coherent interpretation of the vast majority of GS 16. It does this without the need to 
turn to lists of Christian moral laws or demands and without reference to natural law. 
Having said this, we agreed in chapter one with those scholars who claim that it is 
impossible to provide a single coherent interpretation of the text of GS 16. 
Balthasar’s interpretation gives an account of almost every feature and shows how 
the argument of the text conforms to the wider concern of the council fathers that the 
Mystery of Christ be placed at the centre of moral theology (LG and OT 16). 
However, Balthasar’s argument cannot do justice to the reference in GS 16 to the 
‘objective norms of morality’. It would be possible to argue that the plurality of 
   
163 
 
norms in Christian morality are a plurality of general living commands as attributed 
to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. However, it is impossible for these norms to be 
objective, at least in the sense that we have been using this term. As we saw in the 
discussion of proposition six above, it is possible to interpret the Old Testament law 
in this objective sense, because it reveals God from the outside, as it were, but Jesus 
Christ perfects the law by supplementing it with right inclination such that there is no 
longer a conflict between law and inclination. For this reason, like the ITC before 
him, Balthasar is unable to do justice to every part of the text of GS 16. We can find 
no way to avoid the requirement that moral theologians adjudicate which parts of 
GS 16 stand in need of correction. Moreover, this task can only be done in the 
context of the teaching of the council as a whole (as we have tried to do in chapter 
one.) 
As noted above, it is a weakness of the ITC propositions on moral pluralism that they 
retain a neo-Scholastic account of a natural human morality which is repeated in 
Christian morality. This is the idea that there is a single morality which is repeated 
from two different perspectives. In the neo-Scholastic period, the divine law, and the 
pope with the aid of the holy Spirit, provide the definitive clarification of the natural 
law. However, the ITC propositions imply that the natural law is fairly well 
established (human rights) and give a surprisingly vague account of the Christian 
moral law (‘unchanging principles’). Balthasar’s account of Christian ethical life, 
however, questions this neo-Scholastic claim by denying that there are any lists of 
objective laws (natural or Christian) by which Christian ethical activity is 
determined. 
[7.1] On first reading, it is a little unclear how Balthasar’s argument in the first part 
of the seventh proposition participates in the postconciliar debate regarding the role 
of conscience in moral theology. The primary allusion to GS 16 is the reference to 
Rom 2:16 at the end of the second part of the proposition. (GS 16 cites Rom 2:14-16 
and proposition thirteen of the ITC in 1972 cites Rom 2:14.) We will discuss this in 
the relevant section below. From the start of the proposition, however, Balthasar 
assumes the interpretation of GS 16 that we have just given and compares 
philosophical talk about the nature of human experience and Christian talk about 
God. This is an alternative account of what is shared between Christians and non-
Christians than the reference to ‘fundamental demands’ in the 1972 proposition.  
Balthasar’s use of the parenthetical term ‘(Extrabiblical)’ raises the question as to 
whether or not he is addressing the proposition to the whole of humanity or to those 
human beings who draw consolation from the idea of an ethics of conscience. The 
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argument in favour of the former is that all human beings are self-conscious. The 
argument in favour of the latter is that Balthasar has explicitly claimed that 
Section III is about ‘fragments’ of ethics which are inadequate to the task of 
reconciliation. Christians do not participate in such fragmentary accounts but in the 
real ethical life of the church. The English language translators of the Nine 
Propositions have given different answers to this tricky interpretative question. 
Elders and Baker elect for the second answer and Harrison hints at the first, whilst 
retaining some of the ambiguity of the original formulation.
48
 The most charitable 
interpretation would seem to be that Balthasar means both. On the one hand, only 
extrabiblical man takes comfort from the argument of this proposition. Biblical man 
participates in a form of Christian or Old Testament ethics which goes beyond this 
account. In this sense, the proposition is about extrabiblical man. On the other hand, 
Balthasar provides an account of the natural experience of ‘reality’ [Wirklichkeit] 
which is open to perfection by the analogous experience of biblical revelation. In this 
sense, the proposition is about all human beings because we all share the initial 
experience of reality. Biblical man subsequently leaves it behind by adopting the 
perspective of faith in Jesus Christ. 
As argued above, Balthasar rejects talk about the ‘objective norms of morality’ 
(GS 16) or the ‘fundamental demands’ of conscience (ITC, 1972) in favour of an 
existential knowledge of the identity of thinking and reality, that is an existential 
knowledge of the absolute, which is turned into an explicit knowledge of God in the 
Biblical revelation.
49
 Thus, the same argument can be seen in 7.1 as can be found in 
EGB. In the latter, Balthasar argues that human beings are born with a ‘religious 
problem’ whereby they understand that they are not ‘the absolute’ or ‘the whole’ and 
yet are unable to grasp the absolute or the whole.
50
 In Theo-Drama I Balthasar refers 
to this as ‘the contradiction in Being itself’.
51
 Here in 7.1 Balthasar presents this 
argument with the claim that the gift of individual existence to man (‘cogito/sum’ or 
self-consciousness) entails a ‘relationship to his fellow men.’ In other words, whilst 
the individual receives their existence as a gift, they are unable to grasp the ‘whole’ 
of existence due to their necessary dependence upon the rest of humanity. However, 
they are immediately in possession of an existential knowledge of the original 
identity of thinking (self-consciousness) and being (reality). 
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Balthasar’s account of the natural state of humanity shares similarities with Hegel’s 
argument in SCF. Like Hegel, Balthasar insists that human beings are only satisfied 
when they are living harmoniously as a community. The origin of human beings is in 
the hands of others, and the pursuit of individual freedom apart from a community is 
an illusion. Secondly, Balthasar identifies the same pair of terms – thinking and 
reality (being) – as fundamental to human existence that Hegel identifies in SCF. 




[7.2] The first part of this section expands upon the argument which has already been 
made in 7.1. Because human persons are born with a religious problem they have an 
orientation to the solution of that problem which is union with ‘the good’. The new 
contribution to the argument is the reference to ‘primal-conscience’. This is the only 
reference to conscience aside from the title of the proposition and presupposes the 
account of conscience in GS 16. The “factor” which Balthasar claims to be the 
common possession of humanity is ‘the good’, which Christians know to be Jesus 
Christ. However, Balthasar argues that it is not simply ‘the good’ that unites 
humanity but also the experience of freedom and spontaneity. This provides the 
impetus (“inclinations”) towards action in reality, which is the human manifestation 
of goodness. Thus, Balthasar emphasises that it is the whole self-consciousness, the 
“factor” of the absolute good and the inclination (synderesis), which is oriented 
towards the good. This means that wherever duty is divided against inclination, 
whether within or outside the church, the good creation of God is receiving an injury. 
The second part of 7.2 makes some very difficult claims regarding the ‘light of 
transcendence’/‘radiance of reality’. It also opens up a Scriptural dimension to 
Balthasar’s dispute with the ITC over the interpretation of GS 16. In the first place, 
Balthasar discusses three possible relationships to ‘the light’. This light is both the 
light of the goodness of reality (in natural terms) and the light of God (in biblical 
terms). One of the proposed relationships is quite straightforward. Human beings can 
be distracted from the absolute good by ‘immediately available goods’. This would 
seem to shadow the biblical account of the dangers of idolatry. Second, ‘sin’ can 
result in the ‘good’ losing the character of gift. This appears to be a kind of 
intellectual problem parallel to the misinterpretation of the Mystery of Christ. Thus, 
it is possible to sin against this existential knowledge of the absolute good by 
suppressing it, or failing to acknowledge that one is not the ‘whole’. The third 
reference, then, to the ‘withdrawal’ of the light is extremely difficult to interpret. It 
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suggests that God/the good may adopt a more distant posture from human beings in 
response to their actions. It is difficult to reconcile this with the theological 
affirmation that God is love and desires the salvation and blessing of all. Indeed, we 
noted in chapter one that this is a major theme of the council.
53
 We are unable, 
however, to identify an interpretation of this claim that is more consistent with the 
council.  
It would be interesting in the future to interpret the three different relationships to the 
light in terms of Balthasar’s doctrine of evil and sin. In this context, however, 
Balthasar’s primary point is that none of them is sufficient to break the natural 
orientation of the human individual to the good. This is a product of his interpretation 
of Rom 2:14-16 which is aimed at the prior interpretations of the ITC in 1972 and the 
council in GS 16. The latter text makes reference to Rom 2:14-16 after observing that 
the dignity of man ‘lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged.’
54
 
Balthasar, appears to interpret this ‘law’ as a reference to Jesus Christ known, to non-
biblical man, as the good. This has the great advantage that the ‘law’ by which 
Christians and non-Christians will be judged, according to GS 16 is the same Jesus 
Christ through which God ‘will judge the secret thoughts of all’ (Rom 2:16; NRSV). 
Balthasar’s point, here, is that the common natural existential knowledge of 
reality/God means that all human beings are responsible before God for their lives. 
This is a good interpretation of Paul’s argument and further strengthens Balthasar’s 
already impressive interpretation of GS 16. It also challenges the ITC’s 1972 reading 
of GS 16. The latter interpret the council text as teaching a common series of natural 
laws which Christians and non-Christians share. It is these standards against which 
God will judge humanity. This, however, retains objective law in moral theology and 
continues to perpetuate the subordination of the individual subject to the objective 
‘should’. 
[7.3] The third section of the proposition makes the only explicit reference to 
philosophy in the entire text of the nine propositions (i.e. Kant’s ‘categorical 
imperative’). Balthasar’s argument flows from his claim that humanity is united in its 
existential knowledge of the goodness of reality and not in a set of ‘objective norms 
of morality’ (GS 16) or ‘fundamental demands’ (ITC, 1972). The reason that Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative’ is an ‘abstract formulation’ of the radiance of reality is that it 
does not include inclination/synderesis. The categorical imperative is only a 
candidate for the “factor” that is said, by GS 16, to be located within consciousness. 
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Without an account of the unity of human inclination, Kant’s categorical imperative 
is inadequate to the task of reconciling the world. Balthasar describes it as having 
“reference-character” because it identifies that the disharmony of the world is a 
problem that needs to be repaired. However, it is only a reconciliation of persons 
which does not depend merely on duty or merely on inclination (either of which 
presuppose that the person is not reconciled in themselves) that can solve this 
problem. 
Balthasar’s reference to “natural law” provides a second angle on his intervention in 
the postconciliar debate regarding the future of moral theology. It is not simply 
claims to have a good conscience which Balthasar judges to be inadequate, but 
accounts which put the burden onto natural law. Kant is a good representative of 
natural law because he is not satisfied with a list of natural laws but tries to unify it in 
a single natural criterion. Thus, by showing how even the best representative of 
natural law thinking fails (because they cannot account for inclination), Balthasar 
argues that natural law thinking cannot take a load-bearing position in perfected 
(non-objective) postconciliar moral theology. 
Having concluded our interpretation of proposition seven, we note in passing that 
Balthasar’s account of natural law is equivalent to ‘right reason’. Balthasar does not 
share a typical preconciliar account in which natural law is ambiguously internal and 
external to consciousness. In common with Fuchs and other postconciliar 
theologians, Balthasar assumes that natural law is restricted to thought and he goes 
on in proposition eight to discuss ‘natural order’ ethics which attempts to discern a 
pattern in reality. Whilst this makes Balthasar typical of the moral theologians of this 
period, it is worth noting that it is also consistent with our interpretation of Hegel’s 
SCF in which thought and reality is the most basic distinction. 
Aside from his contribution to the interpretation of the council, our interpretation of 
proposition seven has identified two well-known moral concepts which Balthasar 
claims are inadequate in themselves to the task of perfecting moral theology: 
conscience and natural law. We have already explained, in the case of the latter, that 
it is inadequate as a basis for the reconciliation of the world because it only unites 
people in terms of the “factor” in consciousness and not also in terms of their 
inclination. In an attempt to cast further light on Balthasar’s treatment of conscience, 
we now rehearse Hegel’s application of this argument to the morality of conscience 
in SCF.    
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In SCF Hegel criticises Kantian heteronomy and autonomy in the same way. Both 
involve a ‘duty’ which is purely ‘objective’ and thus enslaves inclination, which is 
the manifestation of subjectivity: ‘between the Shaman of the Tungus, the European 
prelate who rules church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans, on the one hand, and 
the man who listens to his own command of duty, on the other, the difference is not 
that the former make themselves slaves, whilst the latter is free, but that the former 
have their lord outside themselves, whilst the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at 
the same time is his own slave.’
55
 Thus, according to Hegel’s critique of law, the 
only difference between heteronomy and autonomy is the location of the voice of the 
master, both are equally effective in enslaving the subjective inclination. Later in the 
text, Hegel uses this same argument to interpret Jesus’ critique of the Pharisees: 
The consciousness of the Pharisee (a consciousness of duty done), like the 
consciousness of the young man (the consciousness of having truly observed 
all the laws – Matthew xix.20), this good conscience, is a hypocrisy because 
even if it be bound up with the intention of the action, it is a reflection on 
itself and on the action, is something impure not belonging to the action; and 
if it is an idea of the agent’s self as a moral man, as in the case of the Pharisee 
and the young man, it is an idea whose content is made up of the virtues, i.e., 
of restricted things whose sphere is given, whose matter is limited, and which 
therefore are one and all incomplete, while the good conscience, the 




Interestingly, Hegel claims that the argument which he is advancing against the 
‘good conscience’ also applies to claims on behalf of virtue. Thus, Hegel’s critique 
of the objectivity of law includes within itself a critique of both good conscience and 
moral virtue. As we have rehearsed repeatedly, the problem with all moral and civil 
laws for Hegel is that they are unifications in thought of particular finite content.
57
 
Moral laws are universally recognised by all people, whilst civil laws are enforced by 
political might. Thus, civil laws are heteronomous, after the manner of the Shaman 
of the Tungus, and moral laws are autonomous, after the manner of the (Kantian) 
Pharisee. In both cases, such laws open up the possibility of guilt because one can 
deny their content. Obeying them, however, does not bring life or love, it simply 
avoids possible guilt. Anyone who claims to be righteous on the basis that they have 
avoided incurring particular guilt by obeying particular moral or civil laws is 
confusing two distinct questions. Righteousness is a state of the person as a unity, 
whilst laws and duty only point to particular parts of human existence. Moreover, 
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this critique remains exactly the same if precise laws are replaced by virtues, and a 
discussion of right action is replaced by a discussion of one’s moral character. The 
‘matter’ (or content) of each virtue is still limited (e.g. patience) and thus it is 
impossible to claim righteousness on the basis of conformity to one or more 
virtues.
58
 All one can claim is that one has managed to avoid developing these 
particular vices. 
The scope of Hegel’s critique of law in SCF is quite impressive and bears 
comparison with the wide range of concepts which Balthasar criticises in Section III 
of the Nine Propositions. Summarising our interpretation of proposition seven, 
Balthasar appears to argue that claims to have a good conscience, or to have been 
obedient to a list of natural laws, are inadequate because they require that the 
claimant is internally divided between duty and inclination. Because the goal of God 
is to reconcile the world in Christ, a morality of conscience, or of specific natural 
laws, has not yet grasped the full consequences of the Mystery of Christ. On this 
account, the main difference between postconciliar moralities of conscience or virtue 
and preconciliar neo-Scholastic manualism is that the former insist that Christians 
allow for greater variation in the conscientious application of natural moral laws or 
virtues. Crucially, however, this still leaves the Christian under an obligation in 
thought to a moral law, or set of virtues, and, whilst this is the case, the individual 
(and therefore the world) cannot be reconciled.  
Balthasar does not include any reference to virtue ethics in the text of proposition 
seven, although we have seen that Hegel includes a critique of virtue within his 
critique of law in SCF. This shows that Balthasar was in possession of a critique of 
virtue ethics seven years before MacIntyre transforms English language moral 
theology in After Virtue (1981).
59
 Balthasar does, however, make a single reference 
to virtue in an explanatory paragraph of proposition seven. The later influence of 
MacIntyre on twentieth century moral theology probably explains why this reference 
is the only section of the Nine Propositions to be quoted in all three full length 
English language studies of Balthasar’s moral theology (although Nathe only cites it 
in his discussion of Barrett): 
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The distinctive ethical [sittliches] task laid upon man is that of ethicizing 
(ethizesthai) [Durchsittlichung] his whole spiritual-bodily essence; the result 
is called virtue (7.e2).
60
 
It is easy to see the attraction of this passage which provides a pithy summary of an 
‘ethical task’ and is thus an obviously ethical claim. Indeed, it leads Barrett to 
suggest that Balthasar’s Christian ethics can be best ‘accounted for within a 
framework of virtue ethics.’
61
 As we have just seen, this is an incorrect 
representation of Balthasar’s faith-ethic as it would negate his claim, similar to 
Hegel, that righteousness is a total state (“virtue”) or it is nothing.
62
 The suggestion 
that one can become more righteous by developing particular virtues, and losing 
particular vices, is exactly the account of moral theology against which Balthasar is 
arguing. We thus agree with Nathe’s critique of Barrett’s proposal, and with his 
summary of the Nine Propositions as ‘…a work principally and directly about ethics 




Steck offers a more cautious interpretation of this passage, which he describes 
inaccurately as ‘a trace of a virtue ethics’.
64
 Steck also gets the priority wrong when 
he claims that ‘[t]o see God’s call, we must first become the type of person able to 
see that call.’
65
 Balthasar’s presentation of the call of God to Abraham in proposition 
five takes up the Barthian perspective: God calls, man responds. Neither can it be the 
case that everything is ‘telescoped into the one “moment” of faith’ because ‘faith’, 
whilst being the sole requirement for participation in Christian ethical life and the 
total requirement for righteousness, is only made known in a real historical 
participation in the church. 
We propose that the best way to interpret Balthasar’s comment in 7.e2 is as a rule for 
the correct use of the term virtue. On the one hand, virtue cannot be divided into 
separate components and then used as a test to determine whether or not a person is 
virtuous. On the other hand, human beings are created with a religious problem 
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which requires resolution. The only real resolution to this problem, Balthasar 
maintains, is faith in Jesus Christ and obedience to one’s personal mission. This can 
be interpreted as virtue or as righteousness. The life of faith draws on the entire 
person without dividing the spirit and body, which we take here as synonyms for 
duty and inclination. 
8: The pre-biblical natural order 
Where self-revelation by the free, personal God is missing, man tries 
to find his life’s ethical order in the cosmos which enfolds him. Since 
he owes [verdankt] his existence to a cosmic lawfulness 
[Gesetzlichkeiten], it is natural for thought about origins (i.e., the 
divine) to be conflated in his mind with thought about the natural 
realm. Such a theo-cosmological ethic collapses when the biblical fact 
attains resonance in world history. 
Much of the interpretative work regarding this proposition has already been carried 
out in the discussion of the title of Section III and in the analysis of proposition 
seven. Unlike propositions seven and nine, Balthasar explains that there have been 
serious attempts in human history to reconcile the world by attention to ‘cosmic 
lawfulness’. However, these ‘ways’ have now ceased under the influence of the 
biblical revelation. They remain of interest, however, because some contemporary 
moral theologians are taking comfort from the idea of a ‘cosmic lawfulness’ instead 
of attending to the fullness of Christian ethical life. 
Before discussing the significance of this proposition for postconciliar moral 
theology we first interpret its literal meaning on the basis of a passage from Theo-
Drama I: 
We could imagine a static model of the world with an ordered nature as its 
umbrella, allotting each part its function in such a way that this part, freely 
and responsibly exercising its function, would embrace and fulfil the situation 
that nature gave it, even in the human and political arena. This is the 
grandiose panorama of the Republic of Plato …and there are signs of it in 
Paul (1 Cor 7:17, 20, 24), though here the function allotted by nature is 
replaced by “the call of God”. Initially the latter is a call to an earthly state of 
life (whether “circumcision” or “uncircumcision”, “freeborn” or “slave”), but 
it can be extended to entirely personal vocations such as Paul (and, by 
analogy, every person possessing a charisma) has. Even for the Greeks, 
however, the all-embracing natural order could be broken through by 
personal missions [Sendungen], for example, the daimōnion of Socrates, 
which had an analogy in the destinies of the great tragic heroes. Oedipus, 
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Heracles and even Prometheus explode the whole Platonic convergence of 
nature and function, of physis and polis. A light shines into the world from a 
higher region and anchors itself deep in the heart of man who is called; as a 




This lengthy quotation confirms a number of the interpretative claims that have 
already been made with regard to the Nine Propositions. It provides a discussion of 
what Balthasar takes to be a high point of extrabiblical ethics – the ‘static model of 
the world’ of Plato – and contrasts it with the emergence of the (dramatic) model of 
the New Testament, in this case represented by Paul. When in proposition eight 
Balthasar claims that the ‘theo-cosmological ethic collapses when the biblical fact 
attains resonance in world history’ he is referring to the fact that the Christian 
account of a dramatic ethical life, dependent upon the Old Testament definition of 
personhood, develops the inadequacies of Plato’s static scheme which had been 
identified in antique Athenian drama. 
The account of Plato’s natural order ethic in the Theo-Drama passage anticipates 
Christian ethical life to the extent that nature is said to allot roles (‘function’) to 
human beings. This is, presumably, a feature of Plato’s sophistication, as his account 
anticipates the invention of personhood by God in the biblical revelation. To this 
picture, the ‘theo-cosmological ethic’ of proposition eight adds that the account of 
the divine at this point in history is found in the laws of the natural order which the 
individual/community has to navigate in order to survive. The biblical revelation 
clarifies the situation by challenging Plato’s claim that nature allots the roles and 
changing the way in which the divine is conceived. In the Old Testament, God 
reveals himself to be personal at the same time that he defines the personhood of 
Abraham and his descendants. Thus, the close study of nature (being/reality) will no 
longer reveal the source of existence which is now understood to be a God who is 
ungraspably beyond the distinction between thinking and being. Similarly, it is this 
new ungraspable God who allots the roles given to persons as identified by Paul in 
1 Corinthians. 
The Theo-Drama passage provides a more detailed account of the individual 
Christian mission than has been provided in the Nine Propositions. It also makes the 
story a little more complicated. Specifically, Balthasar suggests that there are already 
intimations of the Christian understanding of mission in the fact that ‘the all-
embracing natural order could be broken through by personal missions’. However, 
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these anticipations are not meant to challenge the transformation wrought by the 
emergence of a distinction between the personal God and the natural real. Through 
Christ, God opens up missions to ‘every person possessing a charisma’. However, an 
additional stage, which does not feature in the Nine Propositions, is the claim that 
Christians are initially called by God ‘to an earthly state of life’ before going on to 
identify their own unique personal mission (‘should’). This has unnerving echoes of 
the preconciliar distinction between the two stages of the Christian call (moral 
theology and ascetical theology) which may well be why Balthasar leaves it out of 
the Nine Propositions. An interesting project for future research would be to 
establish the importance of the role played by an intermediate ‘state of life’ in 
Balthasar’s wider theological project. 
The conclusion of the passage from Theo-Drama provides the basis for our claim 
above that proposition seven does not have a specific historical location. Specifically, 
the existential knowledge of the call disrupts Plato’s static model of the universe and 
prevents it from maintaining a hold on the imagination of human beings during the 
antique Greek period. This is part of Balthasar’s wider argument that this light is 
given with human existence and can never be entirely eliminated or suppressed. 
Moreover, as the Theo-Drama passage confirms, this light forms the basis of the 
natural human religious problem because it prevents individuals from being 
‘integrated seamlessly into the social edifice’. In proposition seven this was 
rehearsed with the claim that the freedom of the individual is dependent upon their 
social participation. 
At this point we return to the question of the significance of proposition eight for 
postconciliar moral theology. As indicated in the interpretation of proposition seven, 
Balthasar recognises that moral theologians are locating natural law within human 
consciousness and not out in the world. Mark Graham argues that Fuchs changed his 
approach to natural law in the 1960s when he learned to distinguish a natural law 
grounded in the being of the world from a natural law grounded in right reason.
67
 
Thus, Balthasar’s claim that natural order ethics has been superseded by the biblical 
revelation does not apply to Fuchs’ proposal. Instead, Balthasar may be offering a 
critique of a moral statement by John XXIII. The most high profile statement of 
natural order morality that we can find during this period is the teaching of 
John XXIII in his 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris. This includes the opening claim 
‘[t]hat a marvellous order predominates in the world of living beings and in the 
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 As Balthasar has just been seen to argue, this teaching overlooks 
the important qualification that any order in the world is actually attributable to the 
one work, or gift, of God. 
9: Post-Christian anthropological ethics 
The attempt to find a ground for a post-Christian but non-Christian 
ethics can only be pursued in the dialogical relationship of human 
freedoms (“I-Thou”, “I-We”). But since in this case cultic gratitude 
[Sich-Verdanken] (to God) no longer forms part of the free person’s 
primal act, the reciprocal gratitude [Sich-Verdanken] between the 
subjects becomes a secondary and only relatively valid act; the 
reciprocal limitation of unbounded free subjects appears extrinsic and 
imposed. It is impossible to achieve a synthesis between the fulfilment 
of the individual and that of the community. 
In many ways the final proposition simply sums up the points which Balthasar has 
already made in the previous propositions. As with propositions seven and eight it 
presupposes that the ‘religious problem’ in EGB is impossible to resolve apart from 
the real reconciliation of the world that is taking place in Christian ethical life.
69
 The 
significance of the reference to ‘post-Christian’ in the title and, in the first sentence, 
is to locate the proposition in the period after the definition of the individual person. 
This is the fruit of God’s self-revelation, introduced in the call to Abraham (prop 5) 
and discussed above. The rhetorical approach that Balthasar takes in the proposition 
is to ask what would be needed for an extrabiblical ethics to avoid the problem of 
fragmentation. His initial response, then, is that it would have to have a firm grasp on 
the ‘religious problem’ that is given to human kind with their existence.
70
 However, 
Balthasar goes on to explain why this problem is intractable using the concept of 
Sich-Verdanken. This is a very difficult term to translate. However, it is not too 
difficult to interpret. Balthasar is basically arguing that it is only on the basis of faith 
in the God who is beyond the community that it is possible for the individual to 
dispossess themselves (lovingly) in favour of the community. In the absence of faith 
in this greater divine context, the person must experience the claim of the community 
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as an alienating loss which will never be recovered. Thus, they are engaged in the 
perpetual activity of measuring whether what they are receiving from the community 
is sufficient for the investment that they are making. In other words, Christians 
practice a living dispossession which is an action of the whole person in pursuit of 
the reconciliation of the world in love. However, without the work of God which 
forms the community of real reconciliation, and sustains it by the gift of the Spirit 




Conclusion: Balthasar’s proposal for postconciliar moral theology 
Balthasar’s Nine Propositions did not achieve the outcome that he had hoped for 
because the International Theological Commission (ITC) did not adopt it as a 
definition for postconciliar moral theology. As far as we can tell, Balthasar never 
again tabled his own text for discussion by the commission, although he remained an 
active member until his death in 1988. We express some puzzlement in chapter three 
regarding the thinking of the commission in 1974 when they declined to adjudicate 
between the texts by Balthasar and Schürmann. Did they have specific objections to 
Balthasar’s argument in the Nine Propositions? Did they wish to study the proposal 
further? Did they intend, at that stage, to revisit the teaching of the council on moral 
theology at a later assembly? 
Whatever the commission intended to do they have never, in fact, returned to the 
proposals of Balthasar and Schürmann. More importantly, they have also never 
returned to the task of interpreting teaching of the council regarding moral theology. 
This includes even the recent text, unanimously agreed by the ITC, titled In Search 
of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law (2009).
1
 This report, which we 
do not interpret in this thesis, is the product of three successive ITC plenary 
assemblies in the years 2006-2008. The report would seem to have been an excellent 
opportunity to evaluate Fuchs’ and Balthasar’s proposals for moral theology in the 
context of the texts of the council. Unfortunately, the report does not attempt either 
of these tasks. In the first place, it makes no reference to the 1974 papers by 
Balthasar or Schürmann, despite the fact that Balthasar’s Nine Propositions give a 
very clear account of a universal Christian ethic and relativises the use of objective 
law in moral theology. 
In the second place, the 2009 report also makes no attempt to improve upon Fuchs’ 
or Balthasar’s 1974 interpretation of the council. The report restricts itself to a small 
number of references to GS and a single reference to Dignitatis humanae. Even 
OT 16, the text which we have identified as central to the interpretations of the 
council offered by Fuchs and Balthasar, and which was a topic of discussion at the 
1974 assembly, is left out from consideration. In what forum, if not the ITC, has the 
definitive consensus on the teaching of the council on moral theology been worked 
out? And, returning to a theme touched on in the introduction to this thesis, how are 
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the Anglican participants of ARCIC III supposed to pursue their dialogue with the 
Catholic church regarding the discernment of ‘right ethical teaching’ if important 
texts – texts agreed by the whole church in council – are set to one side in major 
investigations of postconciliar moral theology?
2
 
We propose that Balthasar’s Nine Propositions remains one of finest interpretations 
of the council in postconciliar moral theology. In chapter one, we provide an 
interpretation of the teaching of the council on moral theology in discussion with a 
selection of key texts. The strength of this interpretation is that it identifies a line of 
argument in OT 16 and LG regarding the importance of the Mystery of Christ. This 
teaching, which is acknowledged on all sides after the council, endorses the incipient 
preconciliar Christological shift in moral theology. Balthasar’s Nine Propositions 
picks up on the council’s endorsement of this shift and places the Mystery of Christ 
at the centre of his account of Christian ethical life. He also provides an argument 
which explains how the popular repudiation of the neo-Scholastic moral manuals 
might be interpreted as a deeper appreciation for the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
Another strength of the Nine Propositions is the fact that it provides strong 
arguments, albeit heavily disguised, regarding the drawbacks of alternative proposals 
for postconciliar moral theology. Here it is important to reiterate that Balthasar’s 
approach is constructive and that he incorporates concerns from across the spectrum 
of moral theologians into his argument. He does not simply dismiss ethical proposals 
with which he disagrees but seeks to show how the problems that motivate them are 
resolved within his account of Christian ethical life. Even if it proves possible to 
identify shortcomings in Balthasar’s account of Christian ethical life, the Nine 
Propositions remains an impressive attempt to reconcile the concerns of a wide 
variety of moral theologians in a manner that is consistent with the teachings of the 
council. 
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Appendix: The textual history of the Nine Propositions 
It is well documented that the Nine Propositions was discussed at the fifth plenary 
assembly of the International Theological Commission on 15-21 December 1974.
1
 
There are, however, important questions regarding the origin of the text where we 
have had to make assumptions. This appendix discusses two such questions, namely, 
the date that Balthasar first drafted the Nine Propositions and the relationship of the 
various published versions to the text that was discussed by the ITC in 1974. 
On the question of date, we have assumed that Balthasar drafted the Nine 
Propositions at some point between October 1973 and December 1974. This is based 
on the following: first, Balthasar’s comments on Christian ethics in TS, published in 
1972, have a tentative feel. This suggests that Balthasar drafted them before the Nine 
Propositions. We also believe that Balthasar’s essay EGB, from 1973, is a prototype 
for the Nine Propositions.
2
 This essay is addressed to the question of the knowledge 
of God, which is closely related to the 1969 ITC research programme into ‘the 
criteria for Christian moral knowledge’. It is also divided into three sections in a 
similar way to the Nine Propositions (although the order of the sections is reversed). 
If, as we believe, this essay was drafted before the Nine Propositions then the latter 
was drafted sometime between October 1973 and December 1974. 
A final point which supports this conclusion is that the ITC appears to have only set 
the topic of its plenary assembly a maximum of one year in advance. This is based on 
the fact that the order of the work programme in the 1969 final communiqué does not 
reflect the order in which the topics were subsequently discussed. It appears that the 
ITC allowed themselves to be directed by external factors, such as the agenda of a 
Synod of Bishops or a request for advice from the Pope. On this basis, the ITC will 
not have determined to treat moral theology at their 1974 assembly earlier than the 
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 Confirmation that the Nine Propositions was discussed at this assembly can be found in the prefatory 
note by Delhaye published in Sharkey, Texts, 107, and the Preface to Ratzinger ed., Principles of 
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2
 The essay ‘Experience of God in the Bible’ (EGB) was submitted by Balthasar to the second Asian 
Monastic Congress in Bangalore in October 1973. (The language of the Congress, and therefore the 
essay, may have been French given that the subtitle of the Congress was Aide à l’Implantation 
monastique. See Explorations in Theology IV, p.469). The essay is available translation: ‘Experience 
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Christian in the experience of God?” in Explorations in Theology IV: Spirit and Institution Edward T. 




assembly of 1973, which was probably held in October 1973.
3
 For this reason, we 
have assumed that the Nine Propositions was drafted between October 1973 and 
December 1974. 
The second question, then, is the relationship of the various different versions of the 
text. We assume that the Latin version, which we have only been able to access on 
the website of the holy See, was tabled at the ITC assembly of 1974.
4
 This 
assumption has been made, first, because Latin will have been a convenient working 
language for an international commission and, second, because Vatican II did not 
change the convention that the Latin version of texts is the official version.
5
 We 
further assume that Balthasar will have first drafted the text in German, meaning that 
the German version was also available to members of the commission at the 1974 
assembly. Unlike Schürmann, Balthasar appears to have made very few alterations to 
his text before it was published in Ratzinger’s 1975 collection.
6
 This supports our 
practice in this thesis of discussing the 1975 German text as if it was available to the 
commission members in 1974. 
Both of the English translations, like the French translations, appear to have been 
produced after the ITC assembly of 1974. Harrison’s translation, which we use as the 
basis for our quotations in this thesis, is a direct translation from the German text 
published in Ratzinger (1975). However, Elders and Baker appear also to have 
referred to the Latin text in preparing their translation. They do not appear to have 
privileged either the German or the Latin text but judged the discrepancies on a case 
by case basis. For example, they follow the German text by excluding the reference 
to 2 Cor 15:28 from the final sentence of 9.e3 but they follow the Latin text when 
translating the final sentence of the preliminary note. 
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 We have not been able to ascertain the date of the 1973 assembly. However, the assemblies of 1969, 
1970 and 1972 were all held in October so it seems likely that this practice was followed in 1973. The 
assembly appears to have been delayed to December in 1974 due to the late appointment of new 
members to the ITC by Paul VI. 
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